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My research advances our sociological understanding of when and why Africans feel 
better or worse about their standard of living, what role peers play in decision-making, 
and challenges core assumptions about relative deprivation and subjective wellbeing. 
First, analyzing quasi-experimental data collected from northern Kenya, I demonstrate 
that peer monitoring by other respondents shapes respondents’ choices between cash 
and food transfers. I interpret the increased likelihood of treated respondents choosing 
food rather than cash to indicate that in this area, where food is shared but cash may 
not, being monitored acts as a framing effect that encourages compliance with sharing-
norms.  Second, examining subjective wellbeing for ten sub-Saharan countries, I find 
that institutional attributes not commonly considered, such as the level of crime, 
strongly affect the reported wellbeing of respondents. Relatedly, economic inequality 
within spatially-constructed reference groups matters. The positive impact of an 
increase in economic wellbeing on subjective wellbeing is larger in higher inequality 
areas relative to lower inequality areas. Third, the influence of reference groups’ 
economic status on subjective wellbeing is highly sensitive to reference group 
construction. Using micro-level data from rural Ghana, I find improvements to the 
economic status of spatially-constructed reference groups result in relative 
 deprivation. Yet, utilizing reference groups constructed from social network data on 
gift-receipt or trust yields more complex findings. Respondents’ subjective economic 
welfare improves when their social networks’ assets increase and expenditures 
decrease. That is, respondents feel better when their social networks are wealthy but 
thrifty, potentially indicating that respondents hope to draw on their social networks in 
time of need. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
In this dissertation, I address a key quandary in discussions of development 
and wellbeing. I examine how social environments influence individuals’ decisions 
and perceptions of their lives.  Substantial attention in social science research and 
policy debates has been paid to modeling decision-making in markets, communities, 
local and national politics, and development. Understanding the factors that influence 
such decisions is critical for mapping issues from sociopolitical stability to the success 
or failure of development interventions.  Many development projects, as well as much 
social science literature, are based on (often implicit) assumptions about the way 
material inequalities and community characteristics and norms shape decision-making.  
I argue that the influence of the social environment is often overlooked, 
particularly with respect to studies of subjective wellbeing. I take the social 
environment to include social norms, social networks, structures and institutions, both 
formal and informal. If we are to understand how people make decisions, we need a 
better understanding of what roles social environmental factors play in peoples’ lives 
and their perceptions of their lives, particularly in low-income countries. As a result of 
the tendency to treat the social environment as a series of “control” variables (if it is 
considered at all), we often do not articulate whether and how the social environment 
influences decisions. Further, little is known about how the social environment frames 
field experiments. In the following Chapters, I find that a variety of components of 
social environments, including reference groups, social networks, average health 
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status within a community, and crime rates, influence both individuals’ choices and 
how they perceive their lives. 
Nonetheless, my call for a focus on the influence of social environments is not 
new. Researchers on institutions, social networks and social norms readily 
acknowledge the influence of a social environment on individuals (e.g., Durkheim 
1951 (1897), Granovetter 1983, North 1981, Henrich et al. 2001, Horne 2001). Inkeles 
and Smith (1974), in their classic study of modernity, write, “If we are to understand 
the human meaning of the new types of social environment we build …, we must 
conduct more systematic studies of the ways in which the institutional and 
organizational milieus we create shape the responses of the people who work for 
them” (p. 11).   
More recently, Ferguson (2006) argues that social environments in sub-
Saharan Africa are fluid and hybridized. As a result of the unevenness of 
‘globalization’, some communities have become more entwined with international 
markets, culture, and information, others have been relatively isolated from change, 
and still others have are more hybridized. Communities in sub-Saharan African 
experience “highly selective and spatially encapsulated forms of global connection 
and exclusion” (Ferguson 2006, p. 14). The unevenness of change within low-income 
countries results in residents facing evolving and competing approaches to livelihoods 
while simultaneously gaining an understanding of what life is like beyond their own 
immediate experiences (Ferguson 2006). Even when it is readily acknowledged that 
norms, social networks, communities and institutional factors often shape individual’s 
decisions, we often do not know how strong the influence of any particular aspect of 
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the social environment is within low-income countries. I aim to partially address these 
gaps by unpacking which aspects of the social environment directly influence 
decisions and subjective wellbeing.  
Arguing that social norms in low-income countries are similarly fluid, 
Fafchamps (2011) writes, “multiple sets of partially conflicting norms [shared 
understandings about behavior and attitudes] are required for development” (p. 
21308). In other words, in a dynamic social environment, people may need to choose 
among several norms, for example norms emphasizing loyalty to family or respect of 
contractual obligations. Chapter 2 presents findings from a randomized experiment in 
northern Kenya. We isolate sharing norms within communities that influence the 
relative payoffs of different outcomes, which my co-authors and I describe as a 
“reputation effect.” We find that the social norm of sharing food increases the 
likelihood of respondents choosing food over cash when respondents are being 
monitored by peers, and we hypothesize that these decisions “build” their reputations 
as norm abiding.  
Just as there is limited understanding of how social norms influence decisions, 
there is also limited understanding of how institutional attributes influence subjective 
wellbeing, if at all. This is particularly true in developing countries, where the limited 
research has tended to focus on reference group attributes but have rarely incorporated 
other environment factors, such as access to public goods (Fafchamps and Shilpi 
2008). In Chapters 3 and 4, I present evidence that institutional attributes influence 
individuals’ lives and that the influence of reference groups’ economic status on 
subjective wellbeing is highly sensitive to reference group definition.   
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Psychologists Diener et al. (2002) define subjective wellbeing (SWB) as “ a 
person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her life” (p. 63). I argue that how 
a person feels about his or her life is almost certainly related to his or her community 
and the surrounding policy environment. As sociologists such as Merton and Kitt 
(1950), Runciman (1966), Andrews and Withey (1976), Campbell et al. (1976), and 
others have long argued, measures of income and wealth serve as incomplete 
predictors of peoples’ perceptions of their lives.1 Diener et al. (1999) confirm the 
finding that income and wealth have a limited effect on our happiness, arguing that 
“the data do not support a strong causal path from income to SWB” (p. 288).   
In Chapter 3, I examine the correlates of subjective wellbeing, including not 
only individual characteristics but also factors in the social environment, such as crime 
rates and reference group attributes. Relatively few researchers examine the roles of 
public goods provisions or access to services on subjective wellbeing in low-income 
countries.  One exception is Easterlin et al. (2011) who report that urban residents in 
low-income countries tend to be happier than rural residents. But they do not offer 
insight into what attributes of city-life contribute to the improved sense of wellbeing. 
In low-income countries, access to services, health care, and crime rates are highly 
variable, both between and within countries. In a study of ten countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, I also find that urban residents are more likely to report higher levels of 
subjective wellbeing than rural residents. However, I then incorporate characteristics 
of the social environment into my model, finding the difference between urban and 
rural residents is no longer substantial, while structural attributes, such as crime rates, 
                                                
1 Strang (2010) defines reference group as “social group or category to which the individual is oriented” 
(p. 109). 
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are.  
Second, a growing body of evidence from studies of subjective wellbeing 
confirm that wellbeing is shaped, at least partially, by reference group attributes. Frey 
and Stutzer (2001) write “there is little doubt that people compare themselves to others 
and do not use absolute judgments” (p. 412). Yet, the association between wellbeing 
and one’s relative economic position within a network or with respect to a reference 
group is mixed. In studies from high-income countries and at least one low-income 
country, comparing oneself to a relatively better-off reference group leads to feelings 
of lower wellbeing, which is generally termed “relative deprivation” (McBride 2001, 
Frey and Stutzer 2001, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Fafchamps and Shilpi 2008). In 
several low and middle-income countries, comparing oneself to relatively wealthier 
reference groups leads to increased feelings of wellbeing for at least some of the 
population, especially poorer individuals, often described as “positive externalities” 
(Senik 2004, Kingdon and Knight 2007, Ravallion and Lokshin 2010).  
Why relative deprivation is found in some instances but not in others, and 
whether the level of income within a country matters for the findings are both unclear. 
Unfortunately, the methodological approaches used to estimate reference group effects 
vary, making comparisons across findings difficult. Further, as Ravallion (2012) notes, 
both homophily-based and spatially-based reference groups are defined by the analyst, 
who may not observe what the respondent observes. In Chapter 4, I also examine how 
reference group construction influences the likelihood of finding evidence of relative 
deprivation. 
Few subjective wellbeing studies that focus on individuals from low- or 
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middle-income countries incorporate inequality-based measures as predictors of 
wellbeing (Senik 2004 is an exception). In most studies, an average measure of 
reference group income, assets, or consumption is included in the estimation of 
wellbeing, but measures of dispersion of income within the reference group are not. 
Yet, the dispersion within a reference group may matter. Having referents all slightly 
financially better off may impact one’s own wellbeing differently than having 
referents who are wildly better off or wildly worse off, but on average slightly better 
off. Not including dispersion measures, such as Gini coefficients, misses an 
opportunity to identify whether the underlying degree of inequality within the social 
environment is related to one’s own subjective wellbeing. Chapter examines what 
types of inequalities, if any, are valuable predictors of subjective wellbeing. 
Undertaking wellbeing assessments may provide a snapshot into the effects of 
policy changes on lives (Andrews and Withey 1976 and Campbell et al. 1976). 
Campbell et al. (1976) in a study of Americans’ satisfaction with life, find the 
relationship between objective conditions and psychological status to be weak. They 
write that increasing affluence “has not lifted American society to utopian levels of 
harmony and personal fulfillment but it has helped raise national aspirations to the 
attainment of those goals” (Campbell et al. 1976, p. 2). They argue that measures of 
wellbeing better capture the effects of social change on individuals’ assessments of 
their lives than other measures. In their words, “the relationship between objective 
conditions and psychological states is very imperfect” (Campbell et al. 1976, p. 4). 
Diener et al. (2002) points out that SWB gives voice to respondents, which is critical 
because respondents’ own perceptions may differ from external assessments. 
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Economic measures fail to fully capture perceptions of wellbeing. This finding 
indicates the need to better understand the influences played by non-economic aspects, 
such as the social environment, on a respondent’s choices and perceptions.  Below, I 
discuss each of the following three chapters before offering concluding remarks. 
 
Chapter 2: Reputation and sharing norms: How peer monitoring influences 
individual choice in northern Kenya 
Research on social norms indicates that the social environment, including the 
degree of a community’s engagement with markets, matters for how people engage 
with one another (Henrich et al. 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Fafchamps 2011). One 
the one hand, increasing familiarity with markets and cash-based economies tend to 
produce more “economically rational” behaviors (Henrich et al. 2001). But, on the 
other hand, when new norms about economic activities are emerging and old ones are 
still intact or evolving, people have to pick and choose among conflicting norms, 
which may result in choices more complex than what might be expected of purely 
economically rational individuals (Fafchamps 2011). As of yet, there is little 
information on the sensitivity of social norms to new market-based transfers in less 
developed countries (Fafchamps 2011). And there is little evidence from field 
experiments on how the framing of interventions can change the payoffs to abiding or 
deviating from social norms. In Chapter 2, we manipulate the elicitation strategy to 
examine how revealed preferences between cash and food are sensitive to differences 
in peer monitoring. Some social scientists argue that revealed preferences — asking 
people to make choices with actual payouts — are the most appropriate way to recover 
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consumers’ preferences and therefore utility (Samuelson 1938, Varian 1982). Eliciting 
revealed preference enables social scientists to observe what people choose when 
given a real (and not hypothetical) choice. As a result, researchers do not have to rely 
on  best-guesses about what they would choose in hypothetical situations.    
By assigning respondents to choose a transfer in front of peers or in private, we 
identify the degree to which framing changes the relative payoff of being norm-
abiding and of being more self-interested. While many respondents choose cash 
regardless of the elicitation strategy, we find evidence that some respondents’ 
decisions are influenced by the nature of the preference elicitation. 
We argue that choosing transfers in front of peers offers an opportunity to 
build a respondent’s reputation whereas choosing transfers in private does not. As a 
result, respondents making public choices will be more likely to choose food, a good 
shared within the community, compared to cash. This supports our hypothesis that 
peer monitoring affects respondents’ transfer choices. In other words, for some 
members of the group assigned to making public choices, being monitored by peers 
changes the payoffs between transfers. We argue that food becomes more appealing 
when being monitored because selecting food may garner the respondent some non-
monetary benefit, such as the benefit of demonstrating to the community a willingness 
to choose the more “public” (and more shareable) transfer.  
Perhaps surprisingly, neither female household heads nor other female 
respondents are more likely to either prefer food than male respondents, and as a result 
no more likely to be norm-abiding. Thus, hypotheses that women prefer one transfer 
while men prefer another may be over-stated, at least in the instance of northern 
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Kenyan communities we studied (e.g., Harvey 2007; Ahmed et al. 2009).  
Yet, revealed preference approaches are limited. They can only capture actual 
outcomes. There is no obvious way to apply a revealed preferences approach with 
subjective or perception-based data, which have no obvious payout.  As a result, some 
researchers avoid perception-based questions altogether, finding data on perceptions 
about lives or economic status to be nebulous and challenging to interpret (Frey and 
Stutzer 2002, Senik 2004, Ravallion 2012). Nonetheless, in recent years, there has 
been an explosion of research on subjective wellbeing—the study of how people feel 
about their lives (see Diener et al. 2002 for a review). Researchers have used 
subjective wellbeing to examine relationships between individuals and groups, social 
capital, and aspirations for success.  As Ravallion (2003) notes: “oddly, while 
[economists] generally think that people are the best judges of their own welfare, they 
resist asking people directly how they feel.”  In order to understand how the social 
environment is incorporated into individuals’ perceptions, in Chapters 3 and 4, I turn 
to measures of subjective wellbeing as well. 
 
Chapter 3: Community Characteristics, Reference Group Inequality and Subjective 
Wellbeing: Findings from sub-Saharan Africa 
In Chapter 3, I examine the influence of institutions and reference group 
attributes on subjective wellbeing. By so doing, I identify which social structures 
influence individuals’ perceptions about their lives. Much of the research on 
subjective wellbeing has focused on individual and reference group correlates (see 
Diener et al. 2002 for a review) or has identified country-specific of pan-regional 
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cultural differences in understanding what subjective wellbeing means (see Suh and 
Diener 2000, Uchida et al. 2004 for a review). Yet, the relationships (if any) of 
environmental attributes at the community level such as access to community services 
and crime rates have been largely overlooked. This may be because in developed 
countries, where the vast majority of these studies have occurred, service availability 
within country is not highly variable. This is not the case in developing countries. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, the availability of services varies widely, not only across 
countries but also within countries. 
Utilizing crossnational data generated by matching datasets for ten countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, I investigate whether, and if so, how structural factors and 
reference groups within countries shape subjective wellbeing. Specifically, I examine 
the relationships between wellbeing and structural factors such as crime rates, 
community health measures, access to services, reference group attributes, and 
reference group inequality. 
This chapter advances our understanding of when and why Africans feel better 
or worse about their standard of living in two primary ways. First, I find that an index 
of crime and fear of crime adversely impacts reported wellbeing. On the other hand, 
self-reported perceptions of government performance in addressing health, food 
security, poverty and other factors directly related to respondents’ lives is strongly 
associated with improvements in reported wellbeing.  
Second, in this study, relative deprivation is an inequality-based phenomenon. 
When including the more commonly used leave-out mean economic index for broad, 
spatially defined reference groups, I find no evidence of either relative-deprivation or 
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positive externalities. As discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, the lack of evidence 
regarding leave-out mean measures may indicate that spatially-defined reference 
groups are reference groups of analytical convenience rather than the actual reference 
groups perceived by respondents. Nonetheless, after substituting reference group 
dispersion measures and an interaction term for the leave-out mean measures, I find 
strong evidence of what I term “inequality-based relative deprivation.” At low values 
of the consumption-wealth score, an increase in inequality both decreases the 
likelihood of reporting higher levels of SWB, and increases the likelihood of reporting 
lower levels of SWB. In spatial reference groups with lower inequality, a marginal 
increase in the consumption-wealth index has a smaller (absolute) average effect on 
SWB than an increase in reference groups with higher inequality. In other words, for 
those residing in high-inequality areas, a small increase in consumption-wealth index 
means more to one’s wellbeing than for those who reside in areas with lower 
inequality levels. 
 
Chapter 4: Keeping up with the neighbors?: Revisiting reference groups and their 
implications for relative deprivation 
In Chapter 4, I rely on a slightly narrower definition of subjective wellbeing, 
focusing on subjective assessments of economic welfare, which are considered to be 
more stable than broader wellbeing questions (Ravallion 2012). The question I utilize 
asks individuals to rate their household’s economic status relative to other residents in 
their village. Subjective questions about economic welfare are valuable because they 
provide one way to ascertain who considers themselves poor, regardless of whether 
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respondents fall within or outside of standard definitions of absolute poverty (Merton 
and Kitt 1950, Ravallion and Lokshin 2010, Ravallion 2012).  Merton (1938), for 
example, argues that poverty may be experienced differently based on culture and 
institutional norms. He writes “poverty has varying social significance in different 
social structures” (p. 681). By comparing three possible constructions of reference 
groups, I can examine how, if at all, the relationship between subjective economic 
wellbeing and reference group changes by type of reference group. In other words, 
does the likelihood of people identifying themselves as better-off or poor depend on 
the composition of their reference group?   
Unique data from Ghana enable me to estimate a subjective measure of 
economic welfare as a function of three types of reference groups: spatial, spatial-
cohort, and several ego-centric network reference groups.  I find that respondents’ 
wellbeing is sensitive to reference group definitions. First, I find that people 
experience relative deprivation when comparing themselves again asset holdings and 
expenditures by others in their own village. Second, I find a similar, but weaker effect 
when respondents compare themselves to people of the same gender and from the 
same village. Third, and most intriguing, I find that respondents experience higher 
subjective wellbeing when some social network members spend less and accumulate 
assets. In particular, these findings hold for social network members the respondent 
has defined as trusted or the respondent has received a gift from.  
I hypothesize that respondents in this sample feel better when their social 
networks have assets that they can potentially draw on in times of distress – and that 
respondents don’t want their networks spending money that will no longer be 
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available for them. Thus, I find that individuals’ perceptions of their lives are shaped 
by against whom they are benchmarked. Studies of low-income countries relying on 
analyst-defined reference groups, such as spatial or spatial-gender groups, may not 
fully capture how people relate to those individuals more heavily involved in their 
lives.  
 
Summary 
In this dissertation, I foreground the influence of social environments on 
individuals’ decisions and perceptions of their lives. My research advances our 
sociological understanding of when and why Africans feel better or worse about their 
standard of living, what role peers play in decision-making, and challenges core 
assumptions about relative deprivation and subjective wellbeing.  
First, in a randomized block experiment, I find that manipulating the social 
environment by asking people to respond either in public or in private induces framing 
effects. When asked in public, individuals are more likely to choose a food transfer, 
but in private, they are more likely to choose an equivalently-valued cash transfer. In 
northern Kenya, food is more commonly shared among neighbors, kin, and clan than 
cash. I argue that an environment of peer-monitoring induces respondents to select the 
more socially optimal choice of food.  
Second, while many researchers study subjective wellbeing, to date much of 
these studies have focused on individual attributes or the economic characteristics of 
reference groups. In ten countries in sub-Saharan Africa, I find that environmental 
factors, such as crime and perception of governance, are associated with individuals’ 
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subjective wellbeing and should not be discounted as important factors in assessments 
of wellbeing. My findings on the importance of the social environment likely extend 
beyond sub-Saharan Africa to low-income countries more broadly, many of which 
face similarly variable institutional efficacies and environmental characteristics.  
Third, using data from Ghana, I unpack how different constructions of 
reference groups influence subjective wellbeing. Individuals tend to feel better about 
their own economic wellbeing when those they trust or those from whom they have 
received gifts become financially better-off. The same individuals feel worse about 
their economic wellbeing when other villages or villagers of the same gender become 
financially better off. In other words, I find that treating differently defined reference 
groups as equivalent to one another misrepresents the social environment in which 
people reside. This suggests that we can better understand how reciprocity, mutual 
insurance, and sharing of risk occurs within a community by understanding the depth 
of the relationships between individuals. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DOES PEER MONITORING INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL CHOICE?: FINDINGS 
FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN NORTHERN KENYA 
Abstract 
Does peer monitoring shape economic decisions? We employ a randomized 
block experiment to study how northern Kenyans’ choices of monetarily equivalent 
cash or food are influenced by asking respondents in front of peers or asking 
respondents privately. We find that peer monitoring decreases the likelihood of 
choosing a monetarily equivalent value of cash relative to at least some food. We 
consider several explanations as to what motivates this behavioral shift. Based on the 
local context of both chronic food insecurity and tight-knit communities where food 
transfers are commonly shared but cash transfers are relatively new, we argue that 
peer monitoring encourages adherence to social norms of sharing food.  That is, being 
monitored provides respondents an opportunity to demonstrate publicly a commitment 
to local norms or to recall their commitment. These findings point to the importance of 
framing effects in communities where sharing is a salient social norm and suggest 
directions for research on decision-making and group behavior. 
Introduction 
Social scientists have described the extensive role sharing livestock and goods 
plays within pastoral communities in arid and semi-arid Kenya (Ensminger 1992, 
Spencer 1997, McPeak 2004). Concerted community actions, such as reciprocal 
lending for restocking, sending children to live with relatives or friends, and giving 
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gifts, remain important forms of traditionally practiced mutual insurance, even as these 
co-insurance practices become less effective in the face of increased climate 
variability, enclosure of commons, environmental degradation, and other factors 
making pastoralism an increasingly high-risk livelihood (McPeak 2005, Little et al. 
2008, Mude et al. 2009, Chantarat et al. 2012). Whether a community member – and 
her family – overcomes a difficult shock or a time of might ultimately be based on the 
relations that she has built in the community and her ability to draw on resources of 
her social assets (Little et al. 2008). Thus, demonstrating a commitment to one’s own 
community through generalized reciprocity and following local sharing norms may be 
one component of a portfolio of survival strategies. 
One commonly shared good is food, and in particular, food aid, although 
precise sharing rules vary by tribe (Mude et al. 2012). Food aid merits specific 
attention because it has been widely distributed in a decade-long response to chronic 
food insecurity in the region. For at least 25 per cent of the sampled population in 
Marsabit district, in northern Kenya, food aid comprises a quarter of their total income 
(McPeak et al. 2009). As of June 2008, approximately 40 percent of the Marsabit 
population (63,720 individuals) received United Nations World Food Programme food 
aid, delivered by the Kenyan Red Cross (Mude et al. 2012).  
Among donor and recipient governments and aid agencies, there is an 
increased interest in alternatives to food aid, including delivering cash aid (Upton and 
Lentz 2011). Under which conditions households prefer different food security 
transfers, generally cash, food, or some combination, is an ongoing area of research 
(Harvey 2007, Barrett et al. 2009, Michelson et al. 2012). To examine the sensitivity 
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of responses to questions about food assistance preferences, we implemented a field 
experiment examining what type of transfer – cash or food – respondents preferred 
and whether preferences were shaped by being asked privately or in public.   
By asking a random subset of respondents to choose food or cash privately and 
asking a second subset to reveal their preferences in front of peers, we aim to 
understand whether peer monitoring changes the relative value of monetarily 
equivalent cash and food transfers. While many respondents choose cash regardless of 
the elicitation strategy, we find evidence that peer monitoring almost doubles the 
proportion of respondents choosing at least some food, from 20 percent to 38 percent.  
We consider several interpretations of our findings that in this new, 
experimental setting peer-monitoring conditions some individuals’ responses. Within 
northern Kenya, there are established sharing norms for food aid. Yet, no such sharing 
norms appear to be associated with cash transfers, which few respondents have had 
previous experience with. We argue that those respondents, who choose food in front 
of peers, may be demonstrating a willingness to follow social norms of food sharing. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. First, we briefly discuss the 
experimental literature and then describe the sampled northern Kenyan communities. 
We include discussions of the roles of food aid and sharing norms in these 
communities and the relatively little experience respondents have had with cash 
transfers. We examine research about sharing norms, reputation, and the role of 
monitoring in decision-making. We then develop a model wherein respondents’ 
perceptions about payouts vary by elicitation strategy. We present our data and our 
experimental method. We then present findings using logit models and discuss results. 
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We conclude with suggestions for future research. 
Literature Review 
Experimental approaches 
Laboratory experiments have found that respondents are susceptible to social 
framing effects (see Ellingsen et al. (2012) for a review). Framing effects, which 
present logically equivalent alternatives but either highlight different subsets of 
information (e.g., the number of lives saved versus the number of lives lost for the 
same population (Tversky and Kahneman 1981)) or present identical games in 
different ways (Liberman et al. 2004). For example, renaming the prisoner’s dilemma 
as the “Community Game” or the “Wall Street Game” can induce cooperation or more 
self-interested behavior (Liberman et al. 2004).  
Framing effect studies tend to be laboratory-based, focusing on how sensitive 
respondents are to changes of wording in the game or the choice. Within field 
experiment settings, the extent to which choices for actual, and not hypothetical, 
payouts (i.e., “revealed preferences”) are susceptible to framing has not yet received 
the same scrutiny (Hossain and List (2012) is an exception). Outside of experimental 
settings, many have argued that social forces, such as sharing norms, shape decisions 
and regulate behavior (Hechter 1988, Ostrom 1990, Hechter and Dieter-Opp 2001, 
Heckathorn 2002, Anthony 2005, Fafchamps 2011).  Yet, the degree of influence of 
social norms on choices is difficult to identify. Indeed, it is an open question as to 
whether such social forces matter in one-off experimental settings that fall outside of 
normal, day-to-day interactions. 
Our field setting enables us to how the surrounding environs influence choices.  
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Rather than examine the influence of word choices affects decisions, we use a block-
randomized experimental design to empirically test whether, and the degree to which, 
peer monitoring will affect decision making.  
Context: Pastoralism, food aid, and food aid sharing in northern Kenya 
Marsabit district2, an arid and semi-arid region of Northern Kenyan, with an 
estimated population of 160,000, is the second poorest district in the nation (KNBS 
2007).3 In 2007, 82 percent of its population was estimated to be below the $1.25 per 
day poverty line (Kenya Arid Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) II 
2008). Throughout the past decade, the district’s level of global acute malnutrition has 
been above the World Health Organization’s “critical” threshold (15 percent), 
indicating emergency levels of food insecurity in Marsabit (Kenya ALRMP II, 2008). 
Given the duration of high malnutrition rates, food insecurity is also chronic.   
Livelihoods in Marsabit have been traditionally livestock based. 75 percent of 
Marsabit district’s residents obtained more than half of their income through pastoral 
activities (McPeak 2009). While the majority of households continue to engage in 
some form of pastoralism, pastoralists find it increasingly difficult to maintain their 
production system.  Shocks from multiple sources (e.g., drought, conflict, lack of 
grazing rights or access to water, human and animal diseases) make pastoralism an 
increasingly risky livelihood strategy (Mude et al. 2007, Little et al. 2008).  
Like most of northern Kenya, Marsabit’s food relief operations operate mainly 
                                                
2 Marsabit has now been split into three smaller districts, but we refer to the pre-2007 split of Marasbit 
district because food aid programs continue to be administered based on this larger district and the most 
recent census was at this larger district level. 
3 The most recent census in Marsabit was 1999. This figure has been adjusted by 32 percent to reflect 
population increases during the past ten years (Kenya Department of Development Coordination – 
Office of the President 1999; Ouma et al. 2010). 
  23 
through continuous General Food Distribution under the United Nations World Food 
Programme Emergency Operations program. The number of food aid recipients 
fluctuates depending on food security assessments, although aid deliveries reach most 
communities for at least part of each year. In June 2008, the most recent data available 
prior to our April 2009 survey, 40 percent of Marsabit district residents received food 
aid. 
Food aid recipients are identified through a community based targeting 
approach (Kenyan Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) 2008a, and KFSSG 
2008b). Food aid deliveries occur monthly. Targeted households included on a roster 
are eligible to receive a food basket comprised of maize, beans, and fortified vegetable 
oil. A representative of the eligible household waits outdoors, in line to collect the 
household rations.  Distributions are made in public. Generally, rations are offloaded 
the delivery truck and directly transferred to eligible households. Given the large 
proportion of the population who regularly receives food aid, there does not appear to 
be any stigma associated with receipt.  
As part of a survey assessing markets and food insecurity undertaken in April 
2009 (see Mude et al. (2012)), we purposively selected five communities across 
Marsabit District by market access, production system and ethnicity: Dirib Gombo, 
Kargi, Logologo, Loiyangalani and North Horr. A map of Marsabit is presented in 
Figure 2.1. A brief overview of the community attributes is available in Table 2.1.  
Researchers in other contexts have argued that group attributes, such as strong group 
identity, high levels of reciprocity, and the threat of sanctioning, are linked to 
cooperative outcomes (Ostrom 1990, Heckathorn 2002, Anthony 2005). Marsabit 
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communities tend to be tight-knit and composed of individuals from the same tribe or 
allied tribes, who share the same ancestral tribal identity (Schlee 1989, Little et al. 
2008).4   
Little et al. (2008) write that for pastoralists in arid and semi-arid northern 
Kenya “people (social assets) and animals (material assets) … are inherently 
complementary resources and both need to be managed effectively to avoid being 
poor” (p. 598). Ensminger (2004) argues that the high degree of sharing observed in 
many comparatively less market-oriented societies in East Africa is attributable to 
precise sharing rules and is sustained by considerable monitoring within the 
community.  
Indeed, the tight-knit aspect of Marsabit communities may encourage (or 
induce) food aid sharing, although different communities share or redistribute 
differently. Common experience with food aid and with the sharing of food aid is born 
out in our survey of poor and near-poor households (determined by rankings of 
animal-asset holdings). Only three of 120 respondents had not received food aid. 64 
percent of households receiving food aid admitted to having shared their aid with 
relatives and neighbors during our survey.  
During in-depth focus group discussions (FGD) in Marsabit district, 
respondents readily acknowledged that their communities considered food - and food 
aid especially - is a resource to be shared within these pastoralist communities. 
However, the precise nature of food aid sharing differs across communities. 
                                                
4 An exception is the more diverse Marsabit Town, the district capital and major hub of market activity 
in the district. 
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Respondents often perceive re-targeting to be discouraged by aid organizations and, in 
part for this reason, many were reluctant to discuss precise intra-community 
redistribution practices with aid agencies. As a result, this practice often goes 
undocumented or under-reported by aid agencies. Similarly, for this reason, it is likely 
that 64 percent of surveyed people reporting having shared food aid is likely lower 
than the true figure. 
Figure 2.1 here 
In Kargi, Rendille informants explained that in their communities food aid 
must be shared with any neighbor or kin who asks for some. For Rendilles, while 
sharing is informal, it is expected.  Key informants from North Horr, a predominantly 
Gabra community, explained that following a food aid distribution, recipients are 
strongly encouraged by community leaders to return a portion of their food aid into a 
communal pile. Designated community members, usually elders, then re-allocate this 
food aid to certain households. Members of Dirib Gumbo and Logologo communities, 
both of which are located near Marsabit town, the base for local aid agencies, 
acknowledged that food aid was redistributed but were more circumspect about 
indicating exactly how food aid redistribution occurred. Through more frequent 
interactions with aid agencies relative to members of other communities, they may be 
more aware that some agencies frown upon sharing food, and thus could be more 
reluctant to divulge information that may displease agencies. In Loiyangalani, which is 
the most ethnically diverse of our sites, with small ethnically similar hamlets, people 
were similarly reluctant to divulge how food aid was shared.   
Table 2.1 here 
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These northern Kenya cases of sharing food aid within a community are 
consistent with broader research on social norms. Bowles (2009) argues that “moral 
sentiments” combined with incentives can induce behaviors beneficial to others and 
that an individual’s long-standing social reputation is not separable from economic 
incentives. Ostrom (1990) and others have argued that group membership influences 
individuals’ within-group behaviors (see also Heckathorn (2002), and Anthony 
(2005)). Members of cohesive communities are more likely to follow norms, 
possibility due to sanctioning of non-norm abiding behavior (Coleman 1990, Horne 
2001). 
Within most northern Kenyan communities members can lay some claim to 
food aid transfers and pastoral products. However, cash transfers may not be subject to 
the same degree or type of sharing norms, even if cash transfers and food transfers 
have equivalent food security objectives. We do not well understand northern 
Kenyans’ treatment of cash transfers in part because there had been no cash-based 
programs in operation in our sampled communities, and only one respondent in our 
experiment had any previous experience with cash transfers.  
In FGDs, respondents argued that in their communities, cash received would 
not need to be shared with others (Ouma et al. 2010). That FGD participants consider 
cash, regardless of whether a respondent earned it or was provided it as a transfer, to 
have a different value to the community than food aid is consistent with findings from 
other Kenyan pastoral communities, within which cash is perceived as a private good 
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and food aid as a semi-public or public good (Ensminger 2004).5   
Outside of northern Kenya, Margolies and Hoddinott (2012) and Ahmed et al. 
(2009)) note that different transfers may be associated with particular obligations, for 
example, the belief that food transfers “should” be shared with extended family. 
MacAuslan and Riemenschneider (2011) report that in Zimbabwe, relative to food 
transfers, cash transfers were associated with a negative impact on intra-community 
relations; recipient households shared food with non-recipient households but did not 
share cash. Goldberg (2010), in a randomized field experiment, finds that in Malawi 
winners of windfall lotteries whose winnings are made public spend their winnings 
faster than those whose winnings are kept private. The author argues that the rapid 
spending by publicly announced winners is a means of decreasing the fraction of 
winnings that must be shared within the winner’s social network. Thus, money won in 
public comes with a public expectation of abidance of sharing norms while privately 
won money does not (Goldberg 2010). 
Beyond any influence of sharing norms on choices, there are several reasons 
why monetarily-equivalent transfers might be valued differently. Respondents may 
strongly prefer cash or food due to some other attributes, such as previous experience, 
or ability to hide it. Research in Malawi found that experience with certain transfers 
may predispose individuals to prefer those transfers relative to new or different 
transfers (Devereux et al. 2007).  Thus, respondents may be more likely to select food 
rather than cash, regardless of the framing.  In contrast, cash offers greater flexibility 
                                                
5 Luke and Munshi (2006) find that many Kenyan urban migrants remit cash to rural kin or rural kin of 
their spouses. Informal discussions on remittances reveal that pastoralists do not believe that the 
community has a claim over (the relatively few) remittances received by community members.   
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and fungibility than food (Harvey 2007, Villa et al. 2011). The greater fungibility of 
cash could mean that cash is selected, regardless of whether monitoring occurs. Earlier 
research in and around Marsabit district indicates that despite frequent receipt of food 
aid, households rank food aid as a low-priority welfare-improvement intervention 
(McPeak et al. 2009, Mude et al. 2007). Thus, respondents may be willing to try a new 
form of transfer. Further, food, carried in sacks or bags, is also highly visible to 
neighbors and kin. Cash, which can be easily hidden, does not automatically signal 
neighbors, kin, and other community members to the availability of a transfer to be 
shared.   
Thus, it seems likely that community members would not subject cash to the 
same norms as food. As of yet, there is relatively little information on the sensitivity 
of social norms to new market-based transfers, such as cash-based transfers, in less 
developed countries (Fafchamps 2011). When new norms about economic activities 
are emerging and old ones are still intact or evolving, people have to pick and choose 
among conflicting norms, which may result in choices more complex than what might 
be perceived through a lens of pure economically rational individual behavior (Horne 
2001, Fafchamps 2011). Understanding the roles of peer monitoring in tight-knit 
communities in influencing northern Kenyans’ transfer choices can offer insight into 
social framing effects and into the role of reputation in tight-knit communities. 
Hypothesis  
We are interested in isolating the role of monitoring in choice decisions, 
hypothesizing that the total value of each transfer differs by a non-monetary factor, 
reputation.  To do so, we ask one group of individuals to choose between equivalent 
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values of cash and food in front of a peer group and another group to choose in 
private. We test whether monitoring induces a change in choice from at least some 
food toward cash. We hypothesize that an individual may prefer one outcome (cash) in 
private but choose another (food) in public. We develop a model that incorporates a 
reputation-effect, which changes the relative value of different forms of monetarily-
equivalent transfers depending on whether an individual is monitored or not. 
Several mechanisms that explain such a shift are consistent with our hypothesis 
that monitoring changes the relative values of cash and food aid. Choosing in public a 
transfer that can be shared signals a willingness to abide by sharing norms and 
potentially enhances exchange relations. A respondent may choose food that can be 
shared within the community in order to “get credit” from her peers as a person who 
follows social norms. Relatedly, peer monitoring could discourage individuals from 
deviating from the outcome desired by the community as a whole. Peer monitoring, 
then, acts as a form of social control exerted by community members on individuals 
and rather than face sanctioning, respondents may choose to follow norms (Horne 
2001). Third, the very presence of community members during a decision acts as a 
visual reminder (or framing effect on) of the need to follow established food sharing-
norms in their community. All of these interpretations may coexist within a 
community and may be salient different members.  
Alternatively, if monitored and non-monitored groups choose approximately 
equivalent ratios of cash to food, we would know that peer monitoring, at least in a 
field experiment context, did not encourage differential adherence to sharing norms.  
Data, experimental design, and model  
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In our 2009 survey on market access in food insecure areas, we purposively 
selected Dirib Gombo, Kargi, Logologo, Loiyangalani and North Horr by market 
access, production system and ethnicity (Table 2.1 and Mude et al. 2012). We then 
randomly sampled households from lists of middle and low wealth classes. These 
asset-poor households are most likely to be in need of food security responses and 
most likely to be targeted for future aid transfers.  In four communities, a previous 
survey team had established a complete wealth-ranking (high, medium, low) of 
households by herd size within each community (Chantarat et al. 2012). In 
Loiyangalani, where a comprehensive household wealth-ranking was unavailable, we 
randomly sampled households from a list of food relief recipients collected at food 
distribution points operated by the Kenya Red Cross using World Food Programme 
funds and aid.    
Approximately 40 respondents were sampled from each sub-district, including 
those living in outlying communities, some of whom lived in satellite camps as far 
away as 30 kilometers from the sub-district’s main markets. Respondents first 
participated in a household survey and then were invited to participate in one of two 
FGDs that included other sampled respondents from the community. The experiment 
was a component of this second stage of the survey. Before each of the focus group 
discussions, we randomly assigned six to seven respondents to one of three treatment 
groups. Within these treatment groups, preferences were elicited.  
At the start of the household survey, we told respondents that they would 
receive a token of appreciation worth 200 Ksh for their participation in both the 
household survey and the later focus group discussion and that they would receive the 
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token at the FGD.6 The household survey, limited to the household head, a spouse, or 
suitably competent adult member of the household, included questions on household 
demographics, income and assets, market access, food aid experience, and preferences 
over various forms of assistance.   
Three to six weeks later, the two FGDs were convened in each sub-district’s 
main market town. Once participants had arrived for their FGD session, the 
enumerator team directed participants to their randomly assigned treatment group. In 
treatment group one, individuals revealed their preferences privately, one at a time, to 
a FGD facilitator who was far removed from other participants. In treatment group 
two, individuals were asked to reveal their preferences in front of their treatment 
group (i.e., in front of six or so other members of their community). In treatment group 
three, individuals were told they must reach consensus on a single transfer, which will 
be received by everyone in the group.7  
Prior to asking respondents for their preferences, enumerators told each 
treatment group that they would be asked to choose their preferred form of the token 
of appreciation: 200 Kenyan Shillings (Ksh) worth of maize, the dominant staple 
grain, valued at local market prices on the day of each FGD, 200Ksh in cash, or a 50 
percent-50 percent mixture of each and that the choice was binding. We selected 
                                                
6 A payment of 200 Kenyan shillings is slightly more than the then current rate for day-labor. We 
considered it a fair value for respondents’ opportunity costs, given that each respondent had to complete 
both the interview and attend the focus group discussion, which occurred in the sub-district market 
center and for some households was a substantial distance away from their homes. 
7 In the broader study, we elicited preferences from three groups: a group who revealed their 
preferences privately, a group who revealed their preferences in front of one another, and a group who 
came to a consensus about which transfer the entire group preferred.  We do not include consensus 
group responses because we are interested in comparing choices between respondents revealing 
privately and respondents revealing in front of a group of their peers. This reduces our sample size to 
120.  
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maize to represent “food” because all households in our sample reported consuming at 
least some maize and because maize comprises the bulk of food aid deliveries to the 
area. The transfers were shown to each group. See Appendix 1 for phrasing of the 
preference elicitation question. After everyone had made a transfer choice, the three 
treatment groups reconvened for a joint focus group discussion. Transfers were 
distributed at the end of the FGD session. 
To address community heterogeneity, potentially resulting from differences in 
dominant ethnicity, market access, sharing norms, or other unobservable factors in the 
five communities that may influence respondents’ choices, we employ a randomized 
block design.  This design allows us to examine the effect of monitoring on 
populations within each community (or “block”). We ran the experiment twice in each 
of our five blocks. Ten groups of six to seven individuals chose their preferences 
privately and ten groups chose publicly. 
Due to the small number of respondents who selected a food-only transfer, we 
combine food and mixture categories into one category, reflecting a choice of at least 
some food. Our dependent variable then becomes a binary choice, with the base 
category being at least some food. In our model, respondent i from community j 
chooses the transfer, yij, that will maximize his or her underlying joint income and 
reputation payoff. We model respondents selecting the transfer that maximizes their 
total payoff, which is some combination of monetary value and reputation value, 
subject to whether they are being monitored or not.  
Some economists argue that fungiblity of cash makes it more appealing 
relative to other transfer forms (Villa et al. 2011). For this reason, cash may be 
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preferred in private, where there is less opportunity to publicly signal abidance with 
sharing norms. In contrast, monitored respondents may choose at least some food to 
signal a willingness to share food with other community members. In our model, we 
expect respondents are more likely to choose food when monitored because selecting 
food provides higher reputation gains for respondents that may outweigh any gains 
from the fungibility of cash:  
yij = f (wij, vj, rx,εij)
yij ∈ At least some food = 0, Cash =1( )
wij = Treatment :monitoring =1
vj = Effect of block j
rx =Vector of attributes
εij = Experimental error   (1)
 
The monitoring treatment, wij, equals one for those revealing publicly in front 
of peers (i.e., being monitored) and zero for those privately revealing. The coefficient 
on wij reflects the marginal influence of reputational gains or losses on the probability 
of choosing when making a choice in the peer-monitoring group relative to making a 
private decision, holding community attributes constant.8 We expect that the 
monitoring by community members in the public group will shift respondents’ 
preferences away from cash only and toward at least some food. 
We include community-level indicators, vj, to capture variation across the five 
blocks due to unobservable community characteristics (Brown and Melamed 1990). 
Because the focus of the experiment is on the role that monitoring can play in people’s 
choices, we include community fixed effects to control for any community-specific 
                                                
8 The reputation effect could also occur through a contagion process, whereby the first revealer (chosen 
at random) establishes the choice from which to deviate. 
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factors that may also influence choices. Failing to adjust for these characteristics could 
introduce experimental error.   
In Model 2, to account for any imbalance in possible consequential covariates 
across the randomization, we incorporate a vector of adjustment variables, x, that may 
be related by chance with treatment assignment. This vector, x, includes household 
demographic and income characteristics, such as frequency of food taken on credit 
(0=less than weekly), per capita total cash expenditures in the past two weeks (in 
1000s of Kenyan shillings (Ksh) per capita), estimated marginal propensity to 
consume food (elicited through a proportional piling exercise during which 
respondents indicated the proportion of an increase in income that would spent on 
food)9, per capita annual cash income (in 1000s of Ksh per capita), walking distance 
from their house to their community’s central market (in minutes), household size 
(number of persons), and maximum number of years of schooling attained within the 
household. The following indicator variables were also included: past receipt of food 
aid (0=no experience), past experience sharing food aid (0=never shared), and 
respondent gender and household head status (0=male, 1 = female non-head, 2= 
female household head). 
We expect that individuals living in households that access credit for food 
every week, are relatively close to a central market, have shared food aid, and have 
low marginal propensities to consume food, are more likely to need cash and therefore 
may indicate a preference for cash. Female respondents may prefer food relative to 
men because of food’s relative lack of fungibility, making it easier for women to 
                                                
9 Mude et al. (2012) provides details on generating marginal propensities to consume food. 
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control the transfer (Ahmed et al. 2009).  Larger households may have a greater need 
for a large quantity of maize (the food transferred) than smaller households. 
Respondents with high per capita cash income and high food expenditures are more 
familiar with using cash and therefore may prefer cash. By incorporating these factors 
in Model 2, we can better account for transfer responses in the event that other 
determinants are imbalanced across the different treatment groups.  
Results 
We present descriptive statistics in Table 2.2. 204 people participated in at 
least either a FGD or a household survey. Of these 204 respondents, two respondents 
did not participate in the initial survey but were included in the FGD. Thirteen 
households were missing answers to basic questions about the gender of the 
respondent or the household head, time to market, aid preferences, education, and 
shared food in addition to key types of information. All fifteen respondents were 
excluded from our estimations.  
Of the remaining 189 households, 11 did not attend the focus group discussion.  
To test for the non-randomness of attrition for those 11 individuals, we used a logit 
model to determine the likelihood that characteristics of attritors statistically 
significantly differed from those of non-attritors. The attrition results suggest that 
cash-poor individuals and more educated individuals are more likely to attend the 
focus group discussion. This is in keeping with normal attrition, where both the poorer 
and better-off are more likely to participate in longitudinal surveys. We removed 
attritors from the sample, decreasing the sample to 178, which includes only 
respondents who answered both the survey and attended the FGD (See Appendix 2 for 
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results). Results from treatment three are not presented here. This reduces our sample 
size from 178 to 120.  
Nearly 80 percent of respondents were women (95 of 120), reflecting the fact 
that most adult males were pasturing their animals, sometimes in base-camps that were 
a several days walk away from settlements. The sample includes female household 
heads (n=46) and females who are not household heads (n=49). The remaining 
respondents were males, who were all also household heads (n=25). The average time 
required to reach each community’s central market by foot was 84 minutes.  
Table 2.2 here 
The majority of respondents had some familiarity with food aid and, given that 
all respondents were sampled from low and middle asset classes, are likely to be 
targeted in future food assistance programs. In our sample, only three households out 
of 120 did not report receiving food aid within the last year. 77 of 120 (64 percent) 
respondents shared or sold some of their food aid. Only one respondent reported 
experience with cash transfers. Of those individuals privately revealing their 
preferences, nearly 80 percent chose cash, less than two percent chose food, and the 
remainder chose a mix. Of those facing peer monitoring, 62 percent chose cash, nearly 
five percent chose food, and the remainder chose a mix. As described above, we 
combined food and mixture categories in the following models to reflect respondents’ 
preferences for at least some food compared to all cash.10  
We present results for two models in Table 2.3. Model 1, includes our variable 
of interest, choosing transfer publicly. Coded as an indicator variable, privately 
                                                
10 There was not enough variation in responses to estimate a three-category multinomial logistic model.  
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revealing preferences is the reference category. Model 1 also includes community 
indicators, to adjust for any effects due to site-level nuisance factors. In Model 2, we 
introduce individual-level and household-level variables that could account for any 
variation in responses found in Model 1. We present results from both models using 
robust standard errors to correct for any heteroskedasticity and intragroup correlation. 
Given that the sampled communities are tight-knit and relatively small, it is likely that 
our observations are correlated within communities. Robust standard errors are most 
suitable for asymptotically large samples and our sample is small. However, we report 
robust errors, which are larger than conventional standard errors, because they are 
more cautious. 
Table 2.3 here 
In Model 1, we examine the effect of being assigned to the two groups. We 
find that being assigned to the peer monitoring group decreases the predicted 
probability of choosing cash from 80.2 percent to 61.4 percent, with standard errors of 
0.058 and 0.052 respectively. In other words, being monitored decreases the likelihood 
of choosing cash by 23 percent. This difference is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
With the exception of Dirib Gombo, community-level fixed effects do not play 
a role in preference choices. Residing in North Horr (our control community) instead 
of in Dirib Gombo increases the odds of choosing cash compared to at least some food 
by more than 3.5 times. Dirib Gombo residents are near the main (unpaved) highway 
in Marsabit district, would seem to indicate easier access to markets, which would 
enable spending of cash. Upon further investigation, we found that the highway is a 
  38 
major flash point for banditry and conflict.  Thus, Dirib Gombo residents may prefer 
food, which does not require venturing onto the road during periods of insecurity. 
Therefore, other important macro-level effects, in addition to peer monitoring and 
individual’s own desires, influence people’s choice of transfer. 
In Model 2, we assess whether our findings in Model 1 are produced by an 
imbalance in possible consequential covariates across the randomization. 
Incorporating covariates into Model 2 allows us to establish whether the role of 
monitoring remains a significant factor in respondents’ transfer choices. Therefore, we 
include household and respondent characteristics, including gender, household head 
gender, schooling, marginal propensity to consume food, per capita food expenditures, 
income per capita, experience with credit for food, experience sharing food, and 
distance to local market.11  
A Wald chi-square test for the additional variables indicates that they are not 
jointly statistically different from zero. In Model 2, being monitored by a group of 
peers is the only statistically significant variable (at the five percent level). Similar to 
Model 1, we find that 62 percent of respondents who are monitored are predicted to 
choose cash. Among those selecting transfers in private, 80 percent are predicted to 
choose cash, all else equal.  
Community characteristics are not strongly associated with preference choice, 
                                                
11 We first estimated a complete model, which includes all variables listed in the descriptive statistics: 
individual characteristics, household characteristics, community characteristics, and household 
experiences with assistance. We find high variance inflation factors for receipt of food aid, household 
size, and age of household head. After removing each collinear variable sequentially, the variance 
inflation factor for each remaining variable is below seven. The results of this series of estimations are 
in Appendix Table 3. 
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all else held constant. The effect of living in Dirib Gumbo, which was significant in 
Model 1, is no longer as large. This suggests that while key informants suggested that 
sharing norms differed across communities, when we more carefully control for 
household characteristics, the influence of community-specific unobservables on 
revealed preferences is reduced. 
We also find that common socio-economic indicators poorly predict 
individuals’ revealed preferences. Per capita annual cash income, per capita food 
expenditures in the past week, and distance to market are not statistically significantly 
associated with a preference for either cash or for at least some food. Therefore, 
regular contact with cash, as measured through high levels of income and buying food, 
and easy access to markets does not appear to significantly drive preference choices in 
our sample.  Experiences with sharing food aid and with regularly needing credit are 
negatively associated with preference for cash but these estimates are very imprecise. 
Taking food on credit weekly lowers the odds ratio of choosing cash relative to food 
but is not significant. Regularly buying food on credit regularly may be a proxy for 
extreme hardship and households needing credit may be concerned that cash would go 
to repaying debts rather than for immediate consumption. Sharing food aid is also 
associated with lowering the odds of choosing cash relative to food but is not 
significant. The households who share may value the ability to share food with kin and 
neighbors more than non-sharing households.  
Respondent gender and household head status and household demographic 
characteristics also are not strongly associated with preference choice. While Ahmed 
et al. (2009) find in Bangladesh that female-headed households preferred cash, but 
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female non-heads of household preferred food, we do not find a difference by gender 
or household status. Choices between tokens of appreciation are not statistically 
related to whether a respondent is female and the household head or female and not 
the household head, when holding other characteristics constant. All else equal, 
women who are not household heads are 2.1 times more likely to choose cash relative 
to food than male household heads, although this result is not statistically different 
from zero. Therefore, commonly-held beliefs that women prefer less fungible food aid 
while men prefer greater fungibility with cash may not be true for our experimental 
intervention (see also Harvey 2007).  
Discussion: monitoring and reputation 
In our randomized block field experiment in northern Kenya, we find 
respondents’ decisions between cash and at least some food are influenced by peer 
monitoring. In Model 2, about 20 percent of those selecting a token of appreciation in 
private prefer at least some food while that share nearly doubles to 38 percent among 
those who are monitored by peers while choosing. 
We turn now to why this is the case. Food transfers may become more 
appealing to some respondents when being monitored for several possible reasons. In 
our model, selecting food garners the respondent a non-monetary benefit. In other 
words, for some members of the group assigned to making public choices, being 
monitored by peers changes the payoffs between transfers. Candidate explanations for 
this change in valuation is that being monitored increases the value of choosing at 
least some food relative to cash through a “reputation effect.” Being monitored creates 
the opportunity to build reputation as an abider of local food sharing norms or reminds 
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individuals to participate in them. Sharing food and food aid is a common occurrence 
in northern Kenya, but similar practices have not (yet) emerged around cash and cash 
transfers. That is, non-monetary payoff of being seen as willing to abide by local 
sharing norms is a meaningful component of the total value of each transfer.   
Fafchamps (2011) argues that as societies have become more engaged with 
cash economies, social norms of sharing are changing as well. In a dynamic social 
environment, local norms are also dynamic and fluid (Fafchamps 2011). We did not 
find evidence that the willingness to follow sharing norms is related to gender or 
household head status, to household economic characteristics, or to community 
attributes. However, our models may have failed to capture how engaged with cash 
economies different respondents are.  Respondents in our experiment may be facing 
competing and emergent social norms and may be facing norms evolving at different 
rates. Thus, in an environment where cash is becoming newly commonplace, deviating 
from a sharing norm for food may no longer be subject to previous likelihood or 
degree of sanctioning. The unobservable nature of exposure to new norms could be 
contributing to an imbalance in our sample, which could be driving the differential in 
responses by group. 
Another explanation as to why people chose food in public was that they 
perceived that to be the “right” choice to make in front of the enumerators. The 
enumerators, during the household survey, differentiated themselves as members of a 
research team rather than members of an aid agency or government organization. 
Regardless, respondents may have been wary of the experiment. It is possible that 
those who were monitored by peers thought that the enumerators were monitoring 
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their behavior within the group. Given everyone’s experience with food, these 
respondents may have thought that at least some food was the answered desired by 
enumerators. Based on our field-experience and the extensive training received by 
enumerators, particularly for the experimental component and we suspect that this was 
not the case (see Ouma et al. 2010). However, we know of no way to rule out this 
explanation. 
Also, while we find that peer monitoring does influence choices, the majority 
of respondents assigned to make a choice in public deviated from our expected sharing 
norms. Regardless of the treatment, many respondents chose cash, which seems to 
indicate that the food sharing norm is not binding for these respondents in this 
situation. We consider possible explanations for why people deviated from the sharing 
norm. First, while respondents were in ethnically-similar peer groups, these groups 
may not have included members of their immediate, even smaller social network. As a 
result, respondents may not have felt that sharing norms do not apply to the broader 
community but rather to a more localized, subset. We are inclined to rule this 
explanation out as unlikely, at least for the Gabra residing in North Horr, whose food 
sharing is managed and coordinated by local leaders.  
Second, the experiment was a one-off gift of a token of appreciation in a 
unique setting. In our field experiment, 62 to 80 percent chose cash tokens of 
appreciation rather than food. However, in our 2009 household survey of 201 poor and 
near poor respondents across five communities, most respondents (80 percent) 
preferred at least some food aid when we asked respondents whether they would like 
to receive an equivalent value of food aid, cash aid or a mixture, distributed for the 
  43 
same duration, frequency, and distribution currently in place (Mude et al. 2012).  
Some respondents may have felt that norms that apply to food aid did not 
apply to this experimental situation. Zelizer (1994), Villa et al. (2010), and others 
argue that the source of income affects how that income is used (see also Duflo and 
Udry 2004, Fafchamps et al. 2011). Zelizer finds that earmarking designates certain 
types of income (e.g., gifts) for the purchase of certain types of items (such as on 
durable goods or leisure but not on groceries or debt). In our case, transfers intended to 
shore-up family food security may be treated differently than one-off distributions of 
tokens of appreciations. Mental accounting, wherein individuals assign certain income 
streams to cover certain expenditure activities, can also explain why income across 
different sources is not as fungible as economic theory would predict (Villa et al. 
2010). Thus, the source and duration of different transfers (a token or a regularly food 
security transfer) may influence whether those transfers are subject to the same norms.  
Bowles (2009), in contrast, argues experiments can have had longer-term 
signaling impacts by demonstrating whether a respondent abides by or deviates from 
expected sharing norms. Furthermore, a mental-accounting or earmarking explanation 
does not explain why the likelihood to choose cash significantly drops when a 
respondent is monitored by peers, suggesting that, for some respondents, commonly 
held norms did apply in the experimental situation. 
Conclusion 
We find that monetarily equivalent transfers are valued differently depending 
on whether the choice between transfers is made in public or private. In other words, 
the very presence of community-members at a moment of decision-making is enough 
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to change the relative worth of different transfers. In our experiment, while the 
majority of respondents prefer cash, peer monitoring induces over 20 percent of 
respondents to choose food.  
We argue that relative to decisions taken in private, decisions made in public 
provide an opportunity to enhance or maintain one’s reputation as willing to abide 
local, established food sharing norms. Such a choice may build or sustain reputation or 
social standing, relative to cash that can be easily hidden from neighbors and kin. 
Choosing privately may mute feelings of obligation to the community or may not 
afford the reputational benefits derived from choosing food. Thus, the social 
environment acts as a direct influence on the likelihood of following established social 
norms of sharing.  
Our finding of a monitoring-effect may be particularly strong in northern 
Kenya. First, the size of populations in each community is relatively small, and it is 
likely that some peer-monitoring group members know each other, have heard of each 
other, or are distantly related. The lack of perfect anonymity may mean that the 
choices in this field experiment are not one-shot decisions but are part of longer-term 
relationships and decisions may reflect the recognition of respondents that they will 
likely have future interactions with some participants in the public group.  Whether 
people choose food to “get credit” with their peers or to avoid social sanctioning later 
is an interesting avenue for future research.  
Second, at the time of this experiment, seasonal rains had not arrived and were 
expected to fail, increasing the likelihood that a severe drought would occur. Indeed, 
in the following months, this is precisely what did happen, resulting in food security 
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experts’ calls for assistance (IRIN Kenya 2009). During difficult times, respondents 
may have a heightened sense of obligation to their community or may have a 
heightened desire to build their reputations as community-spirited. Expecting 
deteriorating food security in the coming months, respondents may have been more 
likely to choose food to demonstrate their commitment to their community, hoping 
that community members would be more likely to share food with them during the 
crisis. Conversely, those who deviated from the expected norm of sharing may be 
signaling a desire for independence from their community. Nonetheless, given the 
large number of monitored respondents who chose a cash token of appreciation, the 
social norms of food sharing do not appear to binding in the experimental context, 
indicating that our findings could underestimate the importance of norm-abidance 
when preferences for food security transfers are elicited.  
In our study, respondents make choices based on whether anyone is watching 
them answer, arguably reflecting the expectations of the observers. This concurs with 
other experimental findings that changes in the situation can influence behavior in 
important ways (Ellingsen et al. 2012, Hossain and List 2012). Future researchers and 
others relying on revealed preference elicitation could benefit from considering the 
influence of the research conditions (e.g., public discussions versus private discussions 
or focus groups reaching consensus versus undertaking a private vote) on revealed 
preferences and choose the framing that best meets their research goals. The difference 
in framing could be particularly important in approaches to understanding 
marginalized community members’ voices, who may feel more compelled to provide 
the norm-abiding response in public than in private. 
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Figure 2.1: Map of Marsabit district and surrounding area 
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Sampled Communities 
Site Name Ethnic 
Majority 
Market 
Access 
Agricultural/ 
Pastoral potential 
Annual Rainfall 
(mm) 
Dirib Gombo Boran Medium Agro-pastoral 392 
Kargi Rendille Low Pastoral 240 
Loiyangalani El Molo and 
Turkana 
Medium Fishing and Pastoral 238 
Logologo Ariaal Medium Pastoral 326 
North Horr Gabra Low Pastoral 237 
Data source: IBLI survey codebook (Chantarat et al. 2009) with the exception of Loiyangalani annual 
rainfall collected from Loy Airport, Loiyangalani Kenya 
(http://www.worldweatheronline.com/weather-averages.aspx?q=LOY. Accessed September 12, 2011) 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
  
Privately 
revealed 
preferences 
(n=59) 
Publicly revealed 
preferences 
(n=61) Total (n=120) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Respondent is female = 1 0.83 0.38 0.75 0.43 0.79 0.41 
Household head is female = 1 0.44 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.49 
Respondent is male household 
head 0.17 0.38 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 
Respondent is female non head 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.49 
Respondent is female household 
head 0.44 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.49 
Household head age 48.05 14.28 48.67 14.82 48.37 14.50 
Household size 5.69 2.34 6.49 2.47 6.1 2.43 
Maximum number of years of 
schooling in household 5.05 4.79 5.77 4.87 5.42 4.82 
Marginal propensity to consume 
food 0.49 0.14 0.49 0.17 0.49 0.15 
Per capita food expenditure in 
past two weeks in 1000s of 
shillings 0.36 0.25 0.36 0.23 0.36 0.24 
Per capita annual cash income in 
1000s of shillings 42.88 66.13 45.71 66.85 44.32 66.23 
Take food on credit at least 
weekly = 1 0.54 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.58 0.50 
Received food aid = 1 0.98 0.13 0.97 0.18 0.98 0.16 
Shared food aid = 1 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.49 0.64 0.48 
Number of minutes to main 
market used by household 58.00 71.04 109.00 370.49 83.93 268.93 
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Table 2.3: Logistic Estimations of Cash Chosen Relative to At Least Some Food 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Coef. and 
Robust Std 
Errors 
Odds 
Ratio 
Coef. and 
Robust Std 
Errors 
Odds 
Ratio 
Treatment         
Publicly reveal preferences = 1 -1.013** 0.363** -1.007** 0.365** 
  (0.455)   (0.478)   
Individual characteristics^         
Respondent is female non household head     0.742 2.100 
      (0.657)   
Respondent is female household head     0.014 1.015 
      (0.583)   
Household characteristics          
Maximum number of years of schooling in hh     -0.031 0.970 
      (0.051)   
Marginal propensity to consume food     -0.303 0.739 
      (1.684)   
Per capita food expenditure in past two weeks 
in 1000s of shillings     1.053 2.866 
      (0.888)   
Per capita annual cash income in 1000s of 
shillings     -0.000 1.000 
      (0.003)   
Take food on credit at least weekly = 1     -0.065 0.937 
      (0.432)   
Shared food aid = 1     -0.106 0.900 
      (0.576)   
Number of minutes to main market used by hh     0.000 1.000 
      (0.001)   
Community fixed effects         
Dirib Gombo -1.267** 0.281** -0.946 0.388 
  (0.632)   (0.630)   
Kargi 0.285 1.330 0.545 1.724 
  (0.762)   (0.844)   
Logologo -0.784 0.457 -0.301 0.740 
  (0.691)   (0.737)   
Loyangalani 0.087 1.091 0.265 1.303 
  (0.700)   (0.738)   
Constant 1.838***   1.362   
  (0.555)   (1.263)   
R-squared 0.089   0.112   
Wald chi2 11.59** (5)  14.48 (14)  
Mean predicted probability of choosing cash  0.708   0.708   
 (0.039)  (0.038)  
Predicted probability of choosing cash for 
those being monitored 0.614  0.617 
 
 
 (0.058)  (0.059)  
Predicted probability of choosing cash for 
those not being monitored 0.802  0.800  
 (0.052)  (0.052)  
Note: *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
^ Excluded category is male heads of households. 
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APPENDIX 2.1  
SCRIPT USED TO ELICIT PREFERENCES 
 
Structure of Discussion: 
It is important to follow the “script” for revealed preferences in order to maintain 
comparability across sites. 
Once all 20 participants have arrived, welcome them and thank them for their time. 
 
Thank you all very much for coming and for once again giving your time to participate in 
our research.  Today we would like to continue the discussion we began with you 
individually several weeks ago when one of our colleagues visited you in your homes. We 
shall take no more than 3 hours of your time to discuss collectively issues of market access, 
supply availability, and issues related to food aid and the provision of assistance to this 
community during times of food insecurity.   
 
As you are aware we are researchers conducting a project for the International Livestock 
Research Institute.  We would like to stress that the information we gather is strictly for 
research purposes.  We are not associated with any NGO or Government program 
providing food aid or any other assistance.  We are simply trying to understand how the 
markets in the area work, how you are able to access food, and how well food aid has 
worked. We expect to use the findings of our research to inform NGO and government 
agencies offering relief and development services in this area and hope that our findings 
can improve food security programs.  However, we cannot guarantee that our findings will 
have any impact because we work for a research institution that does not implement 
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programs. 
 
Before we go on to the main discussion, we would like to offer you a small token of 
appreciation for the time you have given to us.  You all should have the IOU, “I owe you”, 
that we gave you following the household study.  The IOU states that we shall give you 
either Ksh 200 in cash, its equivalent value in maize, or a mix of Ksh 100 in cash and Ksh 
100 of maize.  We shall give you this token at the end of this session.  However, we would 
like to determine now which of these options you will receive. 
 
To make this process efficient, we would like to split you into three groups.  We have 
randomly selected these groups in advance.  
 
 
 
REVEALING PREFERENCES OVER GIFT: 
 
At this point the facilitators will then call out the randomly selected names and ask the 
relevant participants to gather in their respective groups.  There will be 3 groups each of 
which will be asked to reveal their preferences in a different decision making setting as 
follows: 
 
1. Group 1_Private Revelation: 6 individuals will be randomly selected for this group.  
The instruction will be presented to them as a group then they will each privately 
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state their preference. Enumerators will not show any individual what others have 
chosen.  
2. Group 2_Individual Revelation Publically: 7 individuals will be randomly selected 
for this group.  They will be instructed that they will each individually, in a sequence 
that will be randomly determined, reveal their own preference amongst the group.   
3. Group 3_Consensus Revelation: 7 individuals will be randomly selected for this 
group.  They will be instructed that they must, as a group, come to a consensus on 
what package they are to receive.  They will all receive the same package. 
 
The instructions: 
Ask Groups 2 and 3 to wait in an area separate from where the discussion with Group 1 will 
occur. 
 
Group 1: Once again we thank you for your initial cooperation and participation in our 
survey.  To show our appreciation for the time you took responding to our household survey 
and for the time you are spending with us today we will offer you one of the following 
(Show the equivalent values to the group):  
a) Ksh 200 in cash        
  
b) Maize worth Kshs 200   
c) Ksh 100 in cash plus maize worth Ksh 200. 
 
Each of you will come up to me one by one and let me know what your preference 
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is.  Your choice will not be known to anyone. 
 
Facilitator: Record preferences in provided form. 
 
Group 2; Once again we thank you for your initial cooperation and participation in our 
survey.  To show our appreciation for the time you took responding to our household survey 
and for the time you are spending with us today we will offer you one of the following 
(Show the equivalent values to the group):  
a) Ksh 200 in cash        
b) Maize worth Kshs 200   
c) Ksh 100 in cash plus maize worth Ksh 200. 
 
I will ask each of you to state your preference.  You each will receive what you 
prefer.  The order in which you will state your preference has been chosen 
randomly. 
 
Facilitator:  Follow the list and ensure that the sequence of preferences revealed is per 
the generated list. Record preferences in provided form. 
 
Group 3: Once again we thank you for your initial cooperation and participation in our 
survey.  To show our appreciation for the time you took responding to our household survey 
and for the time you are spending with us today we will offer you one of the following 
(Show the equivalent values to the group):  
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a) Ksh 200 in cash        
b) Maize worth Kshs 200   
c) Ksh 100 in cash plus maize worth Ksh 200. 
 
 
Everyone in this group will receive the same package.  We would like you to decide 
among yourselves, which package you would like to receive. 
 
Facilitator:  Make note of the discussion dynamics as follows:  Do not intervene in the 
group discussion (unless there is a clarifying question). Listen to how the decision is 
being made.  
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APPENDIX 2.2 
ATTRITION 
 
A2.1: Sample Attributes 
Activity Number of respondents 
Initial household survey sample n=204 
Incomplete interviews or attended 
preference elicitation at FGD but not 
the initial interview 
n=15 
Attrition n=11 
Retained household survey sample n=178 
Preference elicitation at FGD  Total: n = 178  
• Public n= 61 
• Private n=59 
• Consensus n=58 
Private and public revealed preferences Sample size for estimation: n=120 
 
Below, in Appendix Table 2, is a logit estimation of the likelihood of attending 
the focus group discussion where preferences were elicited, given that the respondent 
completed the initial survey. All survey respondents from Kargi (n=39) attended the 
focus group discussion. Therefore, they were excluded from the attrition estimate. 
Eleven individuals did not attend the second meeting. 
 
 
A2.2: Attrition 
 
Attrition 
(Model 1) 
VIF 
(Model 2)  
Attrition 
(Model 3) 
VIF 
(Model 3) 
Respondent gender 0.57 6.15 0.4 5.82 
  (1.0412)   (0.9993)   
Household head gender 1.11 2.75 1.18 2.72 
  (1.0613)   (1.0362)   
Household head age -0.01 13.54    - 
  (0.0272)       
Maximum number of years of 
schooling in household 0.24** 3.49 0.23** 3.48 
  (0.1043)   (0.0991)   
Number of minutes to main 
market used by household 0 1.8 0 1.74 
  (0.0064)   (0.0064)   
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Marginal propensity to 
consume food -0.31 10.42 -0.8 8.17 
  (2.2659)   (2.1894)   
Household size 0 9.99 -0.03 8.17 
  (0.1857)   (0.18)   
Per capita food expenditure in 
past two weeks in 1000s of 
shillings -0.73 3.57 -0.95 3.06 
  (1.4979)   (1.4678)   
Per capita annual cash income 
in 1000s of shillings 0 2.05 0 1.9 
  (0.0073)   (0.0072)   
Take food on credit at least 
weekly = 1 1.76** 2.49 1.81** 2.42 
  (0.8253)   (0.8106)   
Received food aid = 1 1.17 20.31    - 
  (1.4242)       
Shared food aid = 1 0.39 4.44 0.46 4.22 
  (0.8702)   (0.8544)   
Dirib Gombo 1.25 2.45 1.5 2.28 
  (1.4491)   (1.4071)   
Logologo -1.37 2.82 -1.23 2.75 
  (1.1939)   (1.1636)   
Loyangalani -0.16 2.45 -0.09 2.26 
  (1.0421)   (1.0139)   
Kargi         
          
Constant -0.75   0.52   
  (3.2318)   (2.5737)   
R-squared 0.2045   0.1958   
          
"*" indicates significance at the 10% level   
"**" indicates significance at the 5% level   
"***" indicates significance at the 1% level   
 
 
High variance inflation factors indicate collinearity in our first model of 
attrition, which employs the same variables used in model one to explain preference 
choice. Sequentially removing receipt of food aid and household head’s age, (model 2 
with just receipt of food aid removed is available upon request), we then estimate 
model 3.  All else constant, each year of education a household receive is slightly 
associated with increases the probability of attending the focus group. Similarly, all 
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else equal, moving from taking food on credit less than weekly to taking food on 
credit more frequently is associated with an increase in the likelihood of attending the 
focus group. These results are sensible. Those requiring food on credit on a weekly 
basis travel to market regularly (at least weekly) and can therefore attend such a focus 
group discussion with less inconvenience.  Those individuals from more highly 
educated households may also slightly more frequently attend market centers, as 
households with more education are more likely to hold jobs in towns and market 
centers. 
These results suggest that cash-poor individuals and more educated individuals 
are more likely to attend the focus group discussion. This is in keeping with normal 
attrition, where both the poorer and better-off are more likely to participate in 
longitudinal surveys. The attritors are removed from the sample. 
The full model estimate of the drivers of preferences for cash relative to at 
least some food is highly collinear. Computing variance inflation factors for each 
variable, we find that the age of the household head, receipt of food aid, household 
size and marginal propensity to consume food have VIFs above ten, which indicates 
the need for additional examination.  After serially removing each of the following 
variables: receipt of food aid, age of household head, and household size and re-
estimating we examine the VIFs in the new estimates.  We find that excluding these 
three variables addresses the model’s multicollinearity and proceed with estimating 
the three models presented in the above text. 
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A2.3: Estimates including multicollinear variables (preference for cash =1) 
 
 Full Model 
 
Model with collinear 
variables removed 
 
 Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors 
 Variance 
Inflation 
Factor 
 Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors 
 Variance 
Inflation 
Factor 
Publicly reveal preferences =1 -1.03 2.19 -1.01 2.12 
  (0.4722)  (0.4559)  
Respondent gender 1.01 6.02 0.74 5.24 
  (0.6742)  (0.6371)   
Household head gender -0.93 2.68 -0.73 2.60 
  (0.6114)  (0.5778)  
Household head age -0.01 14.30 - - 
  (0.0165)     
Household size 0.02 11.42 - - 
  (0.1227)          
Maximum number of years of 
schooling in household 0 3.35 -0.03  2.55 
  (0.0569)  (0.0517)  
Marginal propensity to 
consume food 0.64 12.24 -0.30 7.79 
  (1.8275)  (1.6466)  
Per capita food expenditure in 
past two weeks in 1000s of 
shillings 1.52 3.97 1.05 3.62 
  (1.2013)  (1.0674)  
Per capita annual cash income 
in 1000s of shillings 0 2.17 0 2.01 
  (0.0039)  (0.0037)  
Take food on credit at least 
weekly = 1 -0.02 2.70 -0.07 2.64 
  (0.494)  (0.4748)  
Received food aid = 1 3.07 22.73 -  - 
  (1.507)    
Shared food aid = 1 -0.37 4.26 -0.11   3.85 
  (0.6229)  (0.5581)  
Number of minutes to main 
market used by household 0 1.23 0 1.21 
  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
Dirib Gombo -1.17 2.44 -0.95  2.06 
  (0.7751)  (0.7199)  
Kargi 0.57 2.50 0.54 1.93 
  (0.8442)  (0.7865)  
Logologo -0.43 2.78 -0.30 2.32 
  (0.8686)  (0.8076)  
Loyangalani 0.12 2.58 0.26 1.81 
  (0.878)  (0.8161)  
Constant -1.67  1.36  
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  (2.4001)  (1.4158)  
R-squared 0.1467  0.1125  
Mean VIF  5.86   
 
Results indicate that the two groups are balanced, and as a result, the treatment, 
rather than differences within treatment groups, drives the result. Our control variables 
in Model 2 appear to explain little of how respondents choose between cash and some 
food. The effects of these additional covariates are small and not significant, giving us 
reason to believe that Model 1 is sufficient. 
A2.4: Results from student t-tests on differences of respondent characteristics 
assigned to reveal preferences either privately or publicly  
  T-test Pr(|T|>|t|) 
Respondent is female = 1 1.0263 0.3068           
Respondent’s household head status and gender 1.3830 0.1693           
Household head age     -0.2338 0.8156           
Maximum number of years of schooling in household -0.8158 0.4162           
Marginal propensity to consume food -0.1286 0.8979           
Per capita food expenditure in past two weeks in 1000s 
of shillings 0.1960 0.8449           
Per capita annual cash income in 1000s of shillings -0.2330 0.8162           
Take food on credit at least weekly = 1 -0.7066 0.4812           
Shared food aid = 1 -1.0389 0.3010           
Number of minutes to main market used by household -0.4605 0.6460           
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CHAPTER 3 
 
COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS, REFERENCE GROUP INEQUALITY AND 
SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING: FINDINGS FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Abstract 
Advances in standards of living and sociopolitical stability arguably turn less 
on objective, statistical measures of incomes, expenditures or other standard indicators 
than on people’s subjective assessments of their own wellbeing. Yet, we know 
surprisingly little about subjective wellbeing in less developed countries. Combining 
DHS and Afrobarometer data for ten sub-Saharan African countries, I estimate a series 
of ordinal logistic regressions to make two interventions to the subjective wellbeing 
(SWB) and inequality literatures. First, I find that social environment characteristics, 
such as crime rates and community health, which are not commonly included in SWB 
studies, matter for subjective wellbeing. Second, I contribute to an ongoing debate 
about relative deprivation in low-income countries. While using standard reference 
group leave-out mean measures, I do not find evidence of relative deprivation. I do, 
however, find that the degree of inequality within the reference group dampens the 
impact of a marginal increase in an individual’s economic attributes on SWB. I term 
the effect of reference group inequality on wellbeing “inequality-based relative 
deprivation.” This latter pair of findings indicates that, in this survey, inequality 
matters more to respondents’ perceptions of their lives than mean measures. Thus, 
relative deprivation studies relying on reference group means may miss an important 
form of relative deprivation. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, an explosion of research raises the question of whether relative 
deprivation — the study of how people’s feelings about their lives are influenced by 
characteristics of their social comparators —is a universally experienced phenomenon. 
Researchers consistently find evidence of relative deprivation in high-income 
countries. Residents of high-income countries tend to experience lower wellbeing 
when their reference groups are financially better-off than they are (Runciman 1966; 
Diener et al. 1999; Frey and Stutzer 2001; McBride 2001; Luttmer 2005; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2005; Graham 2009). We know less about relative deprivation in low and 
middle-income countries both because very few studies examine relative deprivation 
in these countries and because findings from these studies are mixed. At least one 
study finds evidence of relative deprivation, although other studies find that at least 
some respondents experience higher senses of wellbeing when their reference groups 
are better-off than themselves (Senik 2004; Kingdon and Knight 2007; Fafchamps and 
Shilpi 2008; Ravallion and Lokshin 2010). In this paper, I contribute to the debate on 
relative deprivation in low-income countries. I argue that to understand relative 
deprivation in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, we need to broaden the debate away 
from a narrow focus on mean reference group income measures and toward inclusion 
of reference group inequality measures and non-economic, community-based 
measures. By building on Durkheim’s (1951 (1897)) insights into resources and 
relative wellbeing, I find that inequality-based relative deprivation is not unique to 
high-income countries. 
Against the backdrop of increased attention to global inequality, the debate 
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over the existence of relative deprivation in less developed countries assumes 
increasing importance. An implication of relative deprivation is that increasing 
disparities between people and their social comparators could leave people feeling 
worse off, even if their incomes increase (Layard 2005). However, if relative 
deprivation does not exist, it may be that having a better-off reference group provides 
important positive externalities, perhaps especially in low and middle income 
countries with weak institutions and volatile economies (Senik 2004; Bookwalter and 
Dalenburg 2010; Ravallion and Lokshin 2010). In studies finding no relative 
deprivation, there is an assumption that people in high-income countries are somehow 
different, and thus more likely to experience reference group deprivation, than people 
residing in low and middle income countries. Nonetheless, Runciman warns that even 
when relative deprivation is not observed, “we must beware of confusing acquiescence 
with contentment” (1966, p. 26). Inasmuch as improving subjective wellbeing – how 
people perceive their lives – is a valued policy outcome, identifying the different 
factors, including relative deprivation, that shape subjective wellbeing can help 
policymakers select policies that could improve people’s perceptions of their lives. 
Further, understanding how different forms of inequality shape wellbeing helps us to 
explore whether people perceive inequality as detrimental to their lives, potentially 
informing long-standing growth-equity debates. Moreover, it could inform 
understandings of how and why people make decisions to join social movements, 
participate in civil society, and engage politically.   
Relative deprivation studies in low-income countries and elsewhere have 
examined differences in income or consumption between the referent group and the 
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respondent and how those differences impact a respondent’s subjective wellbeing. 
Few studies have examined whether non-economic forms of deprivation influence 
SWB, although Runciman argued that relative deprivation could result from 
differences in power, class and status (Runciman 1966; Fafchamps and Shilpi 2008; 
Graham 2009). Examining non-economic factors, such as crime, community health, 
and availability of community services in absolute levels and associated inequality 
measures may be salient for identifying relative deprivation in sub-Saharan Africa, 
especially because these sorts of attributes are highly variable both between and within 
low-income countries (Lipton 1977; Sahn and Stifel 2003; Bezemer and Headey 2008; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).  
Further, most studies of relative deprivation are limited to reference group 
means. Few relative deprivation studies have examined whether the degree of 
dispersion of a reference group’s income or consumption influences a respondent’s 
SWB (an exception is Senik 2004). Yet, inequality – the degree of dispersion - may 
matter. If referent group incomes are widely dispersed, a respondent with an income 
further from the referent group mean may not feel as strongly affected by relative 
deprivation. However, when referent group income is tightly clustered around the 
mean, a respondent whose income falls outside of this cluster may feel abnormally 
fortunate or unfortunate and may report his or her wellbeing as much lower (in the 
case of income being below referent group income) or much higher. 
In this paper, I advance our understanding of when and why sub-Saharan 
Africans feel better or worse about their standard of living. With data from ten sub-
Saharan African countries, I estimate a series of ordinal logistic regressions to unpack 
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the relationships between subjective wellbeing and a range of community attributes, 
demographic characteristics, and reference group measures in order to identify if and 
when sub-Saharan Africans experience relative deprivation.  Specifically, I make two 
interventions into the subjective wellbeing literature. First, I find that community 
characteristics are important, non-economic factors that shape people’s perceptions of 
their lives. Second, I expand the concept of relative deprivation to include inequality. I 
do not find that mean reference group attributes, which capture relative deprivation, 
matter for SWB. Testing whether reference group inequality matters, even when mean 
reference group measures don’t, I estimate reference group Gini coefficients for 
several sources of inequality. I find that crime-based inequality and consumption-
wealth based inequality both matter for how sub-Saharan Africans perceive the lives, 
arguing the latter is evidence of “inequality-based relative deprivation.”  
Below is a discussion of the literature that motivates this study. After which, 
follows a description of the data and sample construction. I then present the estimation 
method, followed by, findings and robustness checks. Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of findings, limitations of this research, and directions forward. 
Literature and theoretical motivation 
Researchers have found consistent relationships between subjective wellbeing 
(SWB), defined as “a person’s cognitive and affective evaluations of his or her life” 
(Diener et al. 2005, p. 63) and a series of correlates. Diener et al. (2005), in a review 
article, identify a series of small but significant associations between SWB and several 
sociodemographic factors. Religious individuals tend to report higher levels of SWB.  
Women, and younger individuals tend to report slightly higher levels of SWB 
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although the strength of these findings depends on the specific SWB question used 
(Diener et al. 2005; see Stevenson and Wolfers 2008 on the disappearing gender gap 
in SWB in the industrialized world). Income and SWB are positively associated, 
although changes in income do not, in general, appear to be associated with SWB 
(Diener et al. 2005; see also Deaton 2008). Other characteristics associated with SWB 
but not specifically modeled here include personality and genetics, marital status, 
network connections, and cross-cultural attributes.12  
The role of reference group economic characteristics on SWB varies by the 
wealth of the country, and by the wealth of the respondents. Runciman (1966), in his 
seminal study on relative deprivation and social justice, argues that relative 
deprivation is the discontent people experience when their reference group has more 
of something they believe that they are entitled to.  The decline of respondent’s 
subjective wellbeing as reference group members (i.e., social comparators) become 
better off, holding respondent’s income constant, is considered to be evidence of 
relative deprivation (Layard 2002; Ravallion 2012). Relative deprivation has been 
heavily studied, although the majority of the evidence of the adverse impact of 
reference group economic characteristics on subjective wellbeing is from high income, 
industrialized countries (Frey and Stutzer 2001; McBride 2001; Luttmer 2005; Ferrer-
i-Carbonell 2005; Graham 2009). A notable exception is Fafchamps and Shilpi’s 
(2008) study in Nepal, where they find relative deprivation effects similar to those in 
                                                
12 Psychologists have found that personality and genetics are strongly associated with SWB, although 
many studies are unable to control adequately for these attributes (Diener et al. 2005). Married 
individuals tend to report higher levels of SWB. Higher quality and quantity of network connections are 
also positively associated with wellbeing (Helliwell and Putnam 2004; Degli Antoni 2009; Lim and 
Putnam 2010; Brashears 2011).  Cultural attributes, such as the importance of self-esteem, have been 
used to explain cross-country differences in SWB although cross-national correlates of SWB are 
substantial (Suh and Diener 2000; Uchida et al. 2004; Diener et al. 2010). 
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industrialized countries; the authors do not consider relative deprivation to be 
exclusively the domain of high-income country residents.   
Other studies of wellbeing in low- and middle-income countries find little 
evidence of relative deprivation. Researchers that don’t find evidence of relative 
deprivation posit that uninsured risk, aspirations, or other positive externalities are 
more prominent features of life in low income countries than in high income countries 
and, as a result, having a relatively wealthier reference group is a boon, not a burden 
(Senik 2004; Kingdon and Knight 2007; Ravallion and Lokshin 2010). Ravallion and 
Lokshin (2010) find that in Malawi, having richer friends and neighbors is associated 
with increases in poor respondents’ wellbeing. Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) 
hypothesize that positive externalities of interacting with wealthier friends and 
neighbors can mitigate uninsured risks. Kingdon and Knight (2007), examining the 
effects of differently spatially defined comparison groups on SWB in South Africa, 
find evidence of relative deprivation in spatially distant reference groups but not 
among more local reference groups. The authors posit, “risk-sharing within a 
community can provide another reason why [one’s] own happiness is raised by other 
peoples’ income” (p. 71). Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2010) confirm Kingdon and 
Knight’s findings in South Africa. At low levels of income, living near wealthier 
people improves an individual’s SWB (Bookwalter and Dalenberg 2010). In a panel 
study from a middle-income country, Russia, Senik (2004) argues that her findings of 
a positive relationship between reference group income and subjective wellbeing is 
evidence of a tunnel effect, where individuals may experience improved welfare 
because they see others’ situations improve and therefore, expect that their situations 
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will also improve.  
Thus, whether relative deprivation is universally experienced or a phenomenon 
primarily limited to high income countries, is very much unresolved. Long before the 
debate about the universality of relative deprivation, Durkheim (1951 (1897)) argued 
that people’s aspirations are tempered by the resources available to them:  
“No matter how one acts, desires have to depend upon resources to 
some extent; actual possessions are partly the criterion of those aspired 
to. The less one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of his 
needs indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling moderation, accustoms 
men to it, while nothing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, 
on the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into believing 
that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing the resistance we 
encounter from objects, it suggests the possibility of unlimited success 
against them. The less limited one feels, the more intolerable all 
limitation appears.” (p. 245).  
 
Durkheim’s argument that one’s desires partially depend on resources is worth 
revisiting. Durkheim intends “resources” to mean something broader than just income 
or wealth. His notion of resources includes power and opportunities. I adopt this 
broader use of resources to include community characteristics.  Runciman (1966), like 
Durkheim, cautions that hardship among poorer members of a population breeds 
cautious pessimism, thereby reigning in their expectations. Sayer (2005) seemingly 
concurs, writing that in the face of inequality, resistance may be less rewarding than 
compliance. In other words, subjective experiences are likely experienced as functions 
of one’s resources-at-hand as well as one’s aspirations.  
The Durkheimian notion that aspirations may be tempered for society’s less 
powerful members is consistent with, although slightly different from, studies finding 
no relative deprivation or positive relationships between reference group economic 
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characteristics and SWB in low- and middle- income countries. Often interpreted as 
evidence of risk-sharing, aspirations, or other positive externalities, a slightly darker 
interpretation, consistent with Durkheim and Sayer, is that people do not expect to 
have better lives and therefore are not bothered, or are even happy, when others 
around them do well.  
While much SWB research focuses either on personality and genetics or on 
economic factors, few would argue that these factors perfectly reflect individual’s 
wellbeing. Examining relative deprivation relying on economic characteristics of the 
reference group is also more narrow than Runciman’s (1966) description (see also 
Merton and Kitt’s (1950) findings that the basis of soldiers’ morale rests on the status 
of the comparison group). Yet, we know little about the sorts of community attributes 
that might matter in low-income countries. 
  Both Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) and Graham and Hoover (2007) argue that 
public goods (and their inefficiencies) are rarely adequately measured in current 
studies of subjective economic wellbeing in low-income countries. In one study, 
Kingdon and Knight (2007), in their study of subjective wellbeing in South Africa, 
include cluster-level amenities, such as whether roads are tarred, the distance and 
number of facilities (e.g., bank, market, health clinic, and post office) available, and 
distance to public transportation, finding none are statistically significant except 
cluster – level mean household absolute income. Recently, Easterlin et al. (2011), 
examining urban-rural differences on subjective wellbeing, find that urban dwellers 
report significantly higher levels of wellbeing than rural dwellers, particularly in low-
income countries. The authors attribute some of the gap in wellbeing to urban-rural 
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differences in education, income, and occupational status. They do not include 
measures of community characteristics, which almost surely differ for urban and rural 
respondents. 
 Literature on urban bias, dating back to Lipton (1977), repeatedly finds 
uneven economic policies leading to uneven availability of institutions, infrastructure 
and income in urban versus rural areas. Unequal investment decisions in services for 
rural and urban populations could reflect politicians’ desire to maintain political 
support from a densely packed urban populations, or the relative ease of targeting and 
delivering services to urban areas (Sahn and Stifel 2003; Bezemer and Headey 2008).  
Thus, people may report higher wellbeing in urban areas not only because of improved 
individual attributes such as education and income, but also because of better access to 
– or availability of – infrastructure and institutional access.  
Findings from industrialized country studies offer insights into the correlates of 
subjective wellbeing in low and middle-income countries. The important role of 
community attributes for wellbeing has been described by William Julius Wilson in 
his work on the culture of poverty, by Sampson et al. (2002) in their review of 
neighborhood effects, and has recently been validated in Ludwig et al.’s (2012) study 
on neighborhood effects in the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program that finds that 
having financially better-off neighbors improves one’s mental health outlook. 
Together, these studies suggest that examining community characteristics and their 
potential role in SWB may be fruitful, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where public 
goods are unevenly available.   
The literature reviewed suggests incorporating community attributes into 
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estimates of subjective wellbeing could be productive, although little research on this 
exists for low and middle-income countries. By incorporating measures of structural 
attributes within communities, such as health care, access to community services and 
crime, I can to identify whether the resources available (in Durkheim’s sense), and 
whether reference group characteristics of these resources contribute to or detract from 
subjective wellbeing.  Further, the conflicting findings from the reference group and 
relative deprivation literature reveals little consensus on the role of reference groups 
on wellbeing in low and middle-income countries. There is also a surprisingly small 
amount of research on the role of inequality in subjective wellbeing in less developed 
countries. I contribute to the debate over relative deprivation in non-industrialized 
countries by, first, broadening relative deprivation to include non-economic factors, as 
suggested by Runciman (1966) and, second, by considering inequality within a 
reference group as a prospective source of influence on subjective wellbeing.  
Data, variables, and method 
Data  
To investigate the roles of reference group characteristics and community 
attributes on subjective wellbeing, I match Afrobarometer, Demographic and Health 
Services, World Bank and World Income Inequality data for ten sub-Saharan Africa 
countries. Afrobarometer round IV (2008-9) is a survey of voting-age citizens’ 
attitudes on the quality of democracy and governance in their countries (Mattes 2009; 
Afrobarometer 2012). Afrobarometer is limited to “reforming” or democratic sub-
Saharan African countries, those who have a multi-party electoral system. The survey 
does not include fragile or failed states and findings should not be considered 
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representative of the continent (Mattes 2009). In 2008-9, Afrobarometer was fielded in 
twenty countries. In ten of these, Round V Demographic and Health Data surveys 
were fielded, between 2006 and 2008, prior to the Afrobarometer survey. These ten 
countries comprise the sample. See Table 3.1 for a list of included countries. 
Table 3.1 here 
The Afrobarometer sampling technique is probability proportionate to 
population sample (Afrobarometer 2012). First, the sample is stratified by region / 
province and by urban or rural stratum. Then, eight interviews are clustered within 
each primary sampling unit (PSU), which is identified using census enumeration areas. 
In nine countries, about 1200 individuals were sampled. Approximately 2400 
individuals were sampled in the tenth country, Uganda. In total, 150 primary sampling 
units are used in countries with 1200 interviews and 300 units are used in countries 
with 2400 interviews. These 150 (300) units are allocated across the strata based on 
the population proportion. Due to ongoing conflict and resulting security concerns 
during Afrobarometer’s Round 4, northern Uganda was not included. All regions were 
surveyed in the remaining nine countries. 
Approximately two-thirds of the Afrobarometer questions are identical across 
surveys. The remaining questions focus on current political or policy issues relevant to 
the specific country.  Only the questions that are identical across countries are used 
below. Response rates tend to be quite high. The combined rates of “missing” and 
“don’t know” responses were less than seven percent of the total sample. No one 
refused to answer any of the questions in which I was interested.  
Verifying that samples were drawn from the same strata, I matched 
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Afrobarometer to the Round V (2006-8) Demographic and Health Services (DHS) 
data by urban or rural designations within each country. DHS surveys gather 
nationally representative and cross-nationally standardized information on maternal 
and child health, as well as other basic demographic information and limited wealth 
and asset information (Vaessen 2005; Measure DHS+ 2008). I constructed urban and 
rural means by country of several community health variables, including rates of 
wasting, stunting, undernutrition, diarrhea, and antenatal services use. In order to 
improve recall about maternal and child health, DHS enumerators elicit information 
from a female member of the household. Approximately 5000 to 6000 women and 
their households are interviewed per country. Response rates for the DHS tend to be 
very high and consistent with Afrobarometer response rates – between 92 and 97 
percent (Vaessen 2005).13 
For each of the ten countries, the Gini coefficients of income inequality are 
estimates from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0c, 
May 2008 (WIID2).14 Using World Bank data on gross domestic product (GDP) per 
country, I estimated the average growth rate in GDP between 2002 and 2006 (World 
                                                
13 Most DHS sampling frames follow the same general approach. First, previous censuses or population 
counts are used to identify primary sampling units (PSUs). PSUs are sampled with probability 
proportional to population (or number of households). Most DHS surveys rely on geographic 
stratification, including rural/urban stratum and or regional stratum. In each stratum, the PSUs are 
selected independently. After the PSUs are selected, if the sampling frame is current, households are 
sampled randomly from within the PSU (Vaessen 2005).  If the sampling frame is out of date, a list of 
households within each PSU is generated and then households are randomly selected. Within each 
selected PSU, respondents are randomly selected, with cluster of 30-40 women in rural areas and 20-25 
women in urban areas. 
14 WIID2 Gini coefficients are estimated from household surveys and therefore considered to be more 
reliable than Ginis computed from macro-economic data (Milanovic 2012). Unfortunately, some of the 
estimates are quite old (Liberia has the oldest estimate from 1974; others are from the 1990s and early 
2000s) and may not reflect current levels of inequality. 
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Bank 2012).15  
Variables 
I construct the dependent variable from Afrobarometer’s comparative 
subjective wellbeing (SWB) question: “In general, how do you rate your living 
conditions compared to other people living in this country?” on a scale of one (one = 
much worse) to five (five = much better).   
Subjective wellbeing questions are challenging to elicit. The Afrobarometer 
survey addresses some of the difficulties of eliciting subjective wellbeing in the 
following ways. First, with regard to findings that wellbeing questions are sensitive to 
the placement of the question within the survey, the dependent variable is the fifth 
question in the survey, thereby minimizing the influence of other questions on SWB 
responses (Graham 2009). Second, Afrobarometer elicits SWB compared to other 
people within the country. This approach anchors the respondent’s reported wellbeing 
to an identified comparison group (Ravallion 2012). Third, the subjective wellbeing 
question asks about perceptions of living conditions or satisfaction with life. Such life-
satisfaction questions results in more stable responses over time compared to 
subjective wellbeing questions that elicit affect or emotion (also known as “happiness” 
questions) (Diener et al. 2005; Deaton 2008; Graham 2009).  
Across ten countries, 13,867 respondents reported answers on a scale of one 
(1= much worse) to five (5=much better).  Figure 3.1 indicates that subjective 
wellbeing varies by urban and rural residency within each country. A higher 
proportion of rural residents report scores of 2 (worse off compared to others) while a 
                                                
15 This five-year timespan ends in the year prior to the first year of Round IV Afrobarometer data 
collection. 
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higher proportion of urban residents report scores of 4 (better off). Rural respondents 
are much more likely to report a score of 1, while urban respondents are more likely to 
report a score of 5.   
Figure 3.1 here 
An important component of SWB is economic wellbeing, measured as income, 
consumption or wealth. Yet, the difficulty in estimating income in low-income 
countries is well known (Sahn and Stifel 2000; Deaton 2008). Neither Afrobarometer 
nor DHS attempt to collect detailed income, expenditure or asset information, 
although both surveys include some proxy measures. Many researchers using these 
datasets rely on data reduction techniques, such as principal components analysis 
(PCA) or factor analysis, to compute an index assigning a single wealth and or 
consumption value to each respondent (Sahn and Stifel 2000; Filmer and Pritchett 
2001).16 See the appendix for more details on the construction of the indices and for 
robustness checks. 
Following the approach of Filmer and Pritchett (2001), I use PCA to 
summarize a series of highly correlated wealth and consumption variables for each 
country, storing the first component of the variance-covariance matrix from the PCA 
as each respondent’s consumption-wealth index.  PCA captures information that 
covaries across the set of included variables. The first component is a “linear 
combination of the variables with maximum variance” (Filmer and Pritchett 2001).  
                                                
16 Sahn and Stifel (2000) argue that factor analysis is more appropriate than principal components 
analysis when an underlying, theoretical model is known. I use principal components analysis rather 
than factor analysis because I am unaware of a strong underlying theoretical model that combines 
wealth and consumption and do no wish to impose a structural model using the very limited asset and 
consumption information available. 
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The dependent variable asks respondents to consider their wellbeing relative to other 
residents in their country. Therefore, I predict the first component by country, so that 
the index score for each respondent is relative to other citizen-respondents in their 
country.  
My starting point is Mattes’ (2009) Lived Poverty Index, which includes 
responses to six Afrobarometer questions focusing on consumption: “over the past 
year, how often have you or your family gone without food, [water, medical treatment, 
cooking fuel and cash]?” Responses vary on a scale of zero to four, reflecting 
responses of “never” to “always.”  In addition to these consumption measures, I 
include asset information, including indicators water availability inside the house or 
compound, ownership of radio, television, and motorvehicle, and access to cash 
employment.17 By combining consumption and wealth measures, I expect that the 
consumption-wealth (c-w) index can identify impoverished households, as well as 
capture more differentiation among well-to-do households that do not regularly go 
without basic consumption items but have varying levels of wealth.18   
I created three other indices: a community services index, a crime index, and a 
perception of government index, all of which include the first scores generated from a 
principal components analysis for each country. Similar to the consumption-wealth 
index, within each index, variables were highly correlated. The community services 
index includes the following indicator variables: availability of schools, clinics, 
                                                
17 Before computing the PCA, I inverted the consumption measures so that a higher response indicates 
greater consumption in order to be consistent with the asset indicators. 
18 Rutstein (2007) has noted that the wealth index generated with DHS data has been accused of being 
urban biased. Given that Afrobarometer shares with DHS a lack of information on land and animal 
holdings, it is likely that the same critiques apply to this index. 
  81 
market, police, paved road, and cellular phone reception in the enumeration area.19 
The underlying variables in the community services index are indicator variables 
reported by the enumerator rather than by the respondent. One limitation of the 
community services measure is that while each service may be observed as available 
by an enumerator, it may or may not be accessible to individual members. The crime 
index includes the following variables: frequency of robberies in the past year, 
frequency of attacks in the past year, and fear of crime. The coding of responses are as 
follows: never is zero, experienced once or twice is one; several times is two; many 
times is three; and always is four. The perception of government index includes a 
ranked assessment of respondent’s perception of the government's job at addressing 
each of the following social issues: poverty, income inequality, crime, health and food 
security. Reports are on scales of one (very badly) to four (very well). Table 3.2 
reports the proportion of the total variance explained by the first component for each 
PCA analysis. Results vary by country. Robustness tests presented in the appendix 
indicate that the indices are internally coherent. 
Table 3.2 here 
Following our PCA analyses, I computed reference group leave-out means and 
Gini coefficients for consumption-wealth index, the community services index, and 
the fear of crime and crime index. Similar to other relative deprivation researchers, I 
rely on spatial measures to define reference groups (Senik 2004; Kingdon and Knight 
                                                
19 I also rescored the DHS Z-scores to obtain nonzero, positive values to create a DHS Health Gini 
coefficient, which included several measures of child under-nutrition as well an information on use of 
skilled birth attendant, and frequency of antenatal visits. I do not use or present results from the DHS 
health Gini because the results mask the heterogeneity found across the different community health 
measures, as seen below in the appendix on the robustness of the findings to different specifications. 
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2007; Fafchamps and Shilpi 2008; Bookwalter and Dalenberg 2010). Respondents are 
placed in a reference group based whether they reside in urban or rural areas within 
each country, for a total of twenty groups.20 I follow the standard approach of 
generating leave-out mean measures by reference group that exclude the respondent’s 
own value when computing his or her reference group mean.  
I also compute Gini coefficients, which allow me to examine whether 
reference group inequality and its relationship with individual SWB differs from 
SWB’s relationship to leave-out mean reference group attributes. Traditionally used to 
measure income inequality, Gini coefficients capture the dispersion of values within 
reference groups.21 Gini coefficients are bounded between zero and one. A score of 
one indicates complete inequality (e.g., one person has all the income, or experiences 
all the crime) and a score of zero indicates that the attribute is evenly shared across the 
population.  
Tables 3.3-3.5 provide descriptive statistics of our independent variables, first 
across the entire sample (Table 3.3), and then by rural (Table 3.4) and urban residency 
status (Table 3.5). I present sociodemographic characteristics, reference group 
characteristics, interaction terms and country-level measures including income-based 
Gini coefficients and average GDP growth rate for the five-year period preceding the 
Afrobarometer survey (2002-2006). Schooling is divided into four categories: no 
formal schooling (category includes Koranic or other informal schooling); some or 
                                                
20 As Runciman (1966) and Ravallion (2012) have noted, relying on analyst-defined groups may miss 
other important reference groups, an issue explored elsewhere (Lentz 2013). 
21 In order to compute Gini coefficients from the PCA scores, I transformed the underlying variables to 
be nonzero and positive. This rescoring does not change the underlying meaning of the ordinal values 
since the ranking and distance between each value was preserved. 
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finished primary school; some or finished secondary school; any post secondary 
education, including certificate programs. Following the Afrobarometer research of 
Bratton et al. (2005), minority language is coded one for those who speak a language 
at home that spoken by less than 10% of population and zero otherwise. 
Table 3.3 here 
I include one additional community attribute measure. I match a DHS-derived 
health measure, wasting, to Afrobarometer respondents based on residency. Wasting is 
a highly visible manifestation of poor health among a vulnerable population, children 
under the age of two.  I compute wasting rates for urban and rural residents in each 
country as the proportion of children under age two who have weight-for-height z-
scores below two.22  
Tables 3.4-3.5 here 
Urban residents tend to be slightly younger, more educated, and less likely to 
speak a minority language in their home. On average, they have lower rates of wasting 
among children under two years old, have greater access to services and experience 
and fear less crime than rural residents. These findings are consistent with other 
studies’ findings of urban bias (Lipton 1977). For example, the prevalence of under-
nutrition is consistently higher among rural children than among urban children (Smith 
                                                
22 DHS captures several different health variables, particularly related to the health of women and 
infants. I use wasting because it is a highly visible sign of poor health that can be readily observed by 
everyone in the community. In what follows, similar results hold regardless of the particular 
undernourishment measure used, including wasting, stunting, and undernutrition for children under the 
age of two.  Access to and frequency of use of prenatal care are not statistically significant, perhaps 
because these are less visible signs of community health. The appendix includes detailed findings as 
well as a discussion of why the different associations between various measures and SWB may be 
observed. Because wasting rates were computed as a community means using DHS data, wasting rates 
for individual respondents are not available. Therefore, I cannot include measures of health inequality 
by reference group.  
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et al. 2005). Incomes also tend to be higher in urban areas; the difference is 
particularly striking in low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Lipton 1977, 
Sahn and Stifel 2003, Bezener and Headey 2008, Easterlin et al. 2011).  
Figure 3.2 here 
Figure 3.2 plots averaged subjective wellbeing and averaged consumption 
wealth index for urban and rural reference groups in each country. I expect these 
results to be consistent with findings that other financial measures, such as income, 
positively influences wellbeing (e.g., Veenhoven 1991). The figure shows that SWB is 
positively related to consumption-wealth index. As expected, the general trend of 
wellbeing is increasing with the index. The reference group mean SWB is clustered 
within 2.4 and 3.4, indicating on average, respondents think their standards of living 
are slightly above or slightly below everyone else’s (a score of three indicates that a 
respondent’s living standards are the same as others in the country). However, 
differences across countries also indicate that the consumption-wealth measure is an 
imperfect predictor of SWB. Urban and rural Liberians report higher SWB and urban 
and rural Kenya report lower SWB than the general trend. While Kenya ranked 144th 
and Liberia ranked 176th out of 179 countries in the UNDP’s 2008 Human 
Development Index (2008 was the year of the Afrobarometer survey), Kenya’s mean 
SWB scores are lower than Liberia’s.  This could indicate cultural differences (e.g., 
the commonly-held belief that West Africans are more cheerful than East Africans), 
memory on the part of Liberians about life during the recent civil war being quite bad 
compared to today, Kenyans’ recent experience with ethnic violence following 
elections in late 2007 or other factors. 
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Method 
The dependent variable, subjective wellbeing, is measured on a scale of one to 
five. Other researchers have found that ordinary least squares (OLS) is suitable for 
estimating SWB when it is measured on an scale of zero to ten (e.g., Easterlin et al. 
2011). With the dependent variable having only five categories, as a more cautious 
approach, I estimate an ordinal logit rather than an OLS model. An ordinal logit can 
better incorporate potential differences in scale between response categories that an 
OLS regression would treat as equivalent and will avoid potentially biased 
inconsistent and inefficient results that could occur if OLS is applied incorrectly.  
The general form of the model is presented below in equation 1: 𝑦∗ =   𝛼 +   𝑰𝒊!𝜷+ 𝑿𝒊!𝜸  + 𝛿!𝐶! + 𝜌!𝑈 + 𝑹𝑮𝒊′𝜽+   𝜀 
𝑦 = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑦 ∗  ≤ 𝜇!2  𝑖𝑓  𝜇! < 𝑦 ∗  ≤ 𝜇!3  𝑖𝑓  𝜇! < 𝑦 ∗  ≤ 𝜇!4  𝑖𝑓  𝜇! < 𝑦 ∗≤ 𝜇!5  𝑖𝑓  𝜇! < 𝑦 ∗  (1) 
The underlying latent response, y* is unknown. Observed responses are an 
ordered set of discrete responses, y, which groups y* into one of five response 
categories. The parameter α is a constant; Ii is a vector of individual attributes of 
interest, including respondent’s consumption-wealth score, assessment of government 
efficacy score, access to community services score, experience of crime and fear of 
crime score. Also included in vector Ii is the rate of wasting among children under age 
two in the respondent’s reference group. Cj are a series of indicators variable taking a 
value of one for each of j countries; U is an indicator taking a value of one for 
residents of urban areas and zero otherwise for each respondent i. Xi is a vector of 
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control variables and 𝜀 is the error term. 
The vector Xi control variables include demographic and personal 
characteristics and country attributes, including income Gini coefficients and growth 
rates. The included sociodemographic variables, age, gender, schooling, minority 
status, and religion, have been found in other studies to be consistently important for 
SWB or important to include as controls (Diener et al 2010; Easterlin et al. 2011). I 
include frequency of listening to the radio, as a way to capture whether people are 
engaged with the outside world. This could be a valid concern in remote regions of 
sub-Saharan Africa, where residents may only have a limited sense of what life is like 
outside their village, relative to those who have more frequent contact with the outside 
world. 
RGi is a vector of the leave-out mean reference group values of the 
consumption-wealth index, the community service index, and the crime index for 
respondent i. Reference groups are composed of other urban (rural) respondents within 
each country for each urban (rural) respondent. Lastly, I consider an alternative 
specification that replaces vector RGi with reference group Gini coefficients of 
consumption and wealth index scores, crime and crime risk index scores, and index 
scores of community services. I also include interaction terms of an individual’s index 
with the reference group Gini coefficient.  
Prior to estimating the correlates of subjective wellbeing, I made two post-
survey adjustments.  First, both the DHS and Afrobarometer data are weighted.  The 
Afrobarometer data were weighted across and within country to adjust for failures to 
sample from certain population units. These weights were computed using the most 
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currently available census data. Similarly, DHS data are weighted in order to be 
representative; DHS oversamples in geographic areas with small percentages of the 
population.  Second, as discussed in the section on robustness checks and in the 
appendix, I estimated the models using multiply imputed data as well. The results are 
robust to chained multiple imputation and given the low-degree of missingness and for 
ease of interpretation, I present the non-imputed findings here. 
Findings, robustness checks, and discussion 
Findings  
The role of reference group attributes on subjective wellbeing is inconsistent 
across studies on subjective wellbeing in low-income countries. Table 3.6 presents 
coefficients from four ordinal logistic regressions estimated to identify if and when 
sub-Saharans experience relative deprivation, and whether relative deprivation is 
limited to economic factors or can result from community-attributes as well. Due to 
unobserved heterogeneity, the relationships between wellbeing and individual 
attributes should be treated as associational rather than causal.  
Model 1 includes the usual socio-demographic correlates of subjective 
wellbeing. Model 2 adds attributes of the respondents’ communities to model 1 to test 
how, if at all, community attributes shape a respondent’s SWB. In models 3 and 4, I 
examine how mean reference group measures and inequality within reference groups 
shape subjective wellbeing in sub-Saharan Africa. Model 3 incorporates leave-out 
mean reference group measures to test whether respondents experience relative 
deprivation in three categories: consumption-wealth deprivation, crime and crime risk 
deprivation, and or community services deprivation. Model 4 replaces the three leave-
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out mean reference group measures with inequality-based measures and interactions 
with respondents’ own measures to test whether dispersion of reference group 
characteristics matters for SWB.   
1. Initial model of usual correlates of subjective wellbeing 
The initial model, model 1, establishes that the usual correlates are consistent 
with findings from other studies of the correlates of subjective wellbeing. In model 1, 
an individual’s wellbeing is estimated as a function of the individual’s attributes and 
community and country fixed effects. Complete results are presented in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 here  
The coefficient on the consumption wealth index is strongly positively and 
statistically significantly associated with expected SWB, all else equal: an increase in 
the consumption wealth index increases the odds of reporting SWB slightly worse or 
better (SWB >=2) are 1.27 times greater than reporting SWB much worse than others 
(SWB = 1). A chi-square test indicates that the consumption-wealth index statistically 
significantly contributes explanatory power to the model at the one percent level 
(chi2(1) =  172.46).  The ordered log odds coefficient estimates of other demographic 
characteristics including gender, age, religiosity, and schooling contribute to the 
expected value of SWB as found in other studies (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2008; 
Ravallion and Lokshin 2010).  The coefficient on the use of a radio is also highly 
statistically significant and positive, suggesting that understanding about the outside 
world improves wellbeing and that concerns that isolated individuals may report high 
SWB because they do not have an understanding of what life is like outside their 
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community do not seem warranted.23 Lastly, the coefficient on speaking a minority 
language at home, a proxy measure for ethnicity, has a negative and highly statistically 
significant relationship with SWB. Given that an explanation in the other direction is 
unlikely, that is that people with worse living conditions will decide to speak a 
minority language at home, this would indicate that being a member of a minority 
language group, all else equal, decreases SWB. The predicted values for each model 
of subjective wellbeing are presented in Table 3.7. 
 Table 3.7 here 
The within-country variation between urban and rural communities visible in 
Figure 3.2 is captured in model 1, which finds a strongly positive relationship between 
the ordered log-odds of living in an urban area and expected subjective wellbeing, all 
else equal. However, from model 1, I cannot identify which aspects of living in an 
urban area improve SWB. SWB could be higher in urban areas because of improved 
access to health (as measured by a health outcome – wasting – here), as noted by 
Smith et al. (2005) or by increased income (Easterlin et al. 2011), or by crime rates, or 
access to community services. I now turn to testing these attributes in model 2. I 
expect that as access to services and satisfaction with government efforts increase, and 
as experience with crime and rates of wasting fall, SWB will increase. 
2. Model of attributes of an individual’s community and subjective wellbeing 
While model 1 demonstrates that living in an urban area is strongly associated 
with increases in the ordered log odds of SWB, the coefficient on living in an urban 
                                                
23 Ownership of a radio is included in the wealth-consumption index, and it is possible that the 
high degree of significance associated with increased use reflects both use and ownership 
(many poor and near-poor households cannot afford to own a radio in much of rural sub-
Saharan Africa). 
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area is no longer statistically significant when community characteristics are included 
in model 2. Including community attributes measures not only decreases the ordered 
log odds estimate of living in an urban area on expected SWB but also renders urban 
residence no longer statistically significant. The coefficient on the experience and fear 
of crime has a negative and highly significant association with wellbeing: a one unit 
increase in the crime index decreases the odds of reporting an increased level of SWB 
by about ten percent. Neither coefficient on wasting nor on access to community 
services index is significantly associated with SWB. A limitation of the community 
services index is that it is based on enumerator reports of availability, and not on 
respondent’s actual access. If these attributes fail to reflect a respondent’s true access 
or use of services, it would not be surprising that this measure is not significant. 
Nonetheless, chi square test rejects hypothesis that the explanatory power of the 
variables community services index, crime risk index, and wasting rate is jointly null 
at the one percent level (chi2(3) =   38.45). Therefore, I include community services 
and wasting measures in later models.  
A one point increase in the perception of government’s handling of various 
social and economic issues increases the odds of a stating one’s SWB is slightly worse 
off or higher (SWB>=2) than reporting SWB is much worse (SWB = 1) by 1.25 times, 
all else held constant. This suggests that people who feel that their government is 
capably handling issues directly relevant to their own lives are happier, holding 
constant their access to services, experience with crime and proportion of wasting 
within the community. The strongly positive and highly statistically significant 
association between perception of government and SWB holds for the later models as 
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well. Lastly, the consumption wealth index variable remains positive and significant 
and other demographic characteristics behave similarly to model 1. 
Model 2 firmly indicates that crime within the community and people’s 
perceptions of their governments, matter for SWB, all else held constant.  In other 
words, at least some community attributes inform people’s assessments of their lives.  
3. Model of relative deprivation and subjective wellbeing 
Model 3 incorporates relative deprivation measures, computed as the leave-out 
mean value within each reference group, excluding the contribution of the individual 
respondent to the value. In model 3, I follow the approach of other relative deprivation 
researchers, define reference groups spatially based on urban or rural residency status 
within a country (Senik (2004) and Kingdon and Knight (2007)).  If relative 
deprivation exists, the community means to enter into the model negatively and 
significantly, but if respondents experience positive externalities from increases to the 
mean community level, these mean measures will be positive.  
In this sample, relative deprivation computed from reference group means does 
not appear to be a relevant correlate of SWB.  None of the three additional measures, 
leave-out mean consumption wealth index, leave-out mean community services index, 
and leave-out mean crime and fear of crime measures, are statistically significantly 
different from zero. The null hypothesis that jointly these three additional variables do 
not add to the model cannot be rejected (chi2(3) = 5.77) at the ten percent significance 
level. However, a joint test of the consumption-wealth index and the mean 
consumption-wealth index rejects the null at the one percent significance level 
(chi2(2) =  146.21), as does a joint text of the crime index and the mean crime index 
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(chi2(  2) =   36.85); both of these findings likely reflect the value of the individual 
indices contribution to the model. The coefficients for the other variables are 
consistent with the coefficients in model 2. 
The Akaike Information Criterion measures the comparative goodness of fit 
across multiple models, by describing the tradeoff between bias and variance; the 
model with the lowest AIC is the model that minimizes the information lost. The AIC 
indicates that model 3 is not an improvement over model 2.  
Nonetheless, the reference group measures used here, which rely on leave-out 
mean values of indices, are not identical to other reference group measures using mean 
income or more complete consumption measures. Further, the reference groups, which 
slot individuals into rural or urban categories within each country, may be too broad, 
an issue explored elsewhere (see Lentz 2013). Thus, the lack of statistical significance 
of the findings fails to confirm either the findings of relative deprivation or the 
findings of positive externalities in other studies. However, I now turn to examining 
whether inequality within reference groups does impact SWB in model 4. 
4. Model of inequality and subjective wellbeing 
Few relative deprivation studies using low or middle-income country data have 
examined how inequality influences SWB. One exception is Senik (2004), who found 
that neither Gini nor Stark inequality measures were significant for Russians’ 
subjective wellbeing. Addressing this omission is particularly valuable for 
understanding SWB in low-income countries, which have uneven institutional 
capacity both across countries and within them (Lipton 1977; Bezemer and Headey 
2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). In model 4, I substitute inequality within 
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reference group attributes and interaction terms for reference group means to test 
whether inequality-based relative deprivation exists. The interaction terms enable me 
to examine whether dispersion of inequality of consumption-wealth, crime, or 
community services, relative to one’s own level of these same factors, impacts 
wellbeing. 
In model 4, I find evidence that the average marginal effect of an increase in 
the consumption-wealth index on SWB, depends on the degree of inequality. People 
residing in more unequal environments experience a greater boost to their subjective 
wellbeing from an increase in their consumption-wealth index relative to people 
residing in less unequal areas. Thus, reference group inequality dampens the effect of 
an increase in an individual’s own economic attributes. I term this finding “inequality-
based relative deprivation.” 
A chi-square test of the null hypothesis that jointly, the coefficients on the 
consumption wealth index, the consumption wealth Gini, and the interaction term are 
not statistically different from zero rejects the null (chi2(3) =  149.87). Holding the 
community consumption-wealth index fixed at a series of values, I compute the 
average marginal effect of consumption-wealth Gini on SWB, as seen in Table 3.8. 
All the other covariates are evaluated at their means.  I do not find that a marginal 
increase in inequality statistically significantly effects subjective wellbeing. 
Table 3.8 here 
Table 3.9 includes the marginal effect of an increase in the consumption wealth 
index on SWB, evaluated at different values of the consumption-wealth Gini, holding 
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of inequality, such as urban Nigeria and urban Kenya, an increase in own 
consumption-wealth has a smaller marginal impact on SWB than for more unequal 
reference groups, such as residents of rural Zimbabwe or rural Uganda. These results, 
which are almost universally highly statistically significant, indicate that increases in 
consumption and wealth matter more for SWB in places where people face more 
extreme inequality than where reference group inequality in lower. Inequality within a 
social environment undermines the effect of an increase in consumption-wealth index. 
Table 3.9 here 
Similar to the consumption-wealth variables, a joint chi-square test of the 
crime index and its related measures rejects the null (chi2(3) =   43.61) at the one 
percent level. 46 percent of respondents have the lowest score, indicating having little 
to no experience with or fear of crime. The mean is -0.289 and the standard deviation 
is 1.21.   Table 3.10 reports the marginal effect of an increase in the crime Gini 
evaluated at different values of the crime index, holding all other covariates at their 
means. A marginal increase in the crime Gini, which indicates that crime is becoming 
more concentrated, for all levels of an individual’s own experiences and fear of crime 
results in negative odds of reporting low levels of SWB and positive odds of reporting 
higher levels of SWB. Thus, when the amount of crime becomes marginally more 
concentrated within a reference group, people feel better, all else equal. 
Table 3.10 here 
Accounting for variation in individual’s responses to inequality results in the 
coefficient on wasting to become statistically significant. The estimated ordered log 
odds for a one percent increase in wasting in children under two becomes more 
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negative and highly statistically significant with the inclusion of the inequality 
measures and the interaction measures for the other attributes. Strikingly, the odds 
ratio is 0.005; a one percentage point increase in wasting in model 4 decreases the 
likelihood of reporting a higher level of SWB by 99 percent. The negative ordered log 
odds suggests two interpretations. First, the overall health of a community, which can 
be readily observed through the degree of wasting in the community, may be a proxy 
of an individual’s own health status, which is linked to SWB. Second, seeing wasted 
children may make people feel depressed or frustrated, and thus may decreases one’s 
own SWB.  
Testing jointly whether the three community service measures are statistically 
significantly different from zero, I fail to reject the null (chi2(3) = 5.25). Given that 
the community services measure is a proxy for a respondent’s true access to 
community services, re-estimating these findings with respondent reported measures 
would better answer whether community services matter for SWB, as the crime index, 
consumption-wealth index, perception of government index and rate of wasting do. 
The coefficients for most of the sociodemographic measures in model 4 remain 
consistent with the earlier models. 
Across models, a respondent’s perception of government’s performance in 
addressing social issues is strongly positively associated with wellbeing. One 
explanation is that optimists are more inclined to both see their own living conditions 
and their government through rose-colored glasses and will report higher levels of 
both. A second explanation is that government efficacy does matter for the lives of its 
residents, perhaps particularly in developing countries, where the quality of 
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governance is highly variable. Relatedly, those who believe the government is 
attending to important social needs feel valued as residents by their government and 
feel that their concerns have been heard, improving their own sense of wellbeing. Data 
on personality traits would help to unpack this relationship.  
The AIC indicates that model 4 is the best fitting model among the four.  The 
predicted probabilities, evaluated at the means of independent variables, from models 
1- 4 are shown in Table 3.7. The models’ predicted probabilities are consistent with 
the distribution of subjective wellbeing responses computed from the descriptive 
statistics. 
Robustness checks 
I perform several robustness checks on the results. First, I discuss in detail in 
the appendix the internal and external consistency of the wealth-consumption index, 
finding that the measuring is internally consistent but that a lack of appropriate 
benchmarks limits my ability to establish external consistency (Filmer and Pritchett 
2000).  
Second, after combining the ten DHS community averaged datasets with the 
Afrobarometer data, I used multiple imputation then deletion to estimate “missing” 
and “don’t know” responses in the Afrobarometer data. The overall degree of 
missingness among the fourteen variables with missing information is quite small; the 
highest was seven percent. Examining missing values and don’t know responses, I 
found no observable patterns. Using chained multiple imputation in Stata version 12, I 
imputed missing data for both continuous and discrete variables, generating five 
datasets. Following Johnson and Young (2011), my imputation model included the 
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same set of variables as the analysis model, including interaction terms. I also included 
two relevant auxiliary variables: electricity access and access to paved road. Estimates 
from the five datasets were pooled with the MIM prefix in Stata version 12.  The 
imputation models’ results are consistent with complete case analysis results. The 
imputed models’ coefficients are neither consistently higher nor lower than the 
coefficients of the complete case models. See the appendix for more details on 
imputation and on results generated with imputed data. 
Third, the models are robust to alternative specifications of key variables, 
including the individual variables underlying each index, although not all variables 
can be included at the same time due to multicollinearity. I also tested other 
community-health variables computed from the DHS, finding the degree of stunting, 
undernutrition, and diarrheal diseases also decrease the log odds of SWB. Models 2-4 
are robust to several different measures of community health.   Rates of wasting, 
stunting, and undernourishment among children younger than two years similarly 
impact subjective wellbeing. All of these measures were computed using DHS data 
aggregated at the community level within each country. See the appendix for results 
and more details. 
Fourth, I test the estimation approach by estimating the same series of models 
using an ordinal probit model, finding the models robust to this alternative estimation 
approach. Results are in the appendix. The variables’ coefficients differ slightly, 
however, the key variables of interest remain statistically significant, usually falling 
within the same interval of statistical significance. The probit models’ coefficients 
tend to be slightly lower than the logit estimates.  One difference is that the ordinal 
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probit estimation indicates that wasting is statistically significant at the ten percent 
level in model 2, the community attributes model. It is not statistically significant in 
the ordinal logit model, although it cannot be rejected at the 13 percent level.  
Summary of main findings and discussion 
1. Summary of main findings 
I contribute two main findings that expand our limited knowledge about 
subjective wellbeing in low-income countries and how relative deprivation, inequality 
and community attributes contribute to people’s perceptions of their lives.  First, 
model 2 demonstrates that community characteristics are important, non-economic 
factors that shape people’s perceptions of their lives for residents of ten countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. A narrow focus on economic measures and individual 
sociodemographic characteristics misses other meso-level factors associated with 
SWB.  Specifically, increases in the degree of crime experienced and fear of crime 
adversely impact wellbeing while increases in the perception of government 
performance improve the odds of increased wellbeing.  
Second, in model 3, I estimate whether leave-out mean reference group levels 
of consumption-wealth, crime, and access to community services matters for SWB. 
Contrary to other findings, I find no evidence of either relative deprivation or of 
positive externalities. Replacing leave-out means with the reference group Gini 
measure, and an interaction term of the Gini and the respondent’s own score, in model 
4, I find statistically strong evidence of consumption-wealth inequality decreasing the 
impact of an increase in the consumption-wealth index on SWB, which I term 
“inequality-based relative deprivation.” In reference groups with lower inequality, 
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increases in consumption-wealth index have a smaller (absolute) marginal effect on 
SWB than in reference groups with higher inequality. In other words, relative 
deprivation, in this sample, is an inequality-based phenomenon and which dampens 
the impact of increases in consumption-wealth.  I also find the rate of wasting for 
children under two adversely impacts SWB and that increases in the inequality of 
crime (i.e., a concentration of crime indicates a decreased probability of any individual 
experiencing crime) increases SWB.  
2. Discussion   
This study aims to contribute to a re-assessment of the broader question of 
inequality in development.  Durkheim was correct when he wrote, “desires depend 
upon resources to some extent” (p. 245). I find that individuals’ assessments of their 
own well-being varies with policy-related variables such as physical security and 
health care.  My findings also indicate that desires depend on how equitably resources 
are distributed. In other words, not only do community attributes matter for subjective 
wellbeing, but also inequality-based relative deprivation matters for SWB, although its 
impact depends on where individuals are in the distribution.  
The life satisfaction of the poorest is most adversely impacted by inequality, 
whereas mean measures of relative deprivation do not appear to exert influence on 
sub-Saharan Africans’ subjective wellbeing. Evaluating mean reference group 
characteristics (net of the individual’s component) may miss important ways in which 
inequality can shape SWB. As Morgan (2006) argues, research on inequality often 
considers it an outcome; inequality is less often used as a predictor. An important next 
step is to establish whether inequality-based relative deprivation matters in other low-
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income country datasets that have richer expenditure and income measures. Such 
future findings could resolve the debate regarding the existence of relative deprivation 
in low-income countries. 
If improving subjective wellbeing is a valued policy outcome, understanding 
the role of inequality in wellbeing can help inform investment decisions for 
policymakers (Layard 2005). The strong, positive relationship between respondents’ 
assessments of their governments’ ability to address social issues and SWB suggests 
that respondents derive increased satisfaction from their lives when they believe their 
government is productively engaged with social issues. My findings also indicate that 
declines in wasting rates and crime will improve respondents’ subjective wellbeing. 
Life satisfaction of poorer segments of the population will also improve with declines 
in consumption and wealth inequality. While the research focuses on findings from 
sub-Saharan Africa, these findings highlight the importance of non-economic social 
environment attributes, which may be relevant for other settings as well. Those 
interested in how people make decisions, such as whether to join a social movement, 
can also benefit from an increased understanding of what factors contribute to 
people’s perceptions of their lives.  
There are a series of methodological challenges associated with the study of 
subjective wellbeing (Frey and Stutzer 2001; Helliwell and Putnam 2004; Krueger and 
Schkade 2008; Graham 2009; Conti and Pudney 2011; Ravallion 2012). First, I do not 
have psychometric measures of personality traits that almost certainly contribute to an 
individual’s sense of wellbeing (Deiner et al. 2002). The second challenge is latent 
unobserved heterogeneity. Urban-rural inequalities are endogenous to migration 
  101 
decisions, something I cannot adequately control for (Sahn and Stifel 2003).  To the 
extent that happier people are able to build or advocate for better communities, the 
results are consistent with this interpretation. Nonetheless, the deep literature on urban 
bias (Lipton 1977; Sahn and Stifel 2003; Bezemer and Headey 2008) suggests that 
urban-rural disparities in access to schools, markets, health facilities, and in nutritional 
outcomes etc. are longstanding. Relatedly, I examine wellbeing relative to urban and 
rural reference groups within each country. As others have noted, this may not be the 
most relevant referent group, an issue explored elsewhere (Kingdon and Knight 2007; 
Ravallion 2012; Lentz 2013). Third, the concepts of happiness or wellbeing may mean 
different things in different cultures (Uchida et al. 2004). Relatedly, many of the 
Afrobarometer questions have ordinal responses. The meaning of the ordinal orderings 
may not be universally agreed upon by respondents. However, differences in 
interpretation of SWB and other questions may be heterogenous and therefore may not 
bias the results in a particular direction (Ravallion 2012). Deiner et al. (2010) find that 
SWB’s association with many factors is consistent in cross-national studies. Given the 
paucity of data on sub-Saharan Africa SWB, this warrants further research. Fourth, the 
lack of significant relationship between mean reference group attributes and SWB in 
this study are not necessarily inconsistent to other findings in low and middle-income 
countries (Senik 2004; Kingdon and Knight 2007; Ravallion and Dokshin 2010). The 
consumption-wealth index is a proxy that may not produce findings equivalent to 
studies using other objective measures of economic wellbeing. 
Although these concerns are important, subjective wellbeing assessments 
nonetheless remain informative, particularly as we aim to better understand what 
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forms of inequality and what community attributes are associated with subjective 
wellbeing.  As Massey (2002) argues, paying attention to emotions, subjective 
interpretations, and perceptions provide critical ways to rethink rationality.  
Potentially, a better understanding of the correlates of subjective wellbeing will allow 
us to understand and predict behavior in more robust ways by incorporating factors 
important for subjective wellbeing such as relative deprivation, instability and 
vulnerability, aspirations, cultural norms, and or mutual insurance.   A sociological 
contribution to the study of development in the coming years might be understanding 
subjective wellbeing and inequality not as epiphenomenal to development in sub-
Saharan Africa, but as central to the ways that people make decisions about, adopt, 
and reject a range of livelihood choices, civic engagements, and development 
interventions.  
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of subjective wellbeing by community 
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Figure 3.2: Consumption wealth index and subjective wellbeing by community  
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Table 3.1: List of survey countries included and year of survey 
Country Afrobarometer 
Round IV 
Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS) Round V 
UNU WIDER Gini 
Estimates 
Benin 2008 2006 2003 
Ghana 2008 2008-09 1999 
Kenya 2008 2008-09 1997 
Liberia 2008 2007 1974 
Mali 2008 2006 2001 
Namibia 2008 2006-07 1993 
Nigeria 2008 2008 2003 
Uganda* 2008 2006 2002 
Zambia 2008 2007 2004 
Zimbabwe 2008 2005-6 1990 
 
Notes: 
*Northern Uganda was excluded from the Afrobarometer survey due to security concerns. 
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Table 3.2: Variation explained by the first component for each principal 
component analysis by country 
  
Consumption-
wealth 
Perception 
of 
government 
Crime and 
crime risk 
Access to 
community 
services 
Benin 0.29 0.61 0.58 0.44 
Ghana 0.30 0.56 0.47 0.48 
Kenya 0.30 0.42 0.54 0.37 
Liberia 0.22 0.52 0.54 0.42 
Mali 0.25 0.49 0.62 0.49 
Namibia 0.35 0.44 0.60 0.40 
Nigeria 0.34 0.56 0.61 0.33 
Uganda 0.31 0.49 0.56 0.39 
Zambia 0.27 0.54 0.48 0.42 
Zimbabwe 0.24 0.60 0.50 0.43 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Subjective wellbeing (1-5) 13867 2.817 1.049 1 5 
Sociodemographic Measures           
Female = 1 14291 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Age 14207 35.097 13.628 18 110 
Age squared 14207 1417.505 1177.693 324 12100 
Education category (0-3) 14268 1.439 0.955 0 3 
Minority language = 1 14288 0.412 0.492 0 1 
Religiosity (1-4) 14036 3.819 0.542 1 4 
Frequency of listening to radio news 14281 1.436 0.709 0 2 
Consumption wealth index 13992 0.279 1.274 -2.580 4.251 
Perception of government index 13271 -1.084 1.797 -3.956 3.901 
Access to community services index 14029 -0.573 1.701 -3.917 1.773 
Experience and fear of crime index 14215 -0.209 1.213 -1.095 6.656 
Reference Group Characteristics           
% of under 2s wasted for reference 
group 14291 0.175 0.050 0.094 0.285 
Mean consumption wealth 14291 0.284 0.638 0.800 1.397 
Mean community services 14291 -0.571 0.971 2.421 1.546 
Mean crime and fear of crime 14291 -0.209 0.232 -0.633 0.274 
Consumption wealth Gini 14291 0.406 0.057 0.305 0.498 
Community services Gini 14291 0.184 0.052 0.045 0.257 
Crime and fear of crime Gini 14291 0.436 0.033 0.387 0.532 
National Level Controls           
National Gini 14291 46.891 9.582 36.500 73.900 
Country GDP growth rate 14291 4.528 4.089 -8.174 7.826 
Urban = 1 14291 0.360 0.480 0 1 
Notes: 
     To create community characteristics, I divide the country into rural and urban areas and 
compute community level characteristics based on either rural or urban information. 
The consumption wealth index, the community services index, the crime index, and the 
perception of government index are the first scores generated from a principal 
components analysis for each country.  
The consumption wealth index includes the following variables:  past year's frequency 
of adequate availability of food, cash, water, medical care, and fuel and access to cash 
employment (consumption measures) and whether water was available inside the house 
or compound, ownership of radio, television, and motorvehicle (wealth measures). 
The community services index includes the following variables: availability of schools, 
clinics, market, police, paved road, and cellular phone reception in the enumeration 
area. 
The crime index includes the following variables: frequency of robberies in the past 
year, frequency of attacks in the past year, and fear of crime (0-4). 
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The perception of government index includes the following variables: 1-4 assessment of 
the government's job in addressing poverty, income inequality, crime, health and food 
security. 
Minority language is coded one for those who speak a language at home that spoken by 
less than 10% of population. 
Schooling is divided into four categories: no formal schooling (category includes 
Koranic or other informal schooling); some or finished primary school; some or finished 
secondary school; any post secondary education, including certificate programs. 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Rural Residents 
 
Variable  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Subjective wellbeing (1-5) 8869 2.666 1.018 1 5 
Sociodemographic Measures           
Female = 1 9146 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Age 9083 36.121 13.939 18 110 
Age squared 9083 1499.011 1226.970 324 12100 
Education category (0-3) 9133 1.247 0.920 0 3 
Minority language = 1 9143 0.447 0.497 0 1 
Religiosity (1-4) 8983 3.804 0.562 1 4 
Frequency of listening to radio news 9139 1.378 0.737 0 2 
Consumption wealth index 8966 -0.071 1.142 -2.580 4.120 
Perception of government index 8477 -1.108 1.777 -3.956 3.901 
Access to community services index 8956 -1.109 1.582 -3.917 1.773 
Experience and fear of crime index 9104 -0.258 1.189 -1.095 6.656 
Reference Group Characteristics           
% of under 2s wasted for reference 
group 9146 0.193 0.048 0.124 0.285 
Mean consumption wealth 9146 -0.663 0.444 -0.800 0.799 
Mean community services 9146 -01.105 0.613 -2.421 0.004 
Mean crime and fear of crime 9146 -0.257 0.231 -0.633 0.530 
Consumption wealth Gini 9146 0.434 0.044 0.350 0.498 
Community services Gini 9146 0.192 0.059 0.045 0.257 
Crime and fear of crime Gini 9146 0.440 0.039 0.387 0.532 
National Level Controls           
National Gini 9146 46.978 9.535 36.500 73.900 
Country GDP growth rate 9146 4.645 4.106 -8.174 7.826 
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics for Urban Residents 
 
Variable  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Subjective wellbeing (1-5) 4998 3.084 1.048 1 5 
Sociodemographic Measures           
Female = 1 5145 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Age 5124 33.282 12.859 18 98 
Age squared 5124 1273.025 1069.818 324 9604 
Education category (0-3) 5135 1.782 0.919 0 3 
Minority language = 1 5145 0.350 0.477 0 1 
Religiosity (1-4) 5053 3.847 0.502 1 4 
Frequency of listening to radio news 5142 1.539 0.644 0 2 
Consumption wealth index 5026 0.904 1.259 -2.580 4.251 
Perception of government index 4794 -1.040 1.831 -3.956 3.901 
Access to community services index 5145 0.761 0.112 0.575 0.907 
Experience and fear of crime index 5073 0.373 1.477 -3.917 1.773 
Reference Group Characteristics           
% of under 2s wasted for reference group 5145 0.142 0.035 0.094 0.210 
Mean consumption wealth 5145 0.906 0.421 0.024 1.397 
Mean community services 5145 0.377 0.738 -1.387 1.546 
Mean crime and fear of crime 5145 -0.123 0.207 -0.409 0.274 
Consumption wealth Gini 5145 0.356 0.040 0.305 0.435 
Community services Gini 5145 0.170 0.031 0.092 0.214 
Crime and fear of crime Gini 5145 0.429 0.018 0.404 0.463 
National Level Controls           
National Gini 5145 46.736 9.664 36.500 73.900 
Country GDP growth rate 5145 4.321 4.052 -8.174 7.826 
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Table 3.6: Ordered logit estimates of subjective wellbeing (1=much worse off … 5 
= much better off) 
Models 1 2 3 4 
  Initial model 
Community 
attributes 
model  
Community 
attributes 
and relative 
deprivation 
Community 
attributes 
and 
inequality 
model  
Sociodemographic Characteristics   
Female = 1 0.0961** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) Age -0.0390*** -0.0356*** -0.0358*** -0.0354*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) Age squared 0.000374*** 0.000344*** 0.000346*** 0.000341*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Primary school (some or 
completed) 0.0232 0.0288 0.0331 0.0553 
 (0.057) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) Secondary school (some or 
completed) 0.426*** 0.449*** 0.452*** 0.461*** 
 (0.061) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) Post secondary school 0.719*** 0.750*** 0.751*** 0.767*** 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) Minority language = 1 -0.0932** -0.129*** -0.134*** -0.123*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) Religion is not very 
important 0.306 0.327* 0.325* 0.309 
 (0.187) (0.193) (0.194) (0.194) Religion is somewhat 
important 0.243 0.182 0.182 0.173 
 (0.152) (0.156) (0.156) (0.156) Religion is very important 0.222 0.185 0.186 0.173 
 (0.143) (0.147) (0.147) (0.146) Listen to radio news 
between monthly and few 
times a week 
0.229*** 0.239*** 0.242*** 0.225*** 
(0.062) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Listen to radio news daily 0.302*** 0.309*** 0.314*** 0.297*** 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) Consumption wealth index 0.240*** 0.232*** 0.231*** -0.0376 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.131) 
Perception of government 
index 
 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Access to community 
services index 
 0.0155 0.0192 -0.0185 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.038) Experience and fear of 
crime index 
 -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.283 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.196) 
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Reference group     
% of under 2s wasted in 
reference group 
 -2.372 -2.834 -5.224*** 
  (1.537) (1.791) (1.748) Leave-out mean 
consumption wealth 
 
 0.172  
   (0.146)  Leave-out mean 
community services 
 
 -0.145  
   (0.091)  Leave-out mean crime and 
fear of crime 
 
 -0.399  
   (0.308)   Reference-group 
consumption wealth gini 
  
 -0.772 
    (1.358) Reference-group 
community services gini 
  
 -1.525 
    (1.197) Reference-group crime and 
fear of crime gini 
  
 4.436*** 
        (1.462) 
Interactions (contingent 
effects) 
    
Interaction of consumption 
wealth gini and index 
  
 0.671** 
    (0.323) Interaction of community 
services gini and index 
  
 0.192 
    (0.204) Interaction of crime gini 
and index 
  
 0.412 
        (0.441) 
National Level Controls     
National Gini 0.000 0.007 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) Country GDP growth rate -0.008 0.0294*** 0.012 0.0504*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) Urban = 1 0.197*** 0.112 0.216 -0.028 
 (0.044) (0.096) (0.150) (0.122) Ghana 0.420*** 0.0999 0.0446 -0.126 
 (0.081) (0.092) (0.108) (0.115) Kenya -0.645*** -0.679*** -0.617*** -0.917*** 
 (0.085) (0.108) (0.144) (0.119) Liberia 0.866*** 0.998*** 1.061*** 1.191*** 
 (0.084) (0.104) (0.205) (0.120) Mali 0.319*** 0.575*** 0.539*** 0.197 
 (0.061) (0.156) (0.178) (0.172) Namibia 0.0526 -0.433 -0.531* -0.343 
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 (0.209) (0.271) (0.314) (0.310) Nigeria 0.206*** 0.247** 0.370*** 0.320* 
 (0.077) (0.122) (0.138) (0.165) Uganda -0.393*** -0.500*** -0.246 -0.471*** 
 (0.087) (0.109) (0.185) (0.170) 
Constant cut1 -2.240*** -2.475*** -2.221*** -2.077* 
 (0.342) (0.614) (0.764) (1.204) Constant cut2 -0.412 -0.584 -0.329 -0.183 
 (0.342) (0.614) (0.764) (1.203) Constant cut3 1.101*** 0.985 1.241 1.388 
 (0.342) (0.615) (0.764) (1.203) Constant cut4 3.364*** 3.269*** 3.525*** 3.677*** 
  (0.343) (0.615) (0.762) (1.205) 
Observations 13,273 12,164 12,164 12,164 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0452 0.0628 0.063 0.0637 
Akaike Information 
Criterion 2.311 2.266 2.266 2.265 
Notes:     *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
To create community characteristics, I divide the country into rural and urban areas and 
compute community level characteristics based on either rural or urban information. 
The consumption wealth index, the community services index, the crime index, and the 
perception of government index are the first scores generated from a principal 
components analysis for each country.  
The consumption wealth index includes the following variables:  past year's frequency of 
adequate availability of food, cash, water, medical care, and fuel and access to cash 
employment (consumption measures) and whether water was available inside the house or 
compound, ownership of radio, television, and motorvehicle (wealth measures). 
The community services index includes the following variables: availability of schools, 
clinics, market, police, paved road, and cellular phone reception in the enumeration area. 
The crime index includes the following variables: frequency of robberies in the past year, 
frequency of attacks in the past year, and fear of crime (0-4). 
The perception of government index includes the following variables: 1-4 assessment of 
the government's job in addressing poverty, income inequality, crime, health and food 
security. 
Minority language is coded one for those who speak a language at home that spoken by 
less than 10% of population. 
Schooling is divided into four categories: no formal schooling (category includes Koranic 
or other informal schooling); some or finished primary school; some or finished 
secondary school; any post secondary education, including certificate programs. 
Leave-out mean consumption wealth, leave-out mean community services, and leave-out 
mean crime risk were all calculated as the reference group mean, excluding the 
contribution of the respondent's value to the average. 
Benin, Zambia and Zimbabwe are the excluded countries. 
Excluded category for religion is "religion is not at all important". 
Excluded category for listen to the radio is "listen less than monthly". 
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Table 3.7: Predicted values of subjective wellbeing 
SWB level 
Descriptive 
Statistics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
1 0.1091 0.0916 0.0858 0.0857 0.0854 
2 0.2892 0.2939 0.2977 0.2977 0.2974 
3 0.3194 0.3546 0.3657 0.3659 0.3663 
4 0.2406 0.2246 0.2177 0.2177 0.2180 
5 0.0417 0.0352 0.0330 0.0330 0.0329 
# of 
respondents  13,867   13,273   12,164   12,164   12,164  
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Table 3.8: Average marginal effect of the consumption-wealth Gini evaluated at 
different values of the consumption-wealth index  
C-W 
index 
value SWB = 1 SWB = 2 SWB = 3 SWB = 4 SWB = 5 
-1.5 0.205 	  	   0.191 	  	   -0.129 	  	   -0.219 	  	   -0.048 
	  
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.041) 
	  -1 0.154 	  	   0.166 	  	   -0.091 	  	   -0.186 	  	   -0.043 
	  
	  
(0.152) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.088) 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.044) 
	  -0.5 0.109 	  	   0.135 	  	   -0.058 	  	   -0.149 	  	   -0.037 
	  
	  
(0.136) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.046) 
	  0 0.070 	  	   0.098 	  	   -0.031 	  	   -0.108 	  	   -0.029 
	  
	  
(0.123) 
 
(0.172) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.050) 
	  0.5 0.036 	  	   0.057 	  	   -0.012 	  	   -0.063 	  	   -0.018 
	  
	  
(0.112) 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.055) 
	  1 0.008 	  	   0.013 	  	   -0.002 	  	   -0.015 	  	   -0.005 
	  
	  
(0.103) 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.061) 
	  1.5 -0.016 	  	   -0.031 	  	   0.000 	  	   0.035 	  	   0.012 
	  
	  
(0.096) 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.069) 
	  2 -0.036 	  	   -0.075 	  	   -0.007 	  	   0.086 	  	   0.031 
	  
	  
(0.090) 
 
(0.190) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.079) 
	  2.5 -0.051 	  	   -0.118 	  	   -0.023 	  	   0.138 	  	   0.055 
	  	  	   (0.084)   (0.196)   (0.040)   (0.229)   (0.091) 	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Table 3.9: Average marginal effect of the consumption-wealth index evaluated at 
different values of consumption-wealth Gini  
Commun
ity Gini SWB = 1 SWB = 2 SWB = 3 SWB = 4 SWB = 5 
Urban 
Nigeria 0.305 -0.014 *** -0.021 *** 0.004   0.024 *** 0.007 *** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.002) 
	  Urban 
Kenya 0.317 -0.015 *** -0.022 *** 0.005 * 0.025 *** 0.007 *** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.002) 
	  Urb 
Zimbabw
e 0.322 -0.015 *** -0.022 *** 0.005 ** 0.025 *** 0.008 *** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Urban 
Zambia 0.347 -0.017 *** -0.024 *** 0.005 *** 0.027 *** 0.008 *** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
 Rural 
Nigeria 0.350 -0.017 *** -0.024 *** 0.006 *** 0.027 *** 0.008 *** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Urban 
Ghana 0.357 -0.017 *** -0.025 *** 0.006 *** 0.028 *** 0.008 *** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Urban 
Namibia 0.362 -0.018 *** -0.025 *** 0.006 *** 0.028 *** 0.009 *** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Urban 
Benin 0.382 -0.019 *** -0.027 *** 0.007 *** 0.030 *** 0.009 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Urban 
Uganda 0.384 -0.019 *** -0.027 *** 0.007 *** 0.030 *** 0.009 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Urban 
Mali 0.385 -0.019 *** -0.027 *** 0.007 *** 0.030 *** 0.009 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rural 
Ghana 0.406 -0.021 *** -0.028 *** 0.007 *** 0.032 *** 0.010 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rural 
Kenya 0.419 -0.022 *** -0.029 *** 0.008 *** 0.033 *** 0.010 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rural 
Zambia 0.420 -0.022 *** -0.029 *** 0.008 *** 0.033 *** 0.010 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rural 
Liberia 0.428 -0.022 *** -0.030 *** 0.008 *** 0.034 *** 0.010 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rural 
Benin 0.434 -0.023 *** -0.030 *** 0.008 *** 0.034 *** 0.010 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Urban 
Liberia 0.435 -0.023 *** -0.030 *** 0.008 *** 0.035 *** 0.010 *** 
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(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rural 
Mali 0.443 -0.023 *** -0.031 *** 0.008 *** 0.035 *** 0.011 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rural 
Namibia 0.444 -0.024 *** -0.031 *** 0.009 *** 0.035 *** 0.011 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rur 
Zimbabw
e 0.446 -0.024 *** -0.031 *** 0.009 *** 0.035 *** 0.011 *** 
  
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
	  Rural 
Uganda 0.498 -0.028 *** -0.034 *** 0.010 *** 0.039 *** 0.012 *** 
    (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.002) 	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Table 3.10: Average marginal effect of the crime risk Gini evaluated at different 
values of the crime risk index  
Crime 
index 
value SWB = 1 SWB = 2 SWB = 3 SWB = 4 SWB = 5 
-1.095 -0.336 *** -0.486 *** 0.094 ** 0.553 *** 0.175 *** 
 
(0.127) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.037) 
 
(0.208) 
 
(0.066) 
 -0.341 -0.382 *** -0.516 *** 0.134 *** 0.588 *** 0.176 *** 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.060) 
 -0.002 -0.404 *** -0.528 *** 0.153 *** 0.603 *** 0.176 *** 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.059) 
 0.336 -0.427 *** -0.539 *** 0.173 *** 0.617 *** 0.177 *** 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.058) 
 0.843 -0.463 *** -0.555 *** 0.204 *** 0.637 *** 0.176 *** 
 
(0.150) 
 
(0.179) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.057) 
 1.090 -0.481 *** -0.561 *** 0.220 *** 0.646 *** 0.176 *** 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.210) 
 
(0.057) 
 1.428 -0.506 *** -0.570 *** 0.242 *** 0.658 *** 0.176 *** 
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.058) 
 1.844 -0.538 *** -0.579 *** 0.270 *** 0.672 *** 0.175 *** 
 
(0.182) 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.059) 
 2.521 -0.593 *** -0.590 *** 0.317 *** 0.693 *** 0.173 *** 
 
(0.210) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.243) 
 
(0.061) 
 3.119 -0.644 *** -0.596 *** 0.360 *** 0.709 *** 0.171 *** 
  (0.240)   (0.219)   (0.137)   (0.261)   (0.063)   
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APPENDIX 3.1 
DATA AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION, IMPUTATION, AND ROBUSTNESS 
CHECKS 
 
Data and Variable Description 
Below, I describe Afrobarometer data, Demographic and Health Services data, 
and other datasets that I combined to create a unique dataset with which to evaluate the 
roles of different forms of inequality on respondents’ subjective wellbeing. 
Afrobarometer Round 4  
Afrobarometer is a survey of voting-age citizens’ attitudes on the quality of 
democracy and governance in their countries.24 In 2008-9, the fourth round of 
Afrobarometer was fielded in twenty African countries. In all but two countries, 1200 
individuals over the age of 18 were sampled (2400 individuals were sampled in Nigeria 
and South Africa). Response rates tend to be quite high. Among the questions of interest, 
no one refused to answer these questions, and combined rates of “missing” and “don’t 
know” responses were less than seven percent of the total sample. Imputation is discussed 
further below. 
Afrobarometer uses probability proportionate to population sample 
(Afrobarometer 2008). First, it stratifies the sample by region / province and by urban or 
rural. Then, it clusters eight interviews within each primary sampling unit, which is 
identified using census enumeration areas. In total, 150 primary sampling units are used 
in countries with 1200 interviews and 300 units are used in countries with 2400 
interviews. These 150 (300) units are allocated across the strata based on the population 
                                                
24 Information on Afrobarometer sampling methods is drawn from here: 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-and-methods/sampling-principals 
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proportion. Data are weighted within countries to account for any oversampling and 
across countries so that samples sizes are the same across countries.  
Approximately two-thirds of the Afrobarometer questions are identical across 
surveys. The other one-third focus on current political issues or policies of interest to the 
specific country.  The questions that are identical across countries and useful for the 
models include basic demographic attributes, location information, sense of security, 
community services, inability to meet basic consumption needs, assets owned, religiosity, 
and technology use.  
As with many surveys in developing countries, Afrobarometer relies on national 
probability samples in order to generate a sample that is representative in the cross-
section of all citizens of voting age. However, in many countries, nationally 
representative surveys are quite outdates and the demographic patterns necessary to 
extrapolate an updated sample are not available. This is particularly likely to be a 
problem in countries experiencing heavy rural-to-urban migration or seasonal migration 
patterns.  Older national samples may indicate lower urban populations than is currently 
the case. Further, when countries experience conflict or insecurity, certain areas may not 
be surveyed, either because there is no national probability sample to draw from or 
because it is deemed unsafe to send enumerator teams. During Round 4, northern Uganda 
was not included due to security concerns. 
Demographic and Health Survey Round 5 
The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data include both questions 
standardized across countries and questions that are country-specific (DHS Recode File 
version 1.0, 2008) but focuses on gathering information on maternal and child health, as 
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well as other basic demographic information and limited wealth and asset information. In 
order to improve recall about maternal and child health, DHS enumerators elicit 
information from a female member of the household. Approximately 5000 to 6000 
women and their households are interviewed per country. Response rates for the DHS 
tend to be extremely high – between 92 and 97 percent (Vaessen 2005).25 
Each DHS sampling frame is slightly different, although most use the same 
general approach. First, previous censuses or population counts are used to identify 
primary sampling units (PSUs). PSUs are sampled with probability proportional to 
population (or number of households). Most DHS surveys use geographic stratification, 
including rural/urban stratum and or regional stratum. In each stratum, the PSUs are 
selected independently. After the PSUs are selected, if the sampling frame is current, 
households are sampled randomly from within the PSU (Vaessen 2005).  If the sampling 
frame is out of date, a list of households within each PSU is generated and then 
households are randomly selected. Within each selected PSU, respondents are randomly 
selected, with cluster of 30-40 women in rural areas and 20-25 women in urban areas.  
To take one example, the 2008 DHS uses the 2000 Ghanaian census as a master 
sampling frame to identify the number of people to sample within each province and 
within urban and rural areas within province. 412 clusters were selected from the 
sampling frame using systematic sampling with probability proportional to size and 30 
households were selected using systematic sampling in each cluster (Ghana Statistical 
                                                
25 The most recently available census for Liberia was undertaken in 1984, prior to its civil war, 
which resulted in massive internal migration and resettlement. Macro International, the 
implementers of DHS, used a 2005 population projection to identify the population by 
enumeration areas (for more information, see DHS Country report for Liberia, Round 5; 
Appendix A p. 253-255). 
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Service et al. 2009). The Ghana sample is nationally representative, but does rely on an 
outdated census.  
When relying on outdated population measures and where reliable estimates exist, 
sample weights also incorporate expected growth rates for particular populations. The 
DHS data need to be reweighed to be representative, as DHS does oversample in small 
geographic areas with small percentages of the population. 
A possible (but unknown result) of using an outdated census is that the Ghana 
DHS survey may fail to sample women and their households from the margins of urban 
areas, which were not necessarily urban areas in 2000. It is possible that poorer 
households are at the margins of urban areas and therefore it is prudent to assume that 
some under-representation of the poorest and poor urban residents may exist. However, 
Rutstein (2008) argues that the poorer urban households may still be better off than rural 
households: “In reality, the households in the lower urban-defined quintiles may be 
wealthier than households in any of the rural-defined quintiles, since in most developing 
countries most people in poorer urban areas and slums are better off than most people in 
rural areas” (p. 11).26 If this is the case, the survey may be more balanced.27 
Income Inequality Gini Coefficients and Gross Domestic Product 
To measure changes in national income inequality over time, I use estimates 
compiled by Milanovic (2010) that includes Gini coefficients from five sources. It 
                                                
26 http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/WP60/WP60.pdf 
27 A second, related concern is that recent migrants to urban communities may be using people in 
urban areas may be using rural communities as their (implicit) reference groups, even though the 
question is asks that the country be the referent. I cannot control for individuals’ different 
interpretations of survey questions, although we expect that if this is happening it is occurring 
consistently across nations. 
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includes information from World Institute for Development Research (WIDER)’s World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID), which has subsumed Deininger and Squire’s 
database, and from the World Income Database (WYD). Since it was introduced, the 
Deininger and Squire database has dominated cross-national inequality studies (Atkinson 
and Brandolini (2006) review 27 studies using macroeconomic variables to look at 
inequality of the income distribution pp 402-413).  However, Milanovic argues that data 
from WYD, included in the All the Ginis database, is preferable to data from WIDER’s 
2008 WIID2 database because WYD computes Ginis from micro-level data. 
(http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/) . Unfortunately, as 
discussed above, in some countries, for example, Liberia only extremely outdated Gini 
estimates are available. 
I also use data from the World Bank to compute a simple average of the gross 
domestic product for the five years 2002-2006 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries).	  
Weighting 
The Afrobarometer data were weighted across and within country to adjust for 
failures to sample from certain population units. These weights were computed using the 
most currently available census data. Similarly, DHS data files are pre-weighted to adjust 
for any oversampling of particular populations (e.g., urban residents).  
According to the DHS III sampling manual (1996), sample sizes are large enough 
to allow for “five or six geographic areas to be distinguished in the tabulation of key 
variables” (p. 2). In countries with urban populations less than 20 percent, there is 
oversampling in urban areas in order to ensure urban populations are adequately 
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represented.  
 
Imputation  
 
Prior to estimating the correlates of subjective wellbeing, and after combining the 
ten DHS community averaged datasets with the Afrobarometer data and creating the 
variables needed for the models, I used chained multiple imputation to estimate 
“missing” and “don’t know” responses in the Afrobarometer data. Missing values and 
don’t know responses can be arbitrary or systematic (e.g., a particular subpopulation may 
find a certain question sensitive and refuse to answer it). When variables are missing at 
random (MAR) (that is, missingness depends on the observed data), then analyzing the 
sample of complete cases can give biased results while analyzing a sample with imputed 
data will not be biased. Under the MAR assumption, the probability that a value is 
missing does not depend on the true value for that case after controlling for observed 
variables. 
Each Afrobarometer question allows respondents to reply “don’t know” or 
“refused to answer” or “missing.”  Among the questions included in my model, no one 
responded “refused to answer.” I treat these responses as the same.28 Examining the 
Afrobarometer data, I found no observable patterns of missingness among variables 
missing values. In a nested table, I did not find instances of monotone missing values 
(where a missing value in variable x means that variable y will also have a missing 
value).  
                                                
28 For all of the missing values, it is likely that the data are missing at random. For almost all of the “don’t 
knows” responses, data are also likely to be random. However, it could be valuable to differentiate between 
missing and “don’t know” responses because some variables are likely missing data not at random. Older 
people may be less likely to know precisely their age.  People who feel destitute and feel ashamed may 
refuse to answer a question about food availability rather than admit that they went hungry. 
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The total sample across the ten countries included 14,291 respondents. The table 
below shows the fourteen variables that have missing information and that I intend to 
include in the estimation models.  The amount of missing data varies by question. For 
example, only three respondents failed to report the language spoke at home, which was 
used to generate the minority language variable. However, the government perception 
index, which was created using series of questions about whether a government is doing a 
good job regarding different social issues, is missing responses from 7 percent of the 
interviewed households. The overall degree of missingness is quite small compared to 
other surveys and I expect imputed results to be consistent with results from a complete 
case analysis. 
 
Table 3A.1: Variables with missing observations to be imputed 
  Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Subjective Wellbeing 13867 2.817 1.049 1 5 
Age 14207 35.097 13.628 18 110 
Age squared 14207 1417.505 1177.693 324 12100 
Education category (0-3) 14268 1.439 0.955 0 3 
Minority language = 1 14288 0.412 0.492 0 1 
Religiosity (1-4) 14036 3.819 0.542 1 4 
Frequency of listening to radio news 14281 1.436 0.709 0 2 
Consumption wealth index 13992 0.279 1.274 -2.58 4.25 
Perception of government index 13271 -1.084 1.797 -3.96 3.90 
Access to community services index 14029 -0.573 1.701 -3.92 1.77 
Experience and fear of crime index 14215 -0.209 1.213 -1.09 6.66 
Interaction of consumption wealth 
Gini and index 13992 0.082 0.501 -1.29 1.80 
Interaction of community services 
Gini and index 14029 -0.117 0.334 -1.01 0.46 
Interaction of crime Gini and index 14215 -0.093 0.532 -0.58 3.54 
 
I then ran logit models to predict missingness (having created indicators of 
missingness) based on the observations in my sample. Below, I present findings from one 
logit estimate and one t-test estimation to demonstrate that other variables in my model 
predict whether a given variable is missing. I then run t-tests to determine whether values 
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of the other variables vary by missingness, finding that some variables do vary 
missingness group. I do not present all the findings, because the below estimation is 
adequate to demonstrate that proceeding with multiple imputation is appropriate. Note 
that variables constructed using DHS data were collinear with the interaction of country 
and community (urban or rural) and were omitted in the model. 
 
Table 3A.2: Logit Estimate of Missingness of Consumption – Wealth Index 
  Coef. Std. Err. 
Other imputed variables     
Perception of government index 0.001 0.042 
Access to community services index 0.127* 0.065 
Experience and fear of crime index 0.029 0.059 
Age -0.005 0.006 
Minority language = 1 0.048 0.155 
Primary school (some or completed) -0.363 0.236 
Secondary school (some or 
completed) 0.020 0.223 
Post secondary school -0.387 0.289 
SWB = 2 -0.520 0.277 
SWB = 3 0.200 0.249 
SWB = 4 0.123 0.260 
SWB = 5 0.164 0.385 
Listen to radio news between 
monthly and few times a week -0.602** 0.234 
Listen to radio news daily -0.658*** 0.224 
Religion is not very important 0.289 0.878 
Religion is somewhat important 0.111 0.778 
Religion is very important 0.400 0.721 
Variables with no missing values     
Female ==1 -0.170 0.149 
Paved Road ==1 -0.104 0.197 
Electricity Access ==1 -0.210 0.218 
Benin 0.541 0.617 
Ghana 1.193** 0.575 
Kenya 1.200* 0.640 
Liberia -0.007 0.671 
Mali 1.029* 0.621 
Nigeria 0.755 0.552 
Uganda -1.479 1.122 
Zambia -0.023 0.720 
Zimbabwe 0.498 0.643 
Urban Benin -0.397 0.558 
Rural Ghana -0.133 0.413 
Rural Kenya -0.586 0.505 
Rural Liberia 1.015** 0.488 
Rural Mali -1.169 0.878 
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Rural Nigeria 0.721*** 0.274 
Rural Uganda 1.475 1.044 
Rural Zambia 0.139 0.651 
Rural Zimbabwe -0.753 0.613 
Constant -3.822*** 0.981 
 
The model indicates that listening to radio news is statistically significantly 
negatively correlated with missing information on wealth and consumption measures.  
A two-sample t-test of the community services index by missingness of the 
consumption wealth index indicates that mean values of community services when the 
consumption wealth index is missing and when it is not are statistically significantly 
different at the one percent level. The findings regarding the missingness of the 
consumption wealth index, among others, demonstrate that missingness of at least some 
variables can be predicted by other variables in the sample. Thus, the data appear to be 
missing at random rather than missing completely at random. 
 
Table 3A.3: Two-sample t-test of community services by missingness of 
consumption-wealth (c-w) index with equal variances 
Group Obs Mean 
Std. 
Err. Std. Dev. 
[95% 
Conf.  Interval] 
Cases not missing c-w 
index 13736 -0.5840 0.0145 1.700439 -0.612 -0.556 
Cases missing c-w index 293 -0.0448 0.0967 1.65545 -0.235 0.146 
Combined 14029 -0.5728 0.0144 1.701202 -0.601 -0.545 
Difference   -0.5392 0.1003   -0.736 -0.343 
diff = 'mean(0) -'mean(1) 
    
t= -5.374 
Ho: diff = 0 
   
degrees of freedom 14027 
Ha: diff < 0 Pr(T < t)  =0.00 
    Ha: diff!=0 Pr(|T| > |t|) =0.00 
    Ha: diff > 0 Pr(T>t) = 1.00 
     
I multiply imputed the missing values by estimating those values as a function of 
the other predictors (and the dependent variable) in the model. Unlike mean imputation or 
conditional mean imputation, multiply imputed values are drawn from a distribution. As a 
result, values contain some variation and are not error free. A multiply imputed parameter 
is the mean of estimates across imputations. When a model includes well-estimated 
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multiply imputed values, it should have less bias than in the complete case analysis 
model.  
After the multiple imputation, I deleted all imputed responses of the dependent 
variable. I included the subjective wellbeing dependent variable in the imputation to 
allow for the correct specification of the imputed model but remove the missing cases 
before undertaking the analysis, although given the small number of missing values, 
deletion may not have been necessary (Johnson and Young 2011). The 14 imputed 
variables (see table above) included both continuous and discrete responses. Therefore, I 
used chained multiple imputation to account for these multiple types of variables.  
Following Johnson and Young’s 2011 survey of imputation approaches in which 
they argue that the imputation model should include at least the same set of variables as 
the analysis model, I included all variables that I later include in the estimation models as 
well as a few relevant auxiliary variables (electricity access and access to paved road). 
Variables without missing values that were also included in the imputation included all of 
the DHS health-related data, sex of the respondent, and location. Failing to include 
variables in the imputation model that are later used in the analysis model results in 
underestimated covariances. The variable included in the analysis model but not included 
in the imputation model will be uncorrelated with the imputed values. Thus, I also 
include the interaction terms. Failing to do so and calculating these terms after an 
imputation can lead to biased results (von Hippel 2009, as cited by Johnson and Young 
2011). Again following Johnson and Young (2011), I generated five datasets. Combining 
results from these imputations into the later analyses allows me to account for the 
uncertainty resulting from any individual imputation. 
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The chained multiple imputation model suffers from the problem of perfect 
prediction. Perfect prediction can result from inclusion of many factor variables, and is 
not uncommon. In STATA, including the option “augment”, forces the imputation to use 
an augmented regression that adds low-weighted observations to the dataset in order to 
disrupt the perfect prediction while having a negligible effect on the results. 
After examining imputed values from each imputation for anomalous results, 
Iaverage results from the five imputations into one set of results in the table below. We 
also examined frequencies of non-continuous variables, to ensure that distributions were 
similar to the complete case distributions. Comparing the imputed values to means and 
standard deviations from the complete case analysis, I find that for most variables the two 
sets of values are consistent, and within range of one another, although not identical.  
 
Table 3A.4: Comparing means and standard deviations between complete cases and 
imputed values 
 
Complete Cases Imputed Values 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 14207 35.097 13.628 84 39.558 13.745 
Age squared 14207 1417.505 1177.693 84 1806.464 1219.624 
Education category (0-3) 14268 1.439 0.955 23 1.487 0.945 
Minority language = 1 14288 0.412 0.492 3 0.600 0.577 
Religiosity (1-4) 14036 3.819 0.542 255 3.810 0.575 
Frequency of listening to radio news 14281 1.436 0.709 10 1.080 0.827 
Consumption wealth index 13992 0.279 1.274 299 0.469 1.291 
Perception of government index 13271 -1.084 1.797 1020 -0.779 1.801 
Access to community services index 14029 -0.573 1.701 262 0.585 -1.801 
Experience and fear of crime index 14215 -0.209 1.213 76 -0.084 1.282 
Interaction of consumption wealth 
Gini and index 13992 0.082 0.501 299 0.148 0.509 
Interaction of community services 
Gini and index 14029 -0.117 0.334 262 -0.122 0.352 
Interaction of crime Gini and index 14215 -0.093 0.532 76 -0.039 0.564 
 
The most important difference is that the mean index measures vary substantially 
between the imputed values and the complete case values. The mean community services 
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mean from the complete case analysis. Mean imputed estimates of the other index 
measures are also higher than mean estimates from the complete case analysis. The crime 
index and the perception of government index are both less negative for imputed values 
and the mean consumption-wealth index is nearly double for the imputed values. These 
higher mean indices would suggest that respondents missing information on the variables 
included in the indices tend to be better off, in terms of wealth, consumption, and/or 
community services than other respondents. However, I have no evidence to confirm that 
this is the case. 
With the caveat in mind that the imputed indices tend to be higher than the indices 
with complete case information, I estimate the models. I find that the imputation models’ 
results are consistent with results from the complete case models. The imputed models’ 
coefficients are neither consistently higher nor lower than the coefficients of the complete 
case models. There are two noticeable differences regarding statistical significance. In 
model 2, the imputed data yield a wasting measure that is statistically significant at ten 
percent, while wasting is not as significant in the complete case analysis model. In 
imputed model 3, the interaction term between the consumption-wealth measure and its 
Gini is statistically significant at the one percent level, but significant at the five percent 
level in the complete case model.  
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Table 3A.5: Ordered logit estimates of subjective wellbeing using data generated by 
chained multiple imputation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Initial model 
Community 
attributes 
model 
Community 
attributes and 
inequality 
model 
Sociodemographic Measures 
   Female = 1 0.0922** 0.0933** 0.0948** 
 (0.0379) (0.0382) (0.0381) Age -0.0375*** -0.0346*** -0.0346*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0071) Age squared 0.0004*** `0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Primary school (some or completed) 0.0283 0.0416 0.0637 
 (0.0562) (0.0569) (0.0577) Secondary school (some or completed) 0.4194*** 0.4384*** 0.4469*** 
 (0.0603) (0.0611) (0.0618) Post secondary school 0.7100*** `0.7429*** 0.7601*** 
 (0.0780) (0.0789) (0.0792) Minority language = 1 -0.0805** -0.1082*** -0.1029*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0394) (0.0394) Religion is not very important 0.34056* 0.3290* 0.3125* 
 (0.1823) (0.1809) (0.1811) Religion is somewhat important 0.2509* 0.1911 0.1831 
 (0.1469) (0.1444) (0.1442) Religion is very important 0.2365* 0.1852 0.1735 
 (0.1378) (0.1351) (0.1348) 
Listen to radio news between monthly and few times 
a week 0.2497*** 0.2307*** 0.2154*** 
 (0.0617) (0.0625) (0.0626) Listen to radio news daily 0.3209*** 0.2983*** 0.2835*** 
 (0.0621) (0.0628) (0.0628) Consumption wealth index 0.2362*** 0.2293*** -0.1106 
 (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.1246) Perception of government index 
 
0.2245*** 0.2247*** 
  
(0.0118) (0.0118) 
Access to community services index 
 
0.0172 -0.0296 
  
(0.0131) (0.0362) 
Experience and fear of crime index 
 
-0.1033*** -0.2781 
    (0.0169) (0.1911) 
Community Characteristics  
   % of under 2s wasted for community 
 
-2.6875* -5.2227***
  
(1.4624) (1.6466) 
 Community-level consumption wealth Gini 
  
-1.0199 
   
(1.2725) 
Community-level community services Gini 
  
-1.2878 
   
(1.1329) 
Community-level crime Gini 
  
3.9638*** 
      (1.3622) 
Interactions (contingent effects) 
   Interaction of consumption wealth Gini and index 
  
0.8457***
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(0.3072) 
Interaction of community services Gini and index 
  
0.2618 
   
(0.1949) 
Interaction of crime Gini and index 
  
0.4049 
      (0.4310) 
Nation Level Controls 
   National Gini -0.0008 0.0064 -0.0017
 (0.0057) (0.0076) (0.0089) Country GDP growth rate -0.0099 0.0339*** 0.0512*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0104) Urban = 1 0.1949*** 0.0880 -0.0457 
 (0.0440) (0.0910) (0.1175) Ghana 0.4008*** 0.0254 -0.1781* 
 (0.0801) (0.0840) (0.1066) Kenya -0.6567*** -0.7197*** -0.9282*** 
 (0.0832) (0.1025) (0.1132) Liberia 0.8613*** 0.9773*** 1.1631*** 
 (0.0832) (0.0990) (0.1153) Mali 0.3019*** 0.5381*** 0.2024 
 (0.0602) (0.1495) (0.1647) Namibia 0.0844 -0.4503* -0.3626 
 (0.2066) (0.2551) (0.2937) Nigeria 0.2168*** 0.24578** 0.3122** 
 (0.0759) (0.1155) (0.1532) Uganda -0.3994*** -0.5371*** -0.4809*** 
 (0.0857) (0.1031) (0.1628) Constant cut1 -2.2250*** -2.5680*** -2.3466** 
 (0.3372) (0.5798) (1.1452) Constant cut2 -0.4024 -0.6926 -0.4683 
 (0.3366) (0.5791) (1.1437) Constant cut3 1.1130*** 0.8717 1.0981 
 (0.3370) (0.5798) (1.1441) Constant cut4 3.37666*** 3.1794*** 3.409*** 
  (0.3378) (0.5800) (1.1461) 
Observations 13,598 13,598 13,598 
Number of imputations 5 5 5 
 
Given the degree of missingness is quite low and results from the imputation are 
consistent with complete case analysis results, I proceed with analysis and post-
estimation analysis of the complete case model. As noted by StataCorp in its 2011 
STATA Multiple Imputation Handbook for version 12 of STATA when using multiple 
imputation, there is no one estimation sample. Rather, there are many estimation samples. 
StataCorp cautions “do not expect postestimation commands that depend on predicted 
values … to produce correct results” (2011, p. 77).  The inability to reliably engage in do 
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post-estimation work with the imputed survey means the imputed models’ explanatory 
power is substantially less than that of the complete case models. Thus, while using the 
complete case analysis with data missing at random runs the risk of biased results, the 
differences in the coefficient values, standard errors, and statistical significances between 
the complete case analysis and the imputed results are quite small.  
 
 
 
Additional References used for Chained Multiple Imputation 
University of Madison, Wisconsin – Social Science Computing Cooperative 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/sscc/pubs/stata_mi_impute.htm 
UCLA Multiple Imputation in STATA 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/seminars/missing_data/mi_in_stata_pt1.htm 
 
 
Construction of Variables: Principal Components Analysis and Inequality Measures 
Principal Components Analysis 
An important component of SWB is economic wellbeing, measure as income, 
consumption or wealth. Failing to include economic factors would be detrimental to the 
models. Unfortunately, neither the Afrobarometer survey nor the DHS surveys include 
detailed income, wealth or consumption measures. Rather, many researchers interested in 
using these datasets opt for an alterative, proxy measure, such as a wealth or consumption 
index. Many of these indices are created using data reducing techniques, such as principal 
components or factor analysis, to compute a single value and to avoid needing to use 
“suspect price deflators and currency converters” (Sahn and Stifel 2000, p. 2123; see also 
Filmer and Pritchett 2001). DHS surveys include wealth factor scores calculated from a 
series of assets (e.g., bike ownership), access to services, and housing materials using 
principal components analysis.  Research on the DHS wealth index, which is calculated 
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separately for each DHS country, finds that the DHS wealth-based index is both 
internally consistent and is more representative of long-term economic status than indices 
of consumption expenditures (Filmer and Pritchett 2001; Rutstein 2008).  
Mattes, Bratton and Davids (2003) compute a Lived Poverty Index. The authors 
use six questions from Afrobarometer, including “over the past year, how often have you 
or your family gone without food, [water, medical treatment, cooking fuel and cash]?” 
Those who respond “never” are categorized as nonpoor. Those who respond 
“occasionally” are poor, while those responding “frequently” are very poor and or 
“always” are categorized as destitute. This index ranges between the values of one and 
four. The number one represents a complete satisfaction of basic needs while the number 
four represents frequent shortages of basic needs. This index is based on self-report 
information and does not include assets or income.  
Mattes Bratton and Davids (2003) also present results validating the Lived 
Poverty Index.  Ranking poverty in seven southern African countries, the authors 
benchmarked the Lived Poverty Index against several other studies, finding cross-country 
poverty rankings generally matched with other approaches, such as GNP, GNP PPP, and 
UNDP HDI (Mattes et al. 2003). However, the Afrobarometer did rank one country as 
the lowest while the other indices ranked an Afrobarometer’s sixth poorest (of seven) as 
the poorest. It also measured fairly consistently with intra-country regional measures of 
money-based poverty in South Africa. The Lived Poverty Index fairs poorly when 
benchmarked against rankings of literacy, education or health. 
Building on the Lived Poverty Index, I include additional information on assets 
and form of income, creating a consumption-wealth index that includes both wealth and 
  140 
consumption measures. In addition to the measures included in the Lived Poverty Index, 
the consumption-wealth index includes Afrobarometer questions about ownership of 
radio, television, motorvehicle, and the form of water availability and degree of access to 
cash income. By combining consumption and wealth measures, I expect that the index 
can identify impoverished households, as the Lived Poverty Index does, as well as 
capture more differentiation among well-to-do households that do not regularly go 
without basic consumption items. Thus, including assets enables me to better differentiate 
among households that do not go without basic consumption items but are not so well off 
as to own, say, a motorvehicle, and those that are very well-off who similarly do not go 
without basic consumption items but who own a motorvehicle. 
Following the work of Filmer and Pritchett (2001) whose wealth index created 
with Indian DHS data using principal components analysis has become a calculated 
variable included in all DHS datasets, I also used principal components analysis to 
summarize these variables for each country, storing the first component of the variance-
covariance matrix from the PCA as each respondent’s consumption-wealth index. PCA 
captures information covarying across the set of included variables. The first component 
is a “linear combination of the variables with maximum variance” (Filmer and Pritchett 
2001). Sahn and Stifel (2000) argue that factor analysis is more appropriate than principal 
components analysis when an underlying, theoretical model is known. In this case, I do 
not have an underlying combined model of wealth and consumption and do no wish to 
impose a structural model using the very limited asset and consumption information 
Ihave available.  
Before computing the PCA, I invert the consumption measures so that a higher 
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response indicates greater consumption. This makes the consumption measures consistent 
with the asset indicators. In order to compute Gini coefficients from the PCA scores, I 
also transformed the underlying variables to be nonzero and positive. This rescoring does 
not change the underlying meaning of the ordinal values since the ranking and distance 
between each value was preserved.  My dependent variable asks respondents to consider 
their wellbeing relative to other citizens in their country. Therefore, I predict the first 
component by country, so that the index score for each respondent is relative to other 
citizen-respondents in their country. 
 
 
 
Figure 3A.1: Distribution of consumption – wealth index values 
 
 
Several other blocks of multicollinear variables are of interest. Therefore, I also 
used PCA to create indices to summarize: (1) crime experience and fear of crime, (2) 
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perceptions of government effectiveness, and (3) respondent’s report of services and 
institutions available within the community.  For the crime experience and fear of crime 
index, I include measures of respondents’ reported experiences with robbery within the 
past year, their experiences with attacks within the past year and their overall fear of 
crime, on scales of zero (never) to four (always).29 For the perception of government 
effectiveness, I included measures of respondents perception of government’s 
effectiveness at addressing the following social issues: poverty, income inequality, crime, 
health and food security. Reports were on scales of one (very badly) to four (very well). 
Finally, to compute the community services index, I used principal components analysis 
to reduce questions about the availability of schools, clinics, market, police, paved road, 
and cellular phone reception in the enumeration area to a single number.30 The underlying 
variables in the community services index are indicator variables and reported by the 
enumerator rather than by the respondent. Thus, I exclude available information on 
sewage access and electricity access because these may not be directly observable to the 
enumerator.  
The proportion of the total variance explained for each PCA analysis varies by 
country. The first component of the wealth-consumption principal components analysis 
explains between 22 and 35 percent of the total variation. The first component for the 
index of the perception of government explains between 42 and 61 percent of the total 
variation, while the crime and crime risk first component explains between 47 and 61 
                                                
29 The other categories are, over the past year: experienced 1 = once or twice; 2= several times; 3= 
many times. 
30 I also rescored the DHS zscores to obtain nonzero, positive values to create a DHS Health Gini 
Coefficient, which included several measures of child under-nutrition as well an information on 
use of skilled birth attendant, and frequency of antenatal visits. I do not use or present results 
from the DHS health Gini because the results mask the heterogeneity found. Child-nutritional 
status measures are statistically significant while pregnancy-based measures are not. 
  143 
percent. Figure 3 is a histogram of experience of and fear of crime index. 46 percent of 
respondents have the lowest score, indicating having little to no experience with or fear 
of crime. The mean is -0.289 and the standard deviation is 1.21.    
 
 
Figure 3A.2: Distribution of crime risk index values 
 
 The access to community services first component explains between 37 and 49 
percent of total variation. There does not appear to be a consistent pattern across 
countries across indices. 
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Table 3A.6: Variation explained by the first component by country 
  
Consumption-
wealth 
Perception of 
government 
Crime and 
crime risk 
Access to 
community 
services 
Benin 0.29 0.61 0.58 0.44 
Ghana 0.30 0.56 0.47 0.48 
Kenya 0.30 0.42 0.54 0.37 
Liberia 0.22 0.52 0.54 0.42 
Mali 0.25 0.49 0.62 0.49 
Namibia 0.35 0.44 0.60 0.40 
Nigeria 0.34 0.56 0.61 0.33 
Uganda 0.31 0.49 0.56 0.39 
Zambia 0.27 0.54 0.48 0.42 
Zimbabwe 0.24 0.60 0.50 0.43 
 
 
Robustness checks 
I compare the rankings of the consumption-wealth index to the rankings of the 
DHS wealth factors and to the 2008 human development rankings and the 2008 gross 
national income per capita index International Human Development Indicators 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103606.html). None of these alternative measures 
include precisely the same indicators. In fact, because I include a mixture of assets and 
consumption measures, the rankings may fall between the DHS wealth index, which 
intend to capture long-term economic wellbeing, and the national income index, which 
captures shorter term, more variable, income per capita. 
 I find that the rankings by country of the consumption-wealth index differs from 
the other rankings, although it most closely tracks the 2008 gross national income index.  
Both the consumption-wealth index and the GNI index have the same sets of countries in 
the top five and in the bottom five. However, the ordering varies between the two indices. 
The GNI ranks Zimbabwe as much worse off than the consumption-wealth index (9th 
versus 7th) and the GNI ranks Ghana as worse than the consumption-wealth index (tied 
for 4th versus 2nd).  Given that the GNI captures short-term (annual) economic activity, 
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these differences are plausible. For example, Zimbabwe, in 2008, was in the midst of 
hyperinflation and its economy performed poorly.   Interestingly, the DHS wealth 
measure is substantially different than the consumption-wealth index and than the Human 
Development Index. It may be that the DHS’s focus on assets only is too narrow to be 
aligned with any of the other indices. 
 
Table 3A.7: Comparison of Consumption-wealth rankings with other rankings 
  
Consumption-
wealth score 
Consumption-
wealth rank 
DHS 
wealth 
score 
DHS 
rank 
2008 
HDI 
rank 
2008 
GNI 
index 
rank 
Nigeria 1.052 1 0.321 1 4 2 
Ghana 0.574 2 0.120 5 2 4 
Namibia 0.507 3 -0.069 9 1 1 
Kenya 0.444 4 -0.097 10 3 3 
Benin 0.232 5 0.146 4 6 4 
Zambia 0.096 6 0.112 6 7 6 
Zimbabwe 0.000 7 0.093 7 9 9 
Uganda -0.057 8 0.190 3 5 7 
Mali -0.091 9 0.025 8 8 8 
Liberia -0.276 10 0.317 2 10 10 
Source for Human Development Index (HDI) and Gross National Income Index: 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/103106.html 
 
Internal Coherence 
I cannot externally validate the other indices computed with the Afrobarometer 
data because comparable measures are not available. However, I can examine internal 
coherence. Again, following Filmer and Pritchett (2001), I examine whether average 
experience with each of the variables included in each PCA differs markedly by classes 
defined by the PCA. For example, I examine whether average asset ownership differs by 
consumption-wealth tercile to determine whether the PCA predicts large asset ownership 
differences across terciles, as I would expect it to if the assets do vary by economic 
status. 
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Most underlying variables are consistent with the ranking generated by the 
wealth-consumption index. The mean ownership of radio, televisions, motorvehicles and 
water inside the dwelling increases by wealth-consumption terciles. Thus, radio 
ownership is 34 percent for the bottom tercile and 95 percent for the top tercile. 
Similarly, most of the consumption measures also increase as the terciles increase. Two 
results appear, at first glance, to be inconsistent with these trends. Those in the top tercile 
report, on average, going without water and fuel than those in the bottom tercile. This 
may indicate an expectation of better public service provision from those in the upper 
tercile while those in the bottom. It may also indicate that those in the upper tercile are 
thinking about access to higher value forms of fuel and water, such as kerosene and 
potable, treated water, whereas respondents in the bottom tercile consider access to 
lower-quality fuel and water such as firewood and untreated water.  If this interpretation 
holds, then the results are internally consistent. 
 
Table 3A.8: Scoring coefficients and summary statistics for variables entering the 
computation of the first principal component for consumption-wealth index 
    Across Sample     Means   
Variable 
Scoring 
Coeff. Means 
Std. 
Dev.   
Bottom 
Tercile 
Middle 
Tercile 
 Top 
Tercile 
Consumption-wealth index 
 
0.279 1.274 
 
-1.059 0.077 1.725 
DHS wealth index 
 
0.140 0.736 
 
-0.142 0.091 0.446 
Own radio = 1 0.3616 0.693 0.461 
 
0.340 0.772 0.951 
Own tv = 1 0.4967 0.302 0.459 
 
0.003 0.085 0.782 
Own motorvehicle = 1 0.2851 0.166 0.372 
 
0.009 0.085 0.388 
Water inside dwelling = 1 0.4401 0.280 0.449 
 
0.048 0.233 0.541 
Access to food (0-4) 0.2602 2.808 1.213 
 
2.340 2.899 3.163 
Access to water (0-4) -0.2866 2.901 1.291 
 
3.043 2.796 2.884 
Access to medical care (0-
4) 0.0608 2.637 1.268 
 
2.333 2.643 2.915 
Access to fuel (0-4) -0.3122 3.064 1.193 
 
3.322 2.948 2.936 
Access to cash (0-4) 0.2233 1.898 1.369 
 
1.240 1.978 2.434 
Cash employment = 1 0.2164 0.527 0.779  0.141 0.497 0.922 
 
Rutstein (2007) has noted that the wealth index generated with DHS data has been 
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accused of being urban biased. Access to services tends to be higher in urban areas than 
rural areas and rural assets may be under-represented (Rutstein 2008). Without including 
detailed lists of rural assets (e.g., farm equipment), the poorest of the poor in rural areas 
may look indistinguishable from less poor households (Rutstein 2008).31 Given the lack 
of information on land and animal holdings in the Afrobarometer survey, it is likely that 
the same critiques apply to my index. 
 
Table 3A.9: Scoring coefficients and summary statistics for variables entering the 
computation of the first principal component for perception of government index 
    Across Sample     Means   
Variable 
Scoring 
Factors Means 
Std. 
Dev.   
Bottom 
Tercile 
Middle 
Tercile 
 Top 
Tercile 
Perception of govt index 
 
-1.084 1.797 
 
-3.020 -1.187 0.974 
Govt addressing poverty 0.4705 1.976 0.925 
 
1.176 1.839 2.884 
Govt addressing income 
inequality 0.4647 1.765 0.872 
 
1.094 1.610 2.582 
Govt addressing crime 0.4140 2.356 0.969 
 
1.625 2.418 3.009 
Govt addressing health 0.4263 2.558 0.953 
 
1.785 2.671 3.190 
Govt addressing food insecurity 0.4578 1.933 0.927  1.174 1.838 2.775 
 
 The index of the perception of the government’s ability to address various social 
problems is internally consistent. Splitting respondents into terciles by their perception of 
government index, I find that the mean response for individuals in the bottom tercile to be 
lower than those in the middle tercile, which is lower than for those in the top tercile.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 Rutstein (2008) recommends several solutions, including generating separate wealth indices for 
rural and for urban households. The rural and urban wealth indices would need to be mapped to 
national wealth index, using conversion adjustments (Rutstein 2008). 
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Table 3A.10: Scoring coefficients and summary statistics for variables entering the 
computation of the first principal component for crime risk index 
    Across Sample     Means   
Variable 
Scoring 
Factors Means 
Std. 
Dev.   
Bottom 
Tercile 
Middle 
Tercile 
 Top 
Tercile 
Crime and crime risk index 
 
-0.209 1.213 
 
-1.095 -0.426 1.177 
Fear crime (0-4) 0.5289 0.778 1.201 
 
0.000 0.909 1.796 
Robbed (0-4) 0.6238 0.549 0.867 
 
0.000 0.381 1.429 
Attacked (0-4) 0.5755 0.248 0.658  0.000 0.088 0.694 
 
Identifying internal coherence is slightly more challenging for the crime and 
crime risk index because many people report not experiencing crime. Thus, in the bottom 
tercile, the mean respondent has been neither attacked or robbed and does not fear crime 
while the mean respondent in the top tercile reports being attacked slightly less than 
several times a year, and being robbed, slightly less than once or twice a year. Given that 
many people in the sample do not directly experience crime (e.g., 84 percent of 
respondents have never been attacked), the ranking are internally consistent. 
 
Table 3A.11: Scoring coefficients and summary statistics for variables entering the 
computation of the first principal component for access to community services index 
    Across Sample     Means   
Variable 
Scoring 
Factors Means 
Std. 
Dev.   
Bottom 
Tercile 
Middle 
Tercile 
 Top 
Tercile 
Access to community services index -0.573 1.701 
 
-2.475 -0.307 1.457 
Access to school 0.0932 0.885 0.319 
 
0.720 0.957 0.996 
Access to clinic 0.4574 0.610 0.488 
 
0.069 0.831 1.000 
Access to market 0.4090 0.656 0.475 
 
0.269 0.781 0.976 
Access to paved road 0.4551 0.378 0.485 
 
0.113 0.375 0.714 
Access to police 0.5305 0.343 0.475 
 
0.011 0.154 1.000 
Cellphone reception 0.3552 0.752 0.432  0.496 0.819 0.980 
 
The index of access to community services is internally consistent. I find that the 
mean access to each services increases as the terciles of access to consumption services 
increase. Therefore, among respondents in the bottom tercile of services, only 7 percent 
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have access to a health clinic while there is universal access for those in the top tercile.32 
 
Inequality measures 
I then used the values of respondents’ indices variables to estimate a Gini 
coefficient for urban and rural communities within each country. Traditionally used to 
understand income inequality, Gini coefficients capture dispersion. Gini coefficients are 
bounded between zero and one. A score of one indicates complete inequality (one person 
has all the income) and a score of zero indicates that income is evenly shared across the 
population. However, Gini coefficients can be used to synthesize other, non-income 
distributions within communities. Here, I compute Gini coefficients for the dispersion of 
crime, the dispersion of access to community services, and the dispersion of 
consumption-wealth within each community. Scores moving from zero to one for the 
consumption-wealth and community services measures indicate increasing inequality, 
and the interpretation is equivalent to the standard Gini income inequality measure. 
Scores closer to one for the crime index also indicates increasing inequality, however, in 
this case, as the Gini coefficient for crime increases, violence is perpetrated on fewer 
people. Thus, increasing inequality in crime could have the effect of making some people 
feel isolated from the threat of crime. 
                                                
32 Filmer and Pritchett also use factor analysis as a robustness check. They write “ an additional 
check for robustness is made by using a different methodology for deriving the weights. Although 
the theoretical underpinnings and the algorithms used in factor analysis are close to those for 
principal components, the two methodologies differ sufficiently to make factor analysis a possible 
alternative approach. The first factor de-rived from a model analogous to that described above 
yields a household ranking that has a .988 Spearman rank correlation with a ranking derived from 
principal components.” (p. 119). 
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Robustness of results to various estimators and estimation approaches 
 
Models 2-3 are robust to several different measures of community health.   
Rates of wasting, stunting, and undernourishment among children younger than two 
years similarly impact subjective wellbeing. All of these measures were computed 
using Demographic and Health Survey data aggregated at the community level within 
each country. 
 
Table 3A.12: Descriptive statistics for different estimators of community health 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Community Characteristics           
% of under 2s stunted in community 14291 0.303 0.060 0.152 0.395 
% of under 2s undernourished in 
community 14291 0.129 0.046 0.067 0.242 
% using of skilled birth attendant in last 
pregnancy 14291 0.766 0.147 0.534 0.985 
%  using antenatal care services >4 times 
in last pregnancy 14291 0.621 0.171 0.293 0.907 
Rural Community Characteristics 	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
% of under 2s stunted in community 9146 0.325 0.049 0.221 0.395 
% of under 2s undernourished in 
community 9146 0.139 0.048 0.080 0.242 
% using of skilled birth attendant in last 
pregnancy 9146 0.702 0.137 0.534 0.952 
%  using antenatal care services >4 times 
in last pregnancy 9146 0.542 0.147 0.293 0.775 
Urban Community Characteristics 	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
% of under 2s stunted in community 5145 0.266 0.061 0.152 0.345 
% of under 2s undernourished in 
community 5145 0.112 0.037 0.067 0.209 
% using of skilled birth attendant in 
last pregnancy 5145 0.881 0.078 0.764 0.985 
%  using antenatal care services >4 times 
in last pregnancy 5145 0.761 0.112 0.575 0.907 
 
However, rates of use of a skilled birth attendant during a woman’s last 
pregnancy and whether a woman had received antenatal care at least four times in her 
last pregnancy are not statistically significant in this model of SWB. The difference 
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between child-nutritional status measures and pregnancy-based measures could be 
attributable to the fact that nutritional status is observable to broader community 
members, and therefore it may have more of an influence on SWB for respondents 
without small children in their own households than harder-to-observe antenatal 
services and birth practices.  
 
Table 3A.13: Model of subjective wellbeing using the prevalence of stunting in 
the community 
Models (1) (2) (3) 
 
Initial model 
Community 
attributes 
model  
Community 
attributes and 
inequality model  
Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
   
Female = 1 0.0961** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0403) (0.0403) 
Age -0.0390*** -0.0356*** -0.0351*** 
 (0.00726) (0.00805) (0.00806) 
Age squared 0.000374*** 0.000344*** 0.000340*** 
 (8.54e-05) (9.60e-05) (9.62e-05) 
Primary school (some or 
completed) 
0.0232 0.0265 0.0573 
 (0.0568) (0.0606) (0.0614) 
Secondary school (some or 
completed) 
0.426*** 0.447*** 0.464*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0651) (0.0658) 
Post secondary school 0.719*** 0.749*** 0.777*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0833) (0.0836) 
Minority language = 1 -0.0932** -0.128*** -0.126*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0416) (0.0416) 
Religion is not very important 0.306 0.327* 0.310 
 (0.187) (0.193) (0.193) 
Religion is somewhat important 0.243 0.182 0.174 
 (0.152) (0.156) (0.156) 
Religion is very important 0.222 0.185 0.175 
 (0.143) (0.147) (0.146) 
Listen to radio news between 
monthly and few times a week 
0.229*** 0.235*** 0.219*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0668) (0.0670) 
Listen to radio news daily 0.302*** 0.306*** 0.291*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0666) (0.0667) 
Consumption wealth index 0.240*** 0.232*** -0.0505 
 (0.0183) (0.0193) (0.132) 
Perception of government index  0.226*** 0.227*** 
  (0.0120) (0.0120) 
Access to community services 
index 
 0.0158 -0.0415 
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  (0.0134) (0.0378) 
Experience and fear of crime index  -0.106*** -0.284 
  (0.0177) (0.196) 
Reference group    
% of under 2s stunted in reference 
group 
 -2.743 -6.890** 
  (2.069) (2.712) 
 Reference-group consumption 
wealth Gini 
  -3.079** 
   (1.449) 
Reference-group community 
services Gini 
  -1.558 
   (1.245) 
Reference-group crime Gini   3.489** 
    (1.523) 
Interactions (contingent effects)    
Interaction of consumption wealth 
Gini and index 
  0.692** 
   (0.324) 
Interaction of community services 
Gini and index 
  0.307 
   (0.204) 
Interaction of crime Gini and index   0.411 
   (0.440) 
National Level Controls    
National Gini -9.33e-05 0.0153** 0.0117 
 (0.00577) (0.00619) (0.00727) 
Country GDP growth rate -0.00803 0.0470*** 0.0870*** 
 (0.00862) (0.0163) (0.0199) 
Urban = 1 0.197*** 0.0545 -0.356 
 (0.0444) (0.142) (0.239) 
Ghana 0.420*** -0.336 -1.235*** 
 (0.0814) (0.366) (0.473) 
Kenya -0.645*** -0.806*** -1.282*** 
 (0.0845) (0.187) (0.251) 
Liberia 0.866*** 0.598** 0.290 
 (0.0843) (0.256) (0.294) 
Mali 0.319*** 0.138 -0.731*** 
 (0.0608) (0.175) (0.282) 
Namibia 0.0526 -1.027*** -1.562*** 
 (0.209) (0.354) (0.379) 
Nigeria 0.206*** 0.0366 -0.292* 
 (0.0771) (0.0987) (0.161) 
Uganda -0.393*** -0.871*** -1.153*** 
 (0.0866) (0.229) (0.241) 
Constant cut1 -2.240*** -2.711*** -4.503** 
 (0.342) (0.833) (1.935) 
Constant cut2 -0.412 -0.820 -2.610 
 (0.342) (0.833) (1.934) 
Constant cut3 1.101*** 0.749 -1.039 
 (0.342) (0.833) (1.933) 
Constant cut4 3.364*** 3.034*** 1.250 
 (0.343) (0.831) (1.933) 
Observations 13,273 12,164 12,164 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0452 0.0628 0.0636 
  153 
Marginal effects (Pr(swb = 1)) 0.0912 0.0858 0.0855 
    
 
Table 3A.14: Model of subjective wellbeing using the prevalence of 
undernourishment in the community 
Models (1) (2) (3) 
 
Initial model 
Community 
attributes 
model  
Community 
attributes and 
inequality model  
Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
   
Female = 1 0.0961** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0403) (0.0403) 
Age -0.0390*** -0.0356*** -0.0352*** 
 (0.00726) (0.00804) (0.00804) 
Age squared 0.000374*** 0.000344*** 0.000338*** 
 (8.54e-05) (9.59e-05) (9.60e-05) 
Primary school (some or 
completed) 
0.0232 0.0298 0.0539 
 (0.0568) (0.0604) (0.0614) 
Secondary school (some or 
completed) 
0.426*** 0.448*** 0.458*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0651) (0.0659) 
Post secondary school 0.719*** 0.750*** 0.767*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0833) (0.0838) 
Minority language = 1 -0.0932** -0.125*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0417) (0.0416) 
Religion is not very important 0.306 0.322* 0.307 
 (0.187) (0.194) (0.194) 
Religion is somewhat important 0.243 0.177 0.170 
 (0.152) (0.156) (0.156) 
Religion is very important 0.222 0.182 0.172 
 (0.143) (0.147) (0.147) 
Listen to radio news between 
monthly and few times a week 
0.229*** 0.236*** 0.222*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0668) (0.0669) 
Listen to radio news daily 0.302*** 0.308*** 0.296*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0666) (0.0666) 
Consumption wealth index 0.240*** 0.232*** -0.0306 
 (0.0183) (0.0193) (0.131) 
Perception of government index  0.226*** 0.227*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0120) 
Access to community services 
index 
 0.0135 -0.0307 
  (0.0135) (0.0375) 
Experience and fear of crime index  -0.104*** -0.278 
  (0.0176) (0.196) 
Reference group    
% of under 2s stunted in reference 
group 
 -4.179** -5.130*** 
  (1.944) (1.964) 
 Reference-group consumption 
wealth Gini 
  -1.245 
   (1.332) 
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Reference-group community 
services Gini 
  0.0212 
   (1.089) 
Reference-group crime Gini   4.706*** 
    (1.477) 
Interactions (contingent effects)    
Interaction of consumption wealth 
Gini and index 
  0.649** 
   (0.323) 
Interaction of community services 
Gini and index 
  0.244 
   (0.203) 
Interaction of crime Gini and index   0.401 
   (0.441) 
National Level Controls    
National Gini -9.33e-05 0.00517 0.00607 
 (0.00577) (0.00762) (0.00808) 
Country GDP growth rate -0.00803 0.0240** 0.0394*** 
 (0.00862) (0.0101) (0.0113) 
Urban = 1 0.197*** 0.116 0.0923 
 (0.0444) (0.0738) (0.102) 
Ghana 0.420*** 0.356*** 0.198 
 (0.0814) (0.135) (0.154) 
Kenya -0.645*** -0.627*** -0.739*** 
 (0.0845) (0.0907) (0.0960) 
Liberia 0.866*** 1.019*** 1.103*** 
 (0.0843) (0.101) (0.109) 
Mali 0.319*** 0.871*** 0.517* 
 (0.0608) (0.249) (0.270) 
Namibia 0.0526 -0.358 -0.519* 
 (0.209) (0.265) (0.285) 
Nigeria 0.206*** 0.411** 0.376* 
 (0.0771) (0.163) (0.193) 
Uganda -0.393*** -0.492*** -0.594*** 
 (0.0866) (0.103) (0.157) 
Constant cut1 -2.240*** -2.624*** -1.202 
 (0.342) (0.555) (1.085) 
Constant cut2 -0.412 -0.733 0.692 
 (0.342) (0.555) (1.084) 
Constant cut3 1.101*** 0.837 2.263** 
 (0.342) (0.555) (1.084) 
Constant cut4 3.364*** 3.122*** 4.551*** 
 (0.343) (0.557) (1.087) 
Observations 13,273 12,164 12,164 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0452 0.0629 0.0636 
Marginal effects (Pr(swb = 1)) 0.0912 0.0858 0.0855 
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Table 3A.15: Model of subjective wellbeing using the prevalence of use of skilled 
birth attendant for last birth 
Models (1) (2) (3) 
 
Initial model 
Community 
attributes 
model  
Community 
attributes and 
inequality model  
Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
   
Female = 1 0.0961** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0403) (0.0403) 
Age -0.0390*** -0.0355*** -0.0351*** 
 (0.00726) (0.00804) (0.00805) 
Age squared 0.000374*** 0.000343*** 0.000338*** 
 (8.54e-05) (9.60e-05) (9.61e-05) 
Primary school (some or 
completed) 
0.0232 0.0327 0.0570 
 (0.0568) (0.0605) (0.0614) 
Secondary school (some or 
completed) 
0.426*** 0.450*** 0.462*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0651) (0.0658) 
Post secondary school 0.719*** 0.753*** 0.777*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0833) (0.0838) 
Minority language = 1 -0.0932** -0.129*** -0.128*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0418) (0.0417) 
Religion is not very important 0.306 0.325* 0.312 
 (0.187) (0.194) (0.194) 
Religion is somewhat important 0.243 0.179 0.171 
 (0.152) (0.156) (0.157) 
Religion is very important 0.222 0.184 0.175 
 (0.143) (0.147) (0.147) 
Listen to radio news between 
monthly and few times a week 
0.229*** 0.237*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0668) (0.0670) 
Listen to radio news daily 0.302*** 0.308*** 0.294*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0666) (0.0666) 
Consumption wealth index 0.240*** 0.230*** -0.0194 
 (0.0183) (0.0193) (0.131) 
Perception of government index  0.226*** 0.227*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0120) 
Access to community services 
index 
 0.0157 -0.0353 
  (0.0134) (0.0382) 
Experience and fear of crime 
index 
 -0.105*** -0.298 
  (0.0177) (0.196) 
Reference group    
% using skilled birth attendant in 
reference group 
 0.101 -0.410 
  (0.468) (0.582) 
 Reference-group consumption 
wealth Gini 
  -1.884 
   (1.397) 
Reference-group community 
services Gini 
  0.187 
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   (1.299) 
Reference-group crime Gini   4.614*** 
    (1.758) 
Interactions (contingent effects)    
Interaction of consumption wealth 
Gini and index 
  0.611* 
   (0.322) 
Interaction of community services 
Gini and index 
  0.279 
   (0.206) 
Interaction of crime Gini and 
index 
  0.444 
   (0.440) 
National Level Controls    
National Gini -9.33e-05 0.0150** 0.0180** 
 (0.00577) (0.00624) (0.00733) 
Country GDP growth rate -0.00803 0.0319** 0.0374** 
 (0.00862) (0.0129) (0.0147) 
Urban = 1 0.197*** 0.211** 0.251** 
 (0.0444) (0.0895) (0.125) 
Ghana 0.420*** 0.114 0.00131 
 (0.0814) (0.129) (0.133) 
Kenya -0.645*** -0.588*** -0.679*** 
 (0.0845) (0.0899) (0.0949) 
Liberia 0.866*** 0.898*** 1.072*** 
 (0.0843) (0.123) (0.144) 
Mali 0.319*** 0.351*** -0.0790 
 (0.0608) (0.0652) (0.132) 
Namibia 0.0526 -0.686*** -0.808*** 
 (0.209) (0.233) (0.258) 
Nigeria 0.206*** 0.107 -0.0510 
 (0.0771) (0.0836) (0.128) 
Uganda -0.393*** -0.596*** -0.667*** 
 (0.0866) (0.0938) (0.158) 
Constant cut1 -2.240*** -1.637*** -0.680 
 (0.342) (0.480) (1.051) 
Constant cut2 -0.412 0.254 1.213 
 (0.342) (0.479) (1.050) 
Constant cut3 1.101*** 1.823*** 2.783*** 
 (0.342) (0.479) (1.051) 
Constant cut4 3.364*** 4.107*** 5.070*** 
 (0.343) (0.480) (1.053) 
Observations 13,273 12,164 12,164 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0452 0.0628 0.0634 
Marginal effects (Pr(swb = 1)) 0.0912 0.0858 0.0855 
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Table 3A.16: Model of subjective wellbeing using the prevalence of receiving 
antenatal services >4 times in last pregnancy 
Models (1) (2) (3) 
 
Initial model 
Community 
attributes 
model  
Community 
attributes and 
inequality model  
Sociodemographic 
Characteristics 
   
Female = 1 0.0961** 0.111*** 0.111*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0403) (0.0403) 
Age -0.0390*** -0.0355*** -0.0352*** 
 (0.00726) (0.00805) (0.00806) 
Age squared 0.000374*** 0.000343*** 0.000339*** 
 (8.54e-05) (9.60e-05) (9.62e-05) 
Primary school (some or 
completed) 
0.0232 0.0339 0.0562 
 (0.0568) (0.0607) (0.0614) 
Secondary school (some or 
completed) 
0.426*** 0.452*** 0.461*** 
 (0.0613) (0.0653) (0.0658) 
Post secondary school 0.719*** 0.756*** 0.771*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0836) (0.0838) 
Minority language = 1 -0.0932** -0.130*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0417) (0.0417) 
Religion is not very important 0.306 0.325* 0.311 
 (0.187) (0.194) (0.194) 
Religion is somewhat important 0.243 0.178 0.171 
 (0.152) (0.156) (0.157) 
Religion is very important 0.222 0.184 0.174 
 (0.143) (0.147) (0.147) 
Listen to radio news between 
monthly and few times a week 
0.229*** 0.236*** 0.224*** 
 (0.0624) (0.0668) (0.0670) 
Listen to radio news daily 0.302*** 0.307*** 0.297*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0666) (0.0667) 
Consumption wealth index 0.240*** 0.230*** -0.0281 
 (0.0183) (0.0194) (0.132) 
Perception of government index  0.227*** 0.227*** 
  (0.0120) (0.0120) 
Access to community services 
index 
 0.0154 -0.0325 
  (0.0134) (0.0375) 
Experience and fear of crime 
index 
 -0.105*** -0.292 
  (0.0177) (0.196) 
Reference group    
% using antenatal services >4 
times in last pregnancy reference 
group 
 -0.111 0.321 
  (0.375) (0.440) 
 Reference-group consumption 
wealth Gini 
  -2.026 
   (1.440) 
Reference-group community   -0.437 
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services Gini 
   (1.143) 
Reference-group crime Gini   4.028*** 
    (1.476) 
Interactions (contingent 
effects) 
   
Interaction of consumption 
wealth Gini and index 
  0.638** 
   (0.324) 
Interaction of community 
services Gini and index 
  0.267 
   (0.202) 
Interaction of crime Gini and 
index 
  0.432 
   (0.441) 
National Level Controls    
National Gini -9.33e-05 0.0152** 0.0156** 
 (0.00577) (0.00619) (0.00717) 
Country GDP growth rate -0.00803 0.0291*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.00862) (0.0103) (0.0116) 
Urban = 1 0.197*** 0.246*** 0.106 
 (0.0444) (0.0895) (0.160) 
Ghana 0.420*** 0.154 -0.114 
 (0.0814) (0.110) (0.137) 
Kenya -0.645*** -0.594*** -0.667*** 
 (0.0845) (0.0935) (0.0970) 
Liberia 0.866*** 0.934*** 0.969*** 
 (0.0843) (0.106) (0.108) 
Mali 0.319*** 0.328*** -0.0329 
 (0.0608) (0.104) (0.152) 
Namibia 0.0526 -0.650*** -0.864*** 
 (0.209) (0.240) (0.259) 
Nigeria 0.206*** 0.103 -0.0458 
 (0.0771) (0.0825) (0.125) 
Uganda -0.393*** -0.602*** -0.588*** 
 (0.0866) (0.0956) (0.182) 
Constant cut1 -2.240*** -1.771*** -0.723 
 (0.342) (0.420) (1.066) 
Constant cut2 -0.412 0.120 1.170 
 (0.342) (0.419) (1.065) 
Constant cut3 1.101*** 1.689*** 2.741** 
 (0.342) (0.420) (1.066) 
Constant cut4 3.364*** 3.973*** 5.027*** 
 (0.343) (0.421) (1.068) 
Observations 13,273 12,164 12,164 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0452 0.0628 0.0634 
Marginal effects (Pr(swb = 1)) 0.0912 0.0858 0.0855 
    
 
Robustness of results to alternative estimation 
Using an ordinal probit model, I estimate the same series of models and find 
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the models robust to this alternative estimation approach. The variables’ coefficients 
differ slightly, however, the key variables of interest remain statistically significant, 
usually falling within the same interval of statistical significance. The probit models’ 
coefficients tend to be slightly lower than the logit estimates.  One difference is that 
the ordinal probit estimation indicates that wasting is statistically significant at the ten 
percent level in model 2, the community attributes model. It is not statistically 
significant in the ordinal logit model, although it cannot be rejected at the 13 percent 
level.  
 
Table 3A.17: Ordinal Probit Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Initial model 
Community 
attributes 
model 
Community 
attributes and 
inequality 
model 
Sociodemographic Measures    
Female = 1 0.0552** 0.0613*** 0.0617*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0231) (0.0231) 
Age -0.0231*** -0.0210*** -0.0209*** 
 (0.00414) (0.00454) (0.00453) 
Age squared 0.000221*** 0.000200*** 0.000199*** 
 (4.86e-05) (5.41e-05) (5.40e-05) 
Primary school (some or completed) 0.0147 0.0215 0.0352 
 (0.0332) (0.0351) (0.0356) 
Secondary school (some or completed) 0.242*** 0.259*** 0.265*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0372) (0.0377) 
Post secondary school 0.413*** 0.430*** 0.439*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0473) (0.0476) 
Minority language = 1 -0.0624*** -0.0840*** -0.0811*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0239) (0.0239) 
Religion is not very important 0.187* 0.188* 0.182 
 (0.106) (0.110) (0.110) 
Religion is somewhat important 0.147* 0.0981 0.0954 
 (0.0864) (0.0900) (0.0898) 
Religion is very important 0.140* 0.110 0.106 
 (0.0808) (0.0843) (0.0840) 
Listen to radio news between monthly and 
few times a week 
0.125*** 0.124*** 0.116*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0386) (0.0387) 
Listen to radio news daily 0.165*** 0.162*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0362) (0.0382) (0.0382) 
Consumption wealth index 0.136*** 0.132*** -0.0154 
 (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0746) 
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Perception of government index  0.129*** 0.129*** 
  (0.00676) (0.00678) 
Access to community services index  0.0100 -0.0189 
  (0.00766) (0.0224) 
Experience and fear of crime index  -0.0595*** -0.125 
  (0.00986) (0.115) 
Reference group    
% of under 2s wasted in reference group  -1.446* -2.738*** 
  (0.874) (0.987) 
 Reference-group consumption wealth Gini   -0.652 
   (0.756) 
Reference-group community services Gini   -0.596 
   (0.690) 
Reference-group crime Gini   2.464*** 
   (0.828) 
Interactions (contingent effects)    
Interaction of consumption wealth Gini and 
index 
  0.367** 
   (0.184) 
Interaction of community services Gini and 
index 
  0.160 
   (0.119) 
Interaction of crime Gini and index   0.151 
   (0.260) 
Nation Level Controls    
National Gini 0.00131 0.00569 0.00174 
 (0.00334) (0.00460) (0.00533) 
Country GDP growth rate -0.000756 0.0208*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.00494) (0.00555) (0.00637) 
Urban = 1 0.114*** 0.0560 -0.0219 
 (0.0253) (0.0542) (0.0688) 
Ghana 0.206*** 0.0307 -0.0958 
 (0.0461) (0.0519) (0.0652) 
Kenya -0.404*** -0.429*** -0.548*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0622) (0.0685) 
Liberia 0.502*** 0.578*** 0.677*** 
 (0.0470) (0.0586) (0.0677) 
Mali 0.164*** 0.326*** 0.109 
 (0.0361) (0.0891) (0.0991) 
Namibia -0.0198 -0.308** -0.282 
 (0.120) (0.154) (0.174) 
Nigeria 0.0698 0.0940 0.109 
 (0.0437) (0.0689) (0.0926) 
Uganda -0.254*** -0.310*** -0.300*** 
 (0.0493) (0.0615) (0.0940) 
Constant Cut 1 -1.255*** -1.404*** -1.135* 
 (0.196) (0.350) (0.676) 
Constant Cut 2 -0.206 -0.319 -0.0485 
 (0.196) (0.349) (0.675) 
Constant Cut 3 0.711*** 0.625* 0.896 
 (0.196) (0.349) (0.676) 
Constant Cut 4 1.926*** 1.856*** 2.129*** 
 (0.196) (0.349) (0.676) 
Observations 13,273 12,164 12,164 
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Pseudo R-squared 0.0448 0.0621 0.0628 
Marginal effects (Pr(swb = 1)) 0.0913 0.0851 0.0849 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
KEEPING UP WITH THE NEIGHBORS?: REVISITING REFERENCE GROUPS AND 
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 
Abstract 
In the burgeoning literature on subjective wellbeing, the association between own 
subjective welfare and the economic characteristics of various reference groups is mixed. 
In studies from high-income countries, improvements in economic wellbeing of a 
reference group tends to decrease subjective wellbeing, known as relative deprivation. In 
contrast, in some low-income countries, the relationship between reference group 
economic and subjective wellbeing is positive for at least some members of the 
population, such as poorer individuals. Yet, not only does the definition of reference 
groups vary across much of the reference group literature but also much of the literature 
relies on analyst-defined reference groups, rather than on respondents’ actual social 
network. Analyzing unique micro-level data from rural Ghana, I find the influence of 
reference groups’ economic status on subjective wellbeing is highly sensitive to reference 
group definition.  As in other studies, improvements to the economic status of spatially-
defined reference groups result in relative deprivation. In contrast, utilizing reference 
groups defined from social network data on gift-receipt or trust yields more complex 
findings. Respondents’ subjective economic welfare improves when these social 
networks’ assets increase and expenditures decrease. That is, respondents feel better 
when the people they trust or the people they have received gifts from are wealthy but 
thrifty. This could indicate that respondents hope to draw on their social networks in time 
of need. 
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Introduction 
Against whom do we benchmark our lives and economic successes? And, do our 
perceptions change in predictable ways based on who our reference benchmark is? Social 
science researchers interested in life satisfaction have studied who people benchmark 
themselves against for the past half-century (Merton and Kitt 1950, Festinger 1954, 
Runciman 1966, Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers 1976). Over half a century ago, 
Merton and Kitt (1950) argued individuals do not need to be members of their reference 
group in order to compare against them. More recently, Frey and Stutzer (2002) argued 
“There is little doubt that people compare themselves to others and do not use absolute 
judgments. But it is crucial to know with which other people such a comparison is being 
made” (p. 412). A more recent explosion of research on subjective wellbeing—the study 
of how people feel about their lives— has made the need to identifying appropriate 
reference groups pressing once again (Veenhoven 1991, Firebaugh and Schroeder 2009, 
Clark and Senik 2010, Ravallion 2012; See Diener et al. 2002 for a review). 
In studies from high-income countries, research relying on spatial or cohort-
reference groups consistently finds that comparing oneself to a relatively wealthier 
reference group leads to feelings of lower wellbeing, termed “relative deprivation” 
(Runciman 1966, McBride 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2001, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, 
Luttmer 2005, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006, Graham 2009). Relative deprivation 
occurs when a respondent’s subjective wellbeing tends to fall as reference group 
members (i.e., social comparators) become better off, holding respondent’s own income 
constant (Runciman 1966, Ravallion 2012).   In the relatively few studies of reference 
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group effects in poor and middle-income countries, findings of relative deprivation are 
more mixed. At least one study relying on reference groups finds evidence of relative 
deprivation (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2008).  In other studies, comparing oneself to 
relatively better-off reference groups leads to increased – not decreased – feelings of 
wellbeing for at least some of the population, in particular, poorer individuals; this 
finding is often referred to as positive external effects (Senik 2004, Kingdon and Knight 
2007, Ravallion and Lokshin 2010, and Bookwalter and Dalenberg 2010).  
Two factors may contribute to the inconsistent association between reference 
group economic status and wellbeing in low and middle-income countries. First, the 
construction of reference groups differs across studies. In low-income countries, the 
robustness of findings of either relative deprivation or positive external effects to 
different reference group constructions is unclear. Most recent studies define reference 
groups as either spatial reference groups or cohort reference groups (appealing to 
homophily to match on respondent characteristics such as race, gender, occupation, 
education level, and or religion (see McPherson et al. 2001 for a review of homophily)). 
As Ravallion (2012) notes, both cohort and spatial reference groups are defined by the 
analyst, who may not observe what the respondent observes. More recently, some 
researchers also rely on respondent-identified reference groups (e.g., a respondent’s 
parents (see Bookwalter and Dalenburg 2010) and respondents’ assessments of friends 
and neighbors (see Ravallion and Lokshin 2010)). As of yet, there is little research on 
whether the actual attributes of respondent-identified social networks matter for 
subjective wellbeing.  
Second, most relative deprivation studies from high-income countries examine the 
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relationship of wellbeing to relative income. Rather than rely on relative income, which is 
hard to measure in low-income countries, studies in low- and middle-income countries 
rely on a variety of relative measures such as assets, consumption, or index-based 
information (Deaton 2010). Respondents may treat these economic measures differently 
from one another, experiencing relative deprivation in relation to one measure but not for 
the other. Thus, a study failing to find relative deprivation with a consumption measure 
(Ravallion and Lokshin 2010) may be consistent with a study that finds relative 
deprivation using an index of consumption adequacy (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2008). 
Understanding how sensitive relative deprivation findings are to the type of economic 
measure can provide insight into whether and / or how different economic attributes of a 
reference group affect one’s own subjective wellbeing (Zelizer 1994).  
Unique data from Ghana enable me to address these two gaps. By comparing 
three possible categories of reference groups – spatial, spatial-cohort and several social 
networks – and including two relative deprivation measures – one generated from assets, 
and the other from expenditures – I examine how the relationship between wellbeing and 
reference group characteristics changes. I show that wellbeing is sensitive both to 
reference group definitions and to economic measures. Thus, relative deprivation depends 
on who the reference group is and what is being measured. 
First, I find that people experience relative deprivation when comparing 
themselves against the asset holdings and expenditures by others in their own village. 
Second, I find a similar, but weaker effect when respondents compare themselves to 
people of the same gender and from the same village. Third, and most intriguing, I find 
that respondents experience higher subjective wellbeing when some social network 
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members spend less and accumulate assets. In particular, these findings hold for social 
network members the respondent trusts or the respondent has received a gift from. In 
other words, people feel better about their own lives when they have close connections to 
thrifty-savers. I hypothesize that respondents in this sample feel better when their social 
networks have assets that they can potentially draw on in times of distress – and that 
respondents don’t want their networks spending money that will no longer be available 
for them. Thus, people’s perceptions of their lives are shaped by against whom they are 
benchmarked. Further, they are more likely to experience relative deprivation when I 
include only expenditure information rather than when I include asset and expenditure 
information. 
I next review the literature on relative deprivation and social networks. I then 
present the data, variable construction, and methods. Then, I present findings and 
robustness checks before concluding with a discussion. 
 
Literature 
Many authors have examined reference group effects on wellbeing (see Frank 
(1997), Frey and Stutzer (2001), and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) for reviews).  Yet, 
the majority of the evidence on reference groups and subjective wellbeing is from high-
income countries. Researchers find that in developed countries the effect of the reference 
group’s leave-out mean income, wealth, or consumption on individual SWB is negative, 
holding individual income constant (McBride 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2001, Luttmer 2005 
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005, Graham 2009).  
Overall, relative deprivation findings in high-income countries do not appear 
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highly sensitive to reference group construction. Reference groups tend to be defined 
geospatially or as “others with similar characteristics” by matching on race, gender, 
occupation, education level, and or religion (Kingdon and Knight 2007, p. 70). Luttmer 
(2005) uses US public use microdata areas to define geospatial reference groups. Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005) matches German respondents to a reference group composed of 
individuals with similar characteristics (education, age, and region). McBride (2001) 
matches US respondents’ characteristics to characteristics (education, health, and sex) of 
those within a ten-year age cohort of the respondent. All find evidence of relative 
deprivation.  
However, a few US studies with finer-grained data do not always find clear 
evidence of relative deprivation. McBride (2001) finds that feelings of relative 
deprivation are attenuated for lower income groups. Further, Firebaugh and Schroeder 
(2009), using smaller geospatial reference groups than Luttmer, find that the better 
amenities in higher-income neighborhoods offset any feelings of relative deprivation 
experienced by poorer people living in these neighborhoods. 
The effect of (variably defined) reference groups on subjective wellbeing seems 
to vary more strongly in low- and middle-income countries, raising the question of 
whether relative deprivation is “universal” (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2008).  A few studies 
in middle and low-income countries have examined the influence of reference groups’ 
economic attributes on subjective appraisals of consumption, and find consumption-
related relative deprivation. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) find in Nepal increases in the 
average appraisal by village or ward of consumables are associated with decreases in 
respondent’s own appraisals of consumables. Using spatial reference groups to study the 
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effect of average consumption within a community on respondent’s appraisal of the 
adequacy of consumption in Peru, Guillen-Royo (2009) finds that the perceived adequacy 
of education, housing and clothing is negatively associated with community’s average 
perceptions of consumption of these three products.  
In other low- and middle-income countries, a significant and positive relationship 
between reference group average economic attributes and subjective wellbeing seems to 
hold, although some findings are sensitive to reference group definitions. Using panel 
data from Russia, Senik (2004) estimates cohort-reference group income by age, sex, 
occupation, region, education, and years of experience and finds that (estimated) 
reference group income is positively associated with subjective wellbeing.  
Kingdon and Knight (2007) examine the effect of reference groups for different 
geographic areas in South Africa. Estimating the relationship between the average 
income of the neighborhood and individual wellbeing, the authors find a positive 
relationship. When expanding the geographic unit to include district level average 
income, they find that comparison group income is no longer significantly associated 
with wellbeing. Thus, echoing Campbell et al.’s (1976) earlier US findings, they find 
“within the local cluster, other people’s income produces positive externalities on the 
household’s utility. Only when the comparator group is widened to include more distant 
others (those in the district as a whole) does other people’s income appear to create 
negative spill-overs” (Kingdon and Knight 2007, p. 79). 
Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2010), in their study of SWB in South Africa, also 
test two types of reference groups: spatial reference groups, and respondent’s assessments 
of their parent’s wellbeing. At low levels of expenditures, living near wealthier people 
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improves an individual’s wellbeing but that being less well off than one’s parents 
standard increases the likelihood of reporting low levels of life satisfaction (Bookwalter 
and Dalenberg 2010).  Bookwalter and Dalenberg warn, “the traditional emphasis on 
geographic neighbors and age or educational peers may not provide the best reference 
group for comparisons. In our analysis, we examine relative standing across numerous 
dimensions and find the most important effects came from economic standing relative to 
one’s parents” (2010, p. 345). 
Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) first estimate the impact of spatial-constructed 
reference group consumption on wellbeing in Malawi, finding a positive effect. They 
then ask respondents to assess their friends’ and neighbors’ economic welfare through 
economic ladder questions. Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) find in Malawi that among 
poorer individuals, having (respondent-reported) richer friends and neighbors improves 
subjective wellbeing. Among non-poor individuals, relative deprivation seems to exist, 
although the authors point out that this result may be due to a “downward bias in our 
regression coefficient on the economic welfare of friends and neighbors when own-
economic welfare reaches relatively high level” (p. 179).  
Researchers have argued that the appropriate reference group is a local 
community, or other individuals with shared characteristics. In small villages, where it is 
possible to observe who owns what, spatial definitions may be appropriate (Fafchamps 
and Shilpi 2008, Bookwalter and Dalenburg 2010).  Bookwalter and Dalenburg (2010) 
point out that housing stock in South Africa is readily observable and vary widely.  
Cohort-reference groups share attributes, and may have the same human capital 
characteristics (Senik 2004).  McPherson et al. (2001) in a review on homophily, find that 
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homophily structures social networks ties, whereby individuals interact with those who 
are like themselves. They write, “similarity breeds connection” (p. 415). Religion, 
education, sex, race and ethnicity are all common dimensions of network homophily. One 
possible implication of network homophily is that network-based reference groups may 
not be more informative than homophily-based reference groups.  
Yet, Ravallion (2012) points out that much of the relative deprivation literature 
relies on analyst-driven identification of comparison groups.  Ravallion’s concerns about 
identification of the appropriate comparison groups have been raised by several 
researchers (Veenhoven 1991, Bookwalter and Dalenberg 2010, Clark and Senik 2010, 
Ravallion 2012). Schor (1998) argues that neighbors no longer act as the primary 
benchmarks against which Americans measure consumption. Rather, Americans compare 
themselves against those in their broader social space. Each person’s social space 
includes not only friends, family and coworkers but also increased exposure to media has 
resulted in Americans’ “need to measure up with some idealized group” (p. 10). In 
quantitative studies, who should or should not be included in a reference group is based 
on social factors the analyst deems important but which may not be important for the 
respondents. As a result, “the researcher must make some potentially strong identifying 
assumptions” (Ravallion 2012, p. 18).  
One implication is that network-derived reference groups may capture reference 
group attributes that differ from analyst-generated matched characteristics or spatial 
measures. Networks are distinct from reference groups in that the members of the 
networks are likely be known to respondents whereas reference group members may or 
may not be. The quantity and quality of networks matter for wellbeing (Lawler and Yoon 
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1998, Helliwell and Putnam 2004, Degli Antoni 2009, Brashears 2010, Lim and Putnam 
2010).33 With the exceptions of Ravallion and Lokshin (2010) and Bookwalter and 
Dalenburg (2010), there is relatively little work assessing the effects of characteristics of 
networks on wellbeing. Furthermore, both of these studies rely on respondents’ 
assessments of network’s economic attributes rather than attributes reported by the 
network members. Arguably, these studies rely on belief-based reference groups, which 
may only have a weak relationship to actual network structure. Little is known about role 
of network members’ actual economic characteristic on respondent wellbeing.  
 
Data, variables and method 
When testing for the relationship between reference group economic characteristics and 
subjective wellbeing, not only do analysts choose the comparison reference group, they 
also choose how to measure the economic attributes of the reference-group. Variations in 
reference group definitions and in economic measures may contribute to why studies 
have found both positive externalities associated with reference group attributes and 
relative deprivation in low- and middle-income countries. Unique data from Ghana allow 
me to construct different reference groups and two distinct reference group economic 
measures - assets and expenditures.  Using these measures, I can identify how sensitive 
the respondents’ experience of relative deprivation is to both the definition of the 
reference group and to the type of reference group economic measure.   
                                                
33 Lawler and Yoon (1998) find that cohesive networks produce feelings of wellbeing through successful 
exchanges.  Social capital produced through networks affects physical health and wellbeing and social 
capital is positively correlated with wellbeing (Helliwell and Putnam 2004). Degli Antoni (2009) finds that 
network quality and density are positively associated with subjective economic welfare. Brashears (2010) 
and Lim and Putnam (2010) find an inverse relationship between networks and unhappiness. 
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Data 
In 2009, survey data were collected from individuals and their spouses residing in one of 
four villages in Akwapim (Akuapim) South district in Ghana’s eastern region (Goldstein 
and Udry 1999, Conley and Udry 2001, Walker and Barrett 2011). The villages - 
Darmang, Konkonuru, Oboadaka, and Pokrom - were purposively sampled in the middle 
1990s to reflect broader production system changes away from maize-cassava cultivation 
toward fruit and vegetable production including export-oriented crops, in particular, 
pineapple (Goldstein and Udry 1999, Conley and Udry 2001, Vanderpuye-Orgle and 
Barrett 2008, Conley and Udry 2010).  
Surveys were fielded over three waves: 1997-1998, 2004, and 2009. Five rounds 
of data were collected between February and November during the 2009 wave. 
Longitudinal data include demographic, consumption, and asset characteristics. In the 
2009 wave, modules on ego-centric networks and on subjective welfare measures were 
also fielded. The subjective perceptions module was fielded in the first round. To be 
consistent with how individuals perceived their economic wellbeing at the point in time, I 
use round 1 values for variables that were collected over multiple rounds.34 
The 1997-98 sample was limited to married households and included 
approximately 35 households per village. The head and at least one spouse were 
interviewed. Only married households were eligible to be added in later rounds, although 
any married households who became single-headed households were included in later 
waves (Walker and Barrett 2011). In the 2004 round, additional households were 
                                                
34 Inflation, at about 16% over the course of 2009, was high, further encouraging me to limit my analysis to 
round 1 reported values rather than to take (deflated) means or medians across the five rounds.  
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sampled, increasing the sample to approximately 70 households per village. The 2009 
round included surveys of about 150 individuals per village. During the 2009 survey, the 
estimated populations were 706 in Oboadaka, 1,270 in Konkonuru, 1,768 in Darmang 
and 2,283 in Pokrom (Walker 2012). Given that the dataset is a random sample of 
married couples and individuals who were once married, the analysis is limited to those 
categories. In other words, the findings may not be applicable to single, never married 
individuals. 
 
Variables  
Description of dependent variable 
The dependent variable is a subjective measure of welfare that asks respondents to assess 
his or her household’s economic wellbeing relative to other households in this village:  
Q: Compared to other households in this village, would you describe your household 
as… 
A: 0= The poorest  … 3= About average  … 6=The richest 
The above question is consistent with other subjective wellbeing questions that ask about 
life satisfaction but differs somewhat from “happiness” questions (an example of a 
happiness question is “How happy are you at this stage of your life?” (Veenhoven 1991)).  
More narrowly defined, this question asks respondents to report assessments of their 
economic conditions. Happinesss questions in contrast, have been described as “more 
nebulous in scope” and have been found to be less stable than life satisfaction questions 
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(Kahneman and Kruegar 2006; Ravallion 2012: 7).35  
Responses to the subjective wellbeing question fall into seven categories, ranging 
from “the poorest” to “the richest.”36 No one responded in the lowest category, “the 
poorest.” Due to low response rates of the second to lowest category “among the 
poorest”, I combined this category with those who considered themselves to be “poorer 
than most.” Only two people responded in the highest category, “the richest”. Due to the 
low response rate for the top two categories, I combined the top three responses: those 
who felt their houses were “among the richest,” those considered their households to be 
“rich”, and those who felt their households were “richer than most.” Thus, the number of 
response categories decreased from seven to three.  
The initial sample size is 608. The dependent variable is missing 26 responses. As 
a robustness check, I impute findings, discussed below.  As seen in Figure 4.1, the 
distribution of responses follows a normal curve, with the majority of respondents 
reporting that their household welfare is “about average” relative to other villagers.37  
 
Description of independent variables 
                                                
35 Inasmuch as a subjective economic wellbeing question is a component life satisfaction, it is likely that 
this subjective wellbeing question is similarly stable, if not more so, although I am unaware of any studies 
examining the stability of this particular question. 
36 In the survey questionnaire, response categories began with 1 = the richest, and ended with 7= the 
poorest. To aid with interpretation (e.g., increases in objective economic measures are associated with 
positive changes in the SWB variable), I have reversed these values. 
37 A second, unanchored subjective welfare question was also fielded. This question asks respondents to 
assess his or her household’s welfare right now, but does not specify a benchmark that the respondent 
should use: Q: Right now, would you say your household… A: 0= Is destitute … 3=Gets by…. 6=Is very 
rich.  As Ravallion (2012) argues, anchoring the question to a reference, such as assessing welfare relative 
to the village, could help attenuate bias resulting from different people using different references (e.g., 
some people compare their welfare to others in their community while some compare their welfare to all 
other Ghanaians) (see also Beegle et al. 2011). Other researchers have used similar versions of the second, 
unanchored question, which allows respondents to state their wellbeing without forcing any particular 
benchmark (Ravallion and Lokshin 2010). The unachored question is asked after the anchored question, 
and therefore responses to the first may influence the second (Graham 2009).  For these reasons, I limit my 
analysis to the anchored response.  
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First, I present motivating models that examine how subjective wellbeing is influenced 
by own economic characteristics, measured by household assets and per capita 
expenditures and reference group economic characteristics. Then, following previous 
findings, I include three categories of variables in my estimation: own economic status, 
including assets, plots and expenditures; standard controls including demographic 
characteristics and village-level effects; and reference groups’ economic status, computed 
both as leave-out means and as inequality within each reference group. See Table 4.1. 
 Table 4.1 here 
 
Own economic status 
Assets  
Assets include the following: susu balances (informal microfinance), bank balances, 
value of investments, jewelry and cloth, cash (any foreign currency is converted to GHC), 
value of building and repairs and agricultural assets. Agricultural assets include food and 
farm output, other stocks (of seeds and planting materials), farm equipment, durable 
assets, livestock, and other tradeable goods, such as cash crops.  
Over 99% of respondents had assets valued in round 1 of less than 30,000 cedis. 
Four respondents had assets between 2.5 and 9 times higher than this, and at least twenty 
times higher than the average asset holdings. I omitted these responses as outliers before 
proceeding. Given the skewness of the remaining underlying distribution of assets, I log 
transformed them. To apply a log transformation requires nonzero values. Two 
respondents from the same household reported negative assets – that is, they owed 118.8 
Ghanaian cedis more than their assets were worth. Therefore, I added the lowest asset 
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value plus one to all respondents, shifting the asset distribution to the right by 119.8 
cedis. In the appendix, Figures A2 and A3 show the original kernel density of the assets 
and their log-transformed kernel densities. 
Plots 
Not included in the assets measure is the value of the farm plots. Valuing plots is 
extremely difficult because plot values vary in soil fertility, and access to water and 
drainage, and the market for plots is relatively thin, making it difficult to determine 
reasonable plot prices. As an alternative I include a separate measure of the number of 
plots controlled or owned by the respondent. 37 percent of respondents do not control or 
own any plots; 79 percent of those not owning or controlling plots are women. 
Per capita expenditures 
Measuring income is notoriously difficult in low-income countries and perhaps 
especially for rural residents (Deaton 2010).  Therefore, I use per capita expenditures for 
the month prior to the survey.  Expenditure data were collected from both spouses (where 
applicable) to reflect that different members of the household are often responsible for 
different parts of the household budget. For example, women purchase food and their 
spouses may not know precisely how much their wives spent on food during the recall 
period (Walker 2012). To minimize error, data were collected both on household 
expenditures and on individual expenditures. I allocate the highest reported household 
expenditure to all household members and then choose the maximum of the highest 
reported household expenditure amount or the sum of individual expenditures for our 
household figure. I divide this figure by the number of people residing in the household 
to arrive at the per capita measure.  
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The per capita expenditure measure includes food from family farms and 
purchases of food, clothing and shoes, transportation, fuel, utilities, rent, entertainment, 
other small purchases and bulky, abnormal expenditures.  Other small purchases such as 
personal care, cleaning items, household equipment and appliances, lottery tickets, 
tobacco, and alcohol are also included. Bulky, abnormal expenditures include funeral, 
wedding, or other ceremonial expenses, vehicle maintenance and repair, schooling, and 
health. I include these bulkier purchases, if they occurred in round 1, because, while they 
might not occur every month, they may contribute to people feeling poorer or richer (e.g., 
an unexpected health expense) when responding to the subjective welfare question.  
I do not include assets, such as jewelry, farming equipment, or other durable items 
that were purchased in round 1 in the expenditure calculation since they are already 
captured in the asset measure. I exclude as outliers two respondents with per capita 
expenditures ten times greater than the mean and three times the next maximum value. I 
log transform per capita consumption to address skewness. Appendix Figures A4 and A5 
present the kernel density of the per capita data and of the log-transformed data. 
 
Village fixed effects 
While all four villages lie within the same region, nonetheless, the villages do differ. 
First, population size varies considerably. As of early 2009, the estimated populations 
were 706 in Oboadaka, 1,270 in Konkonuru, 1,768 in Darmang and 2,283 in Pokrom 
(Walker 2012). Second, Gini estimates of asset inequality reveal a great deal of variation 
across communities. Oboadaka, which is the most remote site, has the lowest levels of 
asset inequality, with Gini coefficient of 0.403. Darmang has the second lowest with 
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0.533, while Konkonuru and Pokrom have nearly identical Ginis of 0.577 and 0.578, 
respectively. Third, the soil composition and geology also differ (Goldstein and Udry 
1999, Walker 2011). To capture this heterogeneity across community attributes, I include 
village level fixed effects for the four villages: Darmang, Konkonuru, Oboadaka, and 
Pokrom in the complete model.  
 
Other standard controls 
While many factors are associated with wellbeing, I include standard demographic 
controls including age, sex, and household size, as well as education.38 I also include an 
age-squared term to reflect that people tend to experience declining happiness in their 
thirties and forties, but increases again as people reach their sixties (see Deiner et al. 2002 
for a review). Increased schooling is positively associated with higher subjective welfare. 
I create education categories to reflect: no schooling (13% of the respondents), at least 
some primary schooling (23%); at least some junior or middle school (28%); some high 
school (29%); and beyond high school (6%).  
 
Reference groups 
I computed the “leave-out mean”, which is the reference group mean calculated without 
the respondent’s own values, for household asset and per expenditure measures.  
I computed these two economic measures for three different types of reference groups: a 
                                                
38 I estimated models with religion and ethnic minority status but due to the lack of heterogeneity within 
these categories, I do not report them. In our sample, over 85 percent of the population indicated that its 
religious affiliation was Christian. Almost 80 percent of respondents are the ethnic majority, Akwapim. Six 
percent of respondents were members of the broader Akan Nations ethnic group, which includes Akwapim, 
while about 13.5% reported being “other” ethnicities. Given that neither was significant in the models, I 
removed them to increase efficiency and degrees of freedom.  
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spatial reference group, using village-level information; a spatial-cohort reference group, 
using village and sex categories to capture homophily; and a series of social network 
reference groups. The first two reference groups are “analyst-defined”, whereas the social 
network reference groups reflect the individual’s actual relationships to other 
respondents. The social network data provide a rich opportunity to understand how 
different types of social networks may influence subjective welfare measures both 
differently from each other and differently from analyst-defined reference groups. Thus, I 
test four different social network reference groups for relative deprivation effects.  
Spatial reference group 
To compute the spatial reference group, I calculated mean per capita expenditures and 
mean household assets for each village, leaving out each respondent’s own values from 
the mean calculation.  
Spatial-cohort reference group 
To construct a reference group of people with similar backgrounds, I split the sample by 
village and sex to create eight categories of respondent characteristics.39 Identical to the 
spatial reference group approach, I then computed leave-out means for reference group 
household assets and per capita expenditures.  
In-sample network reference group: 
The social network data were collected using an ego-centric approach. Individuals, rather 
                                                
39 Age-village combinations were estimated and are presented in Appendix Table 4A.1. The three age 
groupings used are 18-29, 30-49, and 50 and older. Due to small sample size, the age-categories were 
chosen to enable estimation rather than because these age ranges are meaningful in this context. Therefore, 
I am cautious about interpreting the findings, which indicate a positive relationship between per capita 
expenditures by age-village group and subjective wellbeing. McPherson et al. (2001) note that age, 
education levels and religious affiliation may also be characteristics that connect people to one another. 
Due to a lack of religious or ethnic heterogeneity in the sample, I do not compute reference groups by 
either.  Unfortunately, further dividing the sample by education levels (e.g., no schooling, primary school, 
and beyond primary) results in categories too small for estimation.   
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than ties, were sampled. In the 2009 wave, each respondent was asked about his or her in-
sample social networks within the village. Each respondent answered several questions, 
including whether other respondents in their village were relatives, the type and strength 
of the relationship (i.e., not a friend, acquaintance, distant friend, close friend, or good 
friend), whether the respondent had given to or received anything of value from the 
individual, and whether the respondent trusts the person to look after a valuable item 
(Walker and Barrett, 2011). Respondents in each village knew, on average, 95 of the 
other approximately 150 respondents from that village (Walker and Barrett, 2011; p. 40). 
The ego-centric sampling strategy implies that the network data may be 
incomplete. In other words, a researcher knows whether a respondent is connected to 
another respondent but does not know the entire universe of connections for each 
respondent. Assuming the network is complete may lead to misidentifying certain 
individuals as isolates just because their network wasn’t selected (Wasserman and Faust 
2009 (1994)). Using earlier rounds of the Ghana data, and following a similar social 
network sampling protocol, Udry and Conley (2004) report that some individuals in their 
sample appear as social isolates, which they argue is a misleading result in villages where 
virtually no one was completely isolated. Santos and Barrett (2008) refer to situations 
such as these as resulting from “matches-within-sample” strategies. The authors have 
found that matches-in-sample yields less accurate pictures of social networks than 
randomly selecting relationships (e.g., selecting “nodes” rather than “ties”) (Santos and 
Barrett 2008).  
To avoid sampling isolates, I treat the networks as egocentric with independence 
across egocentric networks (Wasserman and Faust 2009). Under this treatment, a means-
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based approach does not require network completeness, unlike density measures, which 
may misrepresent the true underlying network of an individual whose social network has 
not been included in the matches-in-sample. Thus, I use of the social network data to 
compute mean attributes of network respondents for each respondent. The ability to 
compute each network member’s own per capita expenditures and household assets is an 
informative departure from other work, such as Ravallion and Lokshin (2010), who rely 
on respondents’ reports of the economic statuses of their families and neighbors. 
Given the richness of information on the types of connections respondents had to 
one another in the social network data, I computed four different social network reference 
groups. In each case, I exclude from each respondent’s social network his or her 
spouse(s). First, I estimated mean values for social networks comprised of individuals 
who the respondent considered to be at least a good friend, labeled “good friend” 
reference group. Good friends are people the respondent ranked as at least a “3” to the 
question: “would you consider this person to be: not a friend (=1); an acquaintance (=2); 
a distant friend (=3); a good friend (=3); a close friend (= 4)?” Second, I estimated a 
slightly more restrictive social network, limited to those a respondent was willing to trust 
to look after a valuable item, labeled “trust” reference group. Responses to the question 
“would you trust this person to look after a valuable item for you?” were either yes or no. 
I then examined transfer-based social networks. For the third reference group, I computed 
values for social network members who had ever given the respondent a gift, labeled 
“received a gift from” reference group. The phrasing of this question is “have you ever 
received a gift (of money, goods or services) from this person?” Responses were yes or 
no. Fourth, I computed values for social network members the respondent had given a 
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gift to, labeled “gave gift to” reference group. Respondents answered yes or no to the 
question “have you ever given a gift (or money, goods, or services) to this person?”  
Giving and receiving gifts may imply a social obligation that trusting or being 
friends with someone does not (Mauss 2000 (1954)). The transfer-based social networks’ 
relationship to one’s own economic wellbeing could be positive or negative. While 
relative deprivation is one conceivable outcome, the closeness of ties created by gifts 
could change the dynamic away from one of comparison toward one of support, 
aspirations, or some other positive externality. Access to several different social network 
measures allows me to identify how respondent’s wellbeing is related to her different 
social networks, if at all. 
The initial sample is 608.  Missing data reduced the sample size. In addition to 26 
respondents missing dependent variable responses and the six outlying asset and 
expenditure findings (described above), 39 respondents were missing some combination 
of per capita expenditures, education level, and / or and age. The social network data also 
have fewer respondents because some respondents do not report having meaningful 
social interactions with other respondents. As described above, this does not mean that 
these respondents were social isolates. In total, the number of observations in each model 
varies between 537 and 415 respondents. In the section describing robustness checks, I 
discuss findings from estimates using multiply imputed data.   
Method 
I estimate a series of identical ordinal logit models that vary only by reference group 
values to test if the experience of relative deprivation depends on the reference group. 
The dependent variable, “Compared to other households in this village, would you 
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describe your household as…” is coded for three responses. There are too few categories 
to estimate the model with ordinary least squares (Easterlin 2011). Further, ordinal 
logistic regressions can better incorporate potential differences in scale between response 
categories that an OLS regression would treat as equivalent. Therefore estimating an 
ordinal model is a more prudent approach.  
The general form of the model is presented below in equation 1: 𝑦∗ =   𝛼 +   𝑰𝒊!𝜷+ 𝑿𝒊!𝜸  + 𝛿!𝐶! + 𝜌!𝑈 + 𝑹𝑮𝒊′𝜽+   𝜀 
𝑦 = 1  𝑖𝑓  𝑦 ∗  ≤ 𝜇!2  𝑖𝑓  𝜇! < 𝑦 ∗  ≤ 𝜇!3  𝑖𝑓  𝜇! < 𝑦 ∗  ≤ 𝜇!4  𝑖𝑓  𝜇! < 𝑦 ∗≤ 𝜇!5  𝑖𝑓  𝜇! < 𝑦 ∗  (1) 
The underlying latent response, y* is unknown. Observed responses are an ordered set of 
discrete responses, y, which groups y* into one of five response categories. The 
parameter α is a constant; Ii is a vector of individual economic attributes, including the 
natural logs of household wealth and per capita expenditures. Cj are a series of indicators 
variable taking a value of one for each of j villages; Xi is a vector of control variables and 𝜀 is the error term. Xi includes age and age-squared, gender, and schooling, which have 
been found in other studies to be consistently important for SWB or important to include 
as controls (Diener et al 2010; Easterlin et al. 2011). I also include the number of 
agricultural plots and the household size. RGi is a vector of the leave-out mean reference 
group values of per capita expenditures and household assets for respondent i.  
Findings, robustness checks, and discussion 
Findings 
To understand against whom, if anyone, respondents benchmark themselves, and if they 
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do, whether it impacts their wellbeing positively or negatively, I estimate the relationship 
between subjective welfare and a series of reference groups: spatial reference groups, 
village-gender reference groups, and social networks. If relative deprivation is present, a 
mean value of reference group assets or expenditures should have a negative influence on 
a respondent’s subjective welfare, all else equal. In other words, relative deprivation 
exists when a marginal increase to a reference group’s economic standing leads to a 
respondent feeling worse off. 
Motiving models 
To motivate why relative deprivation matters, I first present models estimating the 
effects of economic characteristics and reference group economic characteristics on 
subjective wellbeing. I later present fuller models with controls. The motivating models 
in Table 4.2 include analyst-defined reference group economic characteristics while the 
motivating models in Table 4.3 include social-network reference group characteristics. In 
these and all following models, I report robust standard errors to address any unobserved 
heteroskedasticity. 
Table 4.2 here 
In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the coefficient on household assets is strongly, positively 
associated with subjective well-being. Thus, not surprisingly, having more assets does 
increase the likelihood that a respondent reports his or her household to be better-off.  
The two analyst-defined reference groups presented in Table 4.2 are village-level 
spatial reference groups and village-gender cohort reference groups. Model 1 presents the 
estimate of subjective welfare when including the log leave-out means of per capita 
expenditures and the log leave-out means of household assets for each village. Model 2 
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presents the estimate of subjective welfare when including the log leave-out mean of per 
capita expenditures and log leave-out mean of household assets by village and gender 
cohort. The analyst-defined models indicate that individuals do experience relative 
deprivation when benchmarked against the leave-out mean asset holdings and per capita 
expenditures of other villagers. 
The gender-village results in model 2 are consistent with the village-only 
results.40 Yet, the experience of relative deprivation when using the village-gender 
reference groups is weaker. Therefore, the village-level reference groups are not 
substantially more explanatory when disaggregated by gender. 
The separate spatially-defined reference groups for men and women indicate that 
the finding relative deprivation is weaker when men and women compare themselves to 
same-sex villagers. This is consistent with Udry and Conley (2005) who argue that 
households may not be a meaningful category for understanding political influence, 
access to credit, and security of land access for residents of this area. In fact, they argue 
that the men and women belong to “cleave households” (p. 2). In other words, women 
[men] may feel more solidarity and less deprivation when benchmarking their wellbeing 
against other women [men] in their villages.  
Table 4.3 here 
Turning to the social network measures, I estimate relative deprivation models for 
four different social networks: a “good friend” reference group (Model 3); a “trusted” 
reference group (Model 4); a “received a gift from” reference group (Model 5); and a 
                                                
40 Due to sample size constraints, I was unable to split the network-based reference groups into female-only 
contacts male-only contacts. The role of gender-based social networks on wellbeing would be interesting 
research to pursue, particularly in places with high gender inequity. 
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“gave a gift to” reference group (Model 6). Results are in Table 4.3. These four reference 
groups capture the range of relationships that may differently influence subjective 
welfare. A respondent may be less unlikely to benchmark her subjective welfare against 
good friends whereas she may be much more aware of the economic status of those with 
whom she has exchanged gifts. In other words, the networks of good and trusted friends 
may be less likely to be sources of financial comparison and therefore less likely to 
impact subjective welfare.  
Models 3-6, presented in Table 4.3, show that some social networks’ economic 
characteristics are negatively associated with subjective wellbeing, although this result 
depends on two components. First, the form of economic measure matters. Coefficients 
on per capita expenditure measures tend to be negative and sometimes significant while 
household assets’ coefficients are a mix of positive and negative, although insignificant. 
Second, the type of social network also matters. The coefficients expenditures of 
members of trusted social networks or social networks composed of individuals who have 
given the respondent a gift, are significant (at the ten percent level) while the coefficients 
for other social network characteristics are not. This suggests that certain networks matter 
more for how people evaluate their lives than others.  
Nonetheless, other factors beyond own economic characteristics and reference 
group characteristics influence wellbeing, and I turn to estimating models with additional 
demographic characteristics now. 
 
Models with demographic controls 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present models that incorporate demographic characteristics 
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and, for the social network models, village fixed effects. Increases in education, 
particularly with achieving schooling beyond middle school, results in statistically 
significantly associated with higher log odds of reporting increased subjective welfare. 
Unlike other studies that routinely find age and sex significantly correlated with 
subjective welfare, neither a t-test of sex nor a joint chi-square test of age and age-
squared is significant.  
Table 4.4 here 
As in the motivating models, the coefficients on log household assets are highly 
statistically significant in the full models. An increase in log households is, as expected, 
positively associated with increased probability of higher levels of subjective welfare. 
However, neither log per capita expenditure coefficient nor the number of plots 
controlled by a household coefficient is statistically associated with increased levels of 
subjective welfare. Goldstein and Udry (2008) argue that land holdings are often 
ambiguous. The instability in land holdings from season to season may mean that many 
respondents, especially those in less powerful positions within their villages, do not 
consider the number of plots important to their subjective economic welfare.  
Analyst-defined reference groups and relative deprivation 
In Table 4.4, the addition of demographic controls increases the statistical 
significance and absolute value of the coefficients on reference group economic status. 
Thus, models 2 and 3 confirm that respondents do benchmark themselves against mean-
measures of analyst-defined reference groups and experience relative deprivation when 
these reference group members acquire assets.   
 Nonetheless, respondents experience less relative deprivation when benchmarked 
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against the village-gender cohort than against the entire village. McPherson (2001) notes 
that there are a number of possible characteristics that a person may have in common 
with the individuals with whom she or he associates. Unfortunately, the sample is too 
small to capture finer differentiations of characteristics, such as by age, education level, 
role in the community, or degree of religiousity. Thus, I cannot rule out the possibility 
that respondents experience other, different homophily-based effects beyond location and 
gender.  
Social networks and relative deprivation  
In Table 4.5, Models 3-6 show whether a respondent’s social network’s economic 
status is related to the respondent’s own subjective welfare. Model 3, which estimates the 
economic attributes of a reference group of those identified to be at least a good friend, 
indicates that the coefficients on the reference group measures are not statistically 
significantly related to subjective welfare. However, models 4 - 6 indicate that 
respondents experience deprivation relative to these social networks. First, model 6 
captures a statistically significant negative relationship between the mean per capita 
expenditures of people to whom the respondent has given a gift and the respondent’s 
subjective welfare. Thus, the mean economic status of good friends is not a correlate of a 
respondent’s perception of his or her household’s economic standing within the village 
but an increase in the expenditures of those people the respondents have given a gift to is.  
Table 4.5 here 
Models 4 and 5 tells a more complex story. As in model 6, the coefficients on the 
mean per capita expenditures of those two social networks are statistically significantly 
associated with decreased log odds in subjective welfare, indicating relative deprivation. 
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However, the coefficients on mean household assets of these reference groups are 
positively and statistically significantly associated with subjective welfare. That is, 
respondents seem to feel better about their own subjective welfare when the assets of the 
people who they trust or who give them gifts increase (all else equal), but feel worse 
when the same people increase their expenditures. The result is consistent with people 
treating assets – a store of wealth, not yet spent – and expenditures – purchases already 
made – as different categories of economic wellbeing. Increases in money spent by a 
respondent’s gift-giving social network or trusted network results in less money being 
available for a respondent to receive as a gift, all else equal. However, increases in assets 
means a respondent’s social network has more assets they can then give away. Thus, it 
appears that respondents perceive themselves better off when the people who give them 
gifts save their money. 
Combined, models 3 through 6 indicate that people do benchmark themselves 
against their social networks, but do so selectively. Social networks involving trust and 
transfers to the respondent are more meaningful to respondents’ economic wellbeing than 
the attributes of people labeled “good friends”.  This suggests that networks based on 
transfers and trust, play a bigger role in who people benchmark themselves against than 
friendship-based networks, which may not come with the same sorts of strings attached 
that relationships based on trust and transfers do. 
I find that the influence of reference group material wellbeing varies by reference 
group. The assets and expenditures of analyst-defined reference groups tend to adversely 
impact respondent subjective wellbeing, indicating relative deprivation. However, the 
effect of increased wellbeing of respondent-driven reference groups on subjective 
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wellbeing varies by measure. Asset increases are associated with positive SWB, while 
expenditure increases are associated with decreased SWB. Combined, these measures 
suggest respondents feel better about their own lives when their social network members 
pursue strategies of increasing their wealth, but not spending it, perhaps because 
respondents see these resources as potentially available to drawn-on in times of need or 
financial distress. 
 
Robustness checks 
To test the strength of the leave-out mean relative deprivation findings, I do a series of 
robustness checks. First, to test whether the results are sensitive to alternative 
specifications, I estimate a series of ordinal probit models of leave-out mean measures by 
reference groups. Estimates for the analyst-defined reference groups are presented in 
Table 4A.2 in the appendix and estimates for the social networks reference groups are 
presented in Table 4A.3. I find that the results across all six of the models for this 
alternative specification are consistent with ordinal logistic results. The probit models’ 
coefficients tend to be slightly lower than the logit estimates.  However, the key variables 
of interest remain statistically significant, usually falling within the same interval of 
statistical significance.  
Second, I test whether including both log leave-out mean assets and log leave-out 
mean expenditures is necessary for the identification of relative deprivation. Many 
studies rely on reference group estimates that include one or the other measure, but not 
both. Estimations of subjective welfare as a function of either reference group mean per 
capita expenditures or reference group mean household assets for each reference group 
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are available in the appendix.  
Table 4A.4 presents analyst-defined reference group results. Relying on only one 
type of economic characteristic, either per capita expenditure measures or household 
asset holdings, results in strong findings of relative deprivation. Using per capita 
expenditures result in larger negative, statistically significant coefficients indicative of 
relative deprivation compare to asset holdings. This is different from Table 4.4, which 
includes both economic characteristics and in which asset holdings have larger negative, 
statistically significant coefficients. Thus, relying on only one economic measure may 
hide additional economic factors that contribute to relative deprivation. 
Table 4A.5 presents the effect of per capita expenditures and social network log 
leave-out mean per capita expenditures on wellbeing, while Table 4A.6 presents 
household assets and social network log leave-out mean household assets. In Table 4A.5, 
expenditure measures result in relative deprivation for models 3, 4 and 6. Only the 
coefficient on economic characteristics of those who have given a gift to a respondent is 
not statistically associated with wellbeing, indicating that relative deprivation based on 
per capita expenditures alone is dependent on social network definition. Conversely, in 
Table 4A.6, model 5, respondents’ perceptions of their economic welfare are positively 
and highly statistically significantly related to increases in the mean asset holdings of 
social networks from whom respondents receive gifts. Thus, model 5 in table 4A.6 shows 
one example of how having a wealthier reference group can generate a positive 
externality, which is consistent with other low- and middle-income country findings 
(Senik 2004, Ravallion and Lokshin 2010). Including only per capita expenditures or 
household assets of the respondent and reference group in models tells part of the story. 
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Therefore, including both per capita-based measures and asset-based measures, when 
available, appears warranted.  
Third, I impute results. Demographic characteristics and own economic 
characteristics are missing very few observations. Education level, the variable with the 
highest number missing responses (n=42), is missing only seven percent. However, a 
higher number of respondents are missing social network reference group characteristics. 
For example, 104 respondents out of 608 respondents do not have any reported values for 
trusted reference groups. This is perhaps due to the egocentric network sampling 
approach. Using chained multiple imputation to generate five datasets, I imputed 14 
continuous and discrete variables with “missing” responses, including the dependent 
variable, listed in Appendix Table 4A.7. I deleted the imputed responses for the 
dependent variable, reducing sample size from 608 to 582 (Johnson and Young, 2011).  
Using the imputed data, I re-estimated subjective wellbeing by reference group, 
presented in Appendix Table 4A.8. The results of models relying on imputed are 
consistent with the complete case analysis results, with similar coefficients and statistical 
significance. This indicates that imputed and non-imputed data yield comparable results. 
As discussed above, an egocentric sampling approach may miss some members of each 
respondent’s reference group. Because imputing social network variables relies on 
matches-within-sample respondent pool, respondents whose social networks are not 
included in the original sample have less informative data available from which to 
impute. Further, imputation may negate the assumption of independence across networks. 
Therefore, while imputation provides a useful robustness check, I present the non-
imputed results.  
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Summary of main findings  
I find that mean-based relative deprivation exists, but findings vary by reference group 
and economic measure. In this sample, respondents’ own wellbeing is adversely 
influenced by objective measures of wellbeing for residents of the same village, and, less 
strongly, for same-gender residents. An increase to the expenditures of those who are 
trusted and those who the respondent has given gifts to adversely impact the respondent’s 
subjective welfare, all else equal, indicative of relative deprivation. Respondents also 
experience relative deprivation when the people they have received gifts from spend 
more. However, they feel better off when the same people increase their asset holdings. 
This suggests that respondents take particular note of the financial status of the people 
who give them gifts and that they feel better off when the gift-giving group behaves in a 
way (e.g., saving more and spending less) that increases the total amount available for 
gifts. Thus, having a social network comprised of trusted or gift-giving thrifty-savers, 
defined as low-spenders with high assets, improves ones’ subjective wellbeing. 
Other studies relying on analyst-defined reference groups may fail to find 
evidence of relative deprivation because the selected reference group is not what 
respondents use a benchmark. Further, analysts relying on only asset or only expenditures 
may not be able to observe how respondents treat these two financial categories 
differently. 
 
Discussion 
Subjective wellbeing data have a series of methodological challenges, including 
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frame of reference bias, lack of stability, and endogeneity. (Frey and Stutzer 2001, Diener 
et al. 2002, Helliwell and Putnam 2004, Kahneman and Krueger 2006, Kruegar and 
Schkade 2008, Beegle et al. 2011, Ravallion 2012).  These concerns reflect the 
importance of treating the results as associational rather than causal. Senik (2004) argues 
that many of the problems associated with the use of subjective data relative to objective 
measures (or, action-revealed preferences) “result in classical measurement errors which 
can be benign if they are not correlated with explanatory variables” (p. 2103).  Further, 
some concerns that are theoretically important have not been found to bias findings.  
Beegle et al. (2011) discuss frame of reference problems (e.g., heterogeneity in what 
“poor” and “rich” mean) in subjective questions and tests for them. The authors conclude 
that differences in frames of reference are not an important source of bias in their 
estimation (Beegle et al. 2011). Krueger and Schkade (2008), testing for reliability of 
wellbeing questions, write, “the estimated degree of reliability of subjective well-being 
data is probably high enough to detect effects when they are present in most applications, 
especially if samples are large and the data are aggregated across people or activities” (p. 
1834). Given that my sample is not large, it would be valuable to re-test my findings with 
larger samples. Models of subjective wellbeing may suffer from endogeneity. 
Unfortunately, an instrumental variables approach is hampered by the likelihood that 
variables correlated with social network selection, with assets, or with expenditures are 
also mostly likely correlated with the dependent variable as well (Senik 2004; see also 
Ravallion and Lokshin 2010 for a detailed discussion on the lack of feasible instruments). 
Unobserved characteristics (e.g., an optimistic or pessimistic outlook) may also be 
driving both reported wellbeing and the so-called explanatory variables.   
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The structure of the sample also limits my findings. First, the sample is comprised 
of married or have-been-married individuals. As a result, the findings may not be 
applicable to single, never married individuals. Second, my findings are drawn from a 
small region in southern Ghana. Further research is necessary to determine how 
representative these findings are for other locations within Ghana, within West Africa, or 
within other poor countries. Third, the social networks data was generated using 
“matches-within-sampling”. Confirming that these findings hold for randomly sampled 
relationships or for a name-generator based on egocentric network patterns will be an 
important next step.  
Nonetheless, subjective wellbeing measures can shed light on relative deprivation 
and inequality that is otherwise not directly observable.  As Ravallion (2012) notes, 
subjective wellbeing data “can provide welfare-relevant information that is simply not 
available in standard objective data” (p. 4). This research contributes to an emerging 
literature on relative deprivation in less developed countries in two ways.  First, my 
findings confirm that the selection of reference groups influences whether respondents 
experience relative deprivation. Analyst-defined reference groups, in this study, are more 
likely to yield evidence of relative deprivation compared to reference groups based on 
respondents’ reported social interactions.   
Further research is needed to understand why I find people positively 
benchmarking themselves against strong social networks, such as trusted networks, but 
negatively benchmarking themselves to analyst-defined reference groups. One 
compelling, possible explanation is that in rural sub-Saharan Africa, where state support 
structures are weak, people feel better about their own lives knowing that trusted people 
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or people who have given gifts to the respondent, have high-assets and low per capita 
expenditures. These are the very people one would expect to rely on during times of 
distress. Such positive feelings may be specific to areas or groups with weak or limited 
alternative safety nets and thus may not be observable in high-income countries, except 
among poorer residents (McBride 2001).  
My analyst-based reference group results are consistent with relative deprivation 
findings from high-income countries, which rely on analyst-defined measures.  In Ghana, 
the experience of relative deprivation exists particularly for analyst-defined reference 
groups. Interestingly, village-level relative deprivation remains relevant in a place such as 
rural Ghana where residency patterns may not take on the same degree of sorting (e.g., by 
school zone, by property taxes, by continuing patterns of segregation) that occurs in 
many high-income countries. In comparison to high-income countries, where strong 
cohort-based relative deprivation has been found, my significant, but relatively weaker, 
findings of spatial-cohort relative deprivation may be because the village-gender 
reference group is not fine-grained enough, a limitation of the data. This is potentially an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
With the exception of the reference group that respondents have given gifts to, my 
results differ from some studies from low and middle-income countries that fail to find 
relative deprivation or find positive externalities associated with reference group 
economic status. Across these studies, the definitions of reference groups vary. One 
possible explanation consistent with previous research and these findings is that 
respondents have several different types of reference groups – some of whom are 
associated with relative deprivation, and some of whom are associated with positive 
  197 
externalities.  
One implication of my research is that when relative deprivation is not found, it 
may be because respondents treat the studied reference groups studied differently than 
they treat other reference groups. Studies of wellbeing in low-income countries that rely 
on analyst-defined reference groups, such as spatial or spatial-gender groups, may not 
fully capture how people relate to those individuals more heavily involved in their lives.  
Future researchers interested in the role of reference groups in low-income 
countries may benefit from incorporating social network-based reference groups into 
their estimates. These reference groups yield a complementary set of findings to findings 
using analyst-defined reference groups. An implication of this study for survey design 
and model selection for future studies of relative deprivation is that lower-cost 
geographic or homophily – based reference groups do not appear to produce similar 
results to ego-centric network sampling. An additional interesting avenue for future 
research is evaluating relative deprivation using ego-centric networks versus sampling of 
network ties; it may be that social networks generated from a sampling of ties is even 
more informative about relative deprivation than the matches-within-sample approach 
used here. 
Thus, my research opens up the possibility that reference group benchmarking is 
more nuanced and complex than previously addressed in the subjective wellbeing 
literature. These findings indicate a need to develop a better theorization of the role of 
reference groups on peoples’ lives and suggests that a productive avenue of research 
should shift the debate away from “who is the right reference group” toward examining 
the different, and overlapping, roles that various reference groups play in peoples’ 
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perceptions of their lives. 
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of respondents’ subjective welfare relative to their village 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Subjective economic welfare 576 3.003 0.806 
Among the poorest 576 0.043 0.204 
Poorer than most 576 0.148 0.355 
About average 576 0.616 0.487 
Richer than most 576 0.148 0.355 
Among the richest 576 0.045 0.208 
Demographic Characteristics 
   Female = 1 576 0.493 0.500 
Age 570 43.223 13.734 
Household size 576 5.080 2.199 
Education level 
   No formal education 543 0.133 0.340 
Some primary school 543 0.232 0.423 
Some middle school 543 0.280 0.449 
Some secondary school 543 0.293 0.455 
Beyond secondary school 543 0.063 0.242 
Economic characteristics       
Log pc exp 576 4.661 0.696 
Log hh assets 576 7.150 1.033 
Number of plots 576 1.075 1.079 
Village        
Darmang 156 0.271 0.445 
Pokrom 132 0.226 0.418 
Oboadaka 138 0.240 0.427 
Konkonuru 152 0.264 0.441 
Social network reference groups sizes       
“Giving a gift to” social network 539 143.878 73.548 
 “Trusted” reference group 539 27.479 30.047 
“Receiving a gift from” reference group 574 29.859 28.170 
“Good friend” social network 574 31.136 29.352 
Leave-out means       
Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village 576 4.869 0.106 
Log leave-out mean of assets by village 576 7.655 0.335 
Log leave-out mean of pc exp by age and gender 576 4.872 0.043 
Log leave-out mean of assets by age and gender 576 7.673 0.324 
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of “good friends” reference 
group 486 4.880 0.378 
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of “trusted” reference group 483 4.919 0.306 
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of “received a gift from” 
reference group 522 4.906 0.329 
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of “given a gift to” social 
network 517 4.906 0.319 
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of “good friends” reference 
group 486 7.748 0.750 
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of “trusted” reference group 483 7.758 0.650 
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of “received a gift from” 
reference group 522 7.814 0.717 
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of “given a gift to” social 
network 517 7.785 0.708 
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Table 4.2: Ordinal logistic estimates of the relationship between relative 
deprivation and subjective welfare: analyst defined reference groups 
Models 1 2 
 
Village 
reference 
groups 
Village-
gender 
reference 
groups 
Economic characteristics     
Log pc exp 0.118 0.11 
 
(0.150) (0.148) 
Log hh assets 1.096*** 1.096*** 
 
(0.167) (0.168) 
Relative deprivation measures     
Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village -3.210* 
 
 
(1.652) 
 Log leave-out mean of assets by village -1.300*** 
 
 
(0.504) 
 Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village and gender
 
-1.746 
  
(1.468) 
Log leave-out mean of assets by village and gender
 
-0.833* 
  
(0.447) 
Cut 1 -18.942* -8.265 
 
(11.509) (10.226) 
Cut 2 -15.433 -4.774 
 
(11.496) (10.228) 
Observations 576 576 
Pseudo R square 0.131 0.129 
Chi square 65.31 64.41 
Log likelihood -466.2 -467.7 
Akaike information criterion 1.64 1.645 
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Table 4.3: Ordinal logistic estimates of the relationship between relative 
deprivation and subjective welfare: social network reference groups 
Models 3 4 5 6 
 
“Good 
friend” 
reference 
group 
“Trusted” 
reference 
group 
“Received a 
gift from” 
reference 
group 
“Given a gift 
to” reference 
group 
Economic characteristics         
Log pc exp 0.105 0.114 0.168 0.156 
 
(0.162) (0.160) (0.160) (0.164) 
Log hh assets 1.075*** 1.001*** 1.060*** 1.077*** 
 
(0.187) (0.181) (0.176) (0.179) 
Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“good friends” reference group -0.264 
   
 
(0.230) 
   Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“good friends” reference group -0.124 
   
 
(0.129) 
   Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“trusted” reference group 
 
-0.511* 
  
  
(0.295) 
  Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“trusted” reference group 
 
0.103 
  
  
(0.152) 
  Log leave-out mean of pc exp of
“receiving a gift from” reference 
group 
  
-0.235 
 
   
(0.277) 
 Log leave-out mean of hh assets of
“receiving a gift from” reference 
group 
  
0.027 
 
   
(0.127) 
 Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“giving a gift to” social network 
   
-0.471* 
    
(0.273) 
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“giving a gift to” social network 
   
-0.063 
    
(0.132) 
Cut 1 4.033** 4.189** 5.676*** 3.818* 
 
(1.872) (2.053) (2.010) (1.964) 
Cut 2 7.628*** 7.595*** 9.118*** 7.325*** 
 
(1.922) (2.106) (2.064) (2.015) 
Observations 486 483 522 517 
Pseudo R square 0.123 0.117 0.122 0.126 
Chi square 45.93 50.08 55.10 54.51 
Log likelihood -387.3 -398.8 -427.9 -418.4 
Akaike information criterion 1.618 1.676 1.662 1.642 
 
 
Table 4.4: Ordinal logistic estimates of the relationship between relative 
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deprivation and subjective welfare: analyst defined reference groups with 
controls 
Models 1 2 
 
Village 
reference 
groups 
Village and 
gender 
reference 
groups 
Demographic characteristics     
Female = 1 0.304 
 
 
(0.222) 
 Age -0.021 -0.017 
 
(0.041) (0.041) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Some primary school 0.392 0.368 
 
(0.336) (0.339) 
Some middle school 0.666** 0.594* 
 
(0.335) (0.342) 
Some secondary school 1.183*** 1.025*** 
 
(0.338) (0.336) 
Beyond secondary school 0.987** 0.828** 
 
(0.407) (0.404) 
Household size 0.009 0.015 
 
(0.060) (0.060) 
Economic characteristics     
Log pc exp 0.117 0.210 
 
(0.241) (0.491) 
Log hh assets 1.066*** 0.993** 
 
(0.202) (0.419) 
Number of plots 0.139 0.133 
 
(0.091) (0.096) 
Relative deprivation measures     
Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village -3.520** 
 
 
(1.786) 
 Log leave-out mean of assets by village -1.433*** 
 
 
(0.544) 
 Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village and gender 
 
-2.060 
  
(1.597) 
Log leave-out mean of assets by village and gender 
 
-0.961** 
  
(0.489) 
Cut 1 -21.490* -10.952 
 
(12.547) (11.248) 
Cut 2 -17.933 -7.427 
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(12.538) (11.255) 
Observations 537 537 
Pseudo R square 0.142 0.137 
Chi square 79.39 75.15 
Log likelihood -430.3 -432.9 
Akaike information criterion 1.658 1.665 
Notes:  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
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Table 4.5: Ordinal logistic estimates of the relationship between relative 
deprivation and subjective welfare: social network reference groups with 
controls 
Models 3 4 5 6 
 
“Good 
friend” 
reference 
group 
“Trusted” 
reference 
group 
“Received a 
gift from” 
reference 
group 
“Given a gift 
to” reference 
group 
Demographic characteristics 
    Female = 1 0.055 0.159 0.192 0.138 
 
(0.254) (0.242) (0.238) (0.243) 
Age -0.024 -0.043 -0.017 -0.037 
 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.045) 
Age squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Some primary school 0.269 0.092 0.233 0.218 
 
(0.373) (0.377) (0.356) (0.359) 
Some middle school 0.630* 0.547 0.626* 0.593* 
 
(0.376) (0.367) (0.349) (0.354) 
Some secondary school 0.976*** 0.904** 1.056*** 1.015*** 
 
(0.378) (0.370) (0.349) (0.353) 
Beyond secondary school 0.850* 0.708 0.872** 0.809* 
 
(0.468) (0.479) (0.431) (0.434) 
Household size 0.026 0.003 0.010 -0.000 
 
(0.070) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) 
Economic characteristics         
Log pc exp 0.167 0.082 0.171 0.147 
 
(0.243) (0.222) (0.230) (0.234) 
Log hh assets 0.970*** 1.003*** 1.013*** 1.034*** 
 
(0.233) (0.231) (0.219) (0.222) 
Number of plots 0.068 0.105 0.160 0.145 
 
(0.110) (0.108) (0.106) (0.107) 
Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“good friends” reference group -0.481 
   
 
(0.350) 
   Log leave-out mean of hh assets of
“good friends” reference group -0.062 
   
 
(0.162) 
   Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“trusted” reference group 
 
-0.859** 
  
  
(0.394) 
  Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“trusted” reference group 
 
0.361* 
  
  
(0.203) 
  Log leave-out mean of pc exp of
“receiving a gift from” reference 
group 
  
-0.512* 
 
   
(0.292) 
 Log leave-out mean of hh assets of
“receiving a gift from” reference 
group 
  
0.372* 
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(0.2) 
 Log leave-out mean of pc exp of
“giving a gift to” social network 
   
-0.675** 
    
(0.291) 
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of
“giving a gift to” social network 
   
0.13 
    
(0.149) 
Village-level effects         
Pokrom -0.005 -0.316 -0.306 -0.072 
 
(0.317) (0.352) (0.308) (0.300) 
Oboadaka 0.641** 0.796*** 0.747*** 0.688** 
 
(0.284) (0.284) (0.269) (0.270) 
Konkonuru 0.301 0.568* 0.577** 0.525* 
 
(0.280) (0.291) (0.277) (0.276) 
Cut 1 0.228 0.68 2.543** 1.17 
 
(1.406) (1.418) (1.229) (1.242) 
Cut 2 1.136 1.589 3.478*** 2.083* 
 
(1.410) (1.428) (1.238) (1.245) 
Cut 3 3.274** 3.626** 5.534*** 4.160*** 
 
(1.425) (1.447) (1.263) (1.264) 
Cut 4 4.288*** 4.631*** 6.531*** 5.149*** 
 
(1.447) (1.469) (1.283) (1.278) 
Observations 453 451 492 486 
Pseudo R square 0.139 0.135 0.145 0.141 
Chi square 60.61 59.16 72.19 67.87 
Log likelihood -353.6 -364.1 -393.1 -386.1 
Akaike information criterion 1.641 1.695 1.671 1.663 
 
Notes:  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND IMPUTATION 
 
Below are kernel density estimates for both assets and per capita expenditures. 
Log transformations normalize both economic measures. 
 
 
Figure 4A.1: Kernel density of assets 
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Figure 4A.2: Histogram of natural log of household assets 
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Figure 4A.3: Kernel density of per capita expenditures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  215 
 
Figure 4A.4: Histogram of natural log of per capita expenditures 
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Table 4A.1: Ordinal logistic estimates of the relationship between relative 
deprivation and subjective welfare: analyst defined village-age reference group 
with controls 
Model 
 
 
Village and 
age reference 
groups 
Demographic characteristics   
Female = 1 0.305 
 
(0.224) 
Age 
 
  Age squared 
 
  Some primary school 0.167 
 
(0.338) 
Some middle school 0.333 
 
(0.332) 
Some secondary school 0.854** 
 
(0.342) 
Beyond secondary school 0.783* 
 
(0.425) 
Household size 0.002 
 
(0.061) 
Economic characteristics   
Log pc exp 0.128 
 
(0.242) 
Log hh assets 1.059*** 
 
(0.205) 
Number of plots 0.159* 
 
(0.093) 
Relative deprivation measures   
Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village and age 1.596* 
 
(0.850) 
Log leave-out mean of assets by village and age 0.047 
 
(0.235) 
Cut 1 15.077*** 
 
(5.042) 
Cut 2 18.607*** 
 
(5.072) 
Observations 543 
  217 
Pseudo R square 0.139 
Chi square 78.61 
Log likelihood -436.3 
Akaike information criterion 1.655 
Notes:  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
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Table 4A.2: Ordinal probit estimates of the relationship between relative 
deprivation and subjective welfare: analyst defined reference groups 
Models 1 2 
 
Village 
reference 
groups 
Village and 
gender 
reference 
groups 
Demographic characteristics     
Female = 1 0.195 
 
 
(0.126) 
 Age -0.011 -0.010 
 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Some primary school 0.236 0.222 
 
(0.192) (0.193) 
Some middle school 0.387** 0.342* 
 
(0.192) (0.195) 
Some secondary school 0.689*** 0.592*** 
 
(0.192) (0.192) 
Beyond secondary school 0.619*** 0.515** 
 
(0.236) (0.234) 
Household size 0.005 0.008 
 
(0.034) (0.033) 
Economic characteristics     
Log pc exp 0.101 0.097 
 
(0.112) (0.110) 
Log hh assets 0.484*** 0.490*** 
 
(0.110) (0.109) 
Number of plots 0.093* 0.062 
 
(0.055) (0.049) 
Relative deprivation measures     
Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village -2.085** 
 
 
(1.006) 
 Log leave-out mean of assets by village -0.780** 
 
 
(0.307) 
 Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village and gender
 
-1.361 
  
(0.901) 
Log leave-out mean of assets by village and gender
 
-0.540* 
  
(0.278) 
Cut 1 -12.737* -7.490 
 
(7.074) (6.358) 
Cut 2 -10.683 -5.450 
 
(7.071) (6.360) 
Observations 537 537 
Pseudo R square 0.137 0.132 
Chi square 76.10 71.10 
Log likelihood -432.7 -435.3 
Notes:  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
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Table 4A.3: Ordinal probit estimates of the relationship between relative 
deprivation and subjective welfare: social network reference groups 
Models 3 4 5 6 
 
“Good 
friend” 
reference 
group 
“Trusted” 
reference 
group 
“Received a 
gift from” 
reference 
group 
“Given a gift 
to” reference 
group 
Demographic characteristics 
    Female = 1 0.045 0.113 0.140 0.108 
 
(0.142) (0.137) (0.134) (0.136) 
Age -0.009 -0.020 -0.007 -0.017 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Some primary school 0.152 0.073 0.136 0.129 
 
(0.212) (0.215) (0.203) (0.204) 
Some middle school 0.353* 0.310 0.352* 0.332 
 
(0.214) (0.211) (0.201) (0.202) 
Some secondary school 0.561*** 0.524** 0.612*** 0.587*** 
 
(0.213) (0.210) (0.200) (0.201) 
Beyond secondary school 0.547** 0.481* 0.559** 0.525** 
 
(0.268) (0.275) (0.249) (0.250) 
Household size 0.012 0.004 0.006 0.001 
 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Economic characteristics         
Log pc exp 0.121 0.080 0.126 0.117 
 
(0.127) (0.120) (0.123) (0.124) 
Log hh assets 0.473*** 0.485*** 0.495*** 0.502*** 
 
(0.117) (0.120) (0.117) (0.118) 
Number of plots 0.035 0.055 0.088 0.080 
 
(0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) 
Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“good friends” reference group -0.306 
   
 
(0.199) 
   Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“good friends” reference group -0.013 
   
 
(0.098) 
   Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“trusted” reference group 
 
-0.517** 
  
  
(0.223) 
  Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“trusted” reference group 
 
0.209* 
  
  
(0.116) 
  Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“receiving a gift from” reference 
group 
  
-0.308* 
 
   
(0.174) 
 Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“receiving a gift from” reference 
group 
  
0.205* 
 
   
(0.109) 
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Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“giving a gift to” social network 
   
-0.402** 
    
(0.176) 
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“giving a gift to” social network 
   
0.076 
    
(0.087) 
Village-level effects         
Pokrom 0.008 -0.144 -0.135 -0.007 
 
(0.181) (0.197) (0.175) (0.171) 
Oboadaka 0.352** 0.435*** 0.416*** 0.379** 
 
(0.157) (0.158) (0.150) (0.151) 
Konkonuru 0.151 0.305* 0.306** 0.275* 
 
(0.156) (0.163) (0.156) (0.154) 
Cut 1 1.821 2.114 3.787*** 2.014 
 
(1.344) (1.436) (1.319) (1.245) 
Cut 2 3.961*** 4.155*** 5.848*** 4.096*** 
 
(1.361) (1.455) (1.344) (1.265) 
Observations 453 451 492 486 
Pseudo R square 0.134 0.130 0.140 0.136 
Chi square 62.07 58.74 69.75 64.51 
Log likelihood -355.5 -366.2 -395.3 -388.4 
Notes:  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
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Table 4A.4: Separate ordinal logit estimates of the relationship between per 
capita expenditure measures and household asset measures of relative 
deprivation and subjective welfare: analyst-defined reference groups 
  1 2 3 4 
 
Village 
reference 
groups 
Village 
reference 
groups 
Village – 
gender 
reference 
groups 
Village – 
gender 
reference 
groups 
Demographic characteristics         
Female = 1 0.485** 0.331 
  
 
(0.218) (0.222) 
  Age 0.003 -0.018 0.008 -0.013 
 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Some primary school 0.397 0.350 0.368 0.323 
 
(0.341) (0.337) (0.339) (0.337) 
Some middle school 0.629* 0.572* 0.567* 0.523 
 
(0.334) (0.335) (0.337) (0.339) 
Some secondary school 1.345*** 1.066*** 1.181*** 0.941*** 
 
(0.339) (0.337) (0.331) (0.333) 
Beyond secondary school 1.395*** 0.913** 1.179*** 0.746* 
 
(0.427) (0.413) (0.412) (0.400) 
Household Size 0.128** -0.009 0.138*** -0.004 
 
(0.053) (0.050) (0.053) (0.050) 
Economic characteristics         
Log pc exp 0.605*** 
 
0.601*** 
 
 
(0.191) 
 
(0.188) 
 Log hh assets
 
1.053*** 
 
1.052*** 
  
(0.175) 
 
(0.172) 
Number of plots 0.206** 0.217** 0.113 0.145* 
 
(0.096) (0.096) (0.084) (0.086) 
Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of pc exp by 
village -2.209** 
   
 
(0.897) 
   Log leave-out mean of assets by 
village 
 
-0.535* 
  
  
(0.290) 
  Log leave-out mean of pc exp by 
village and gender 
  
-2.196** 
 
   
(0.867) 
 Log leave-out mean of assets by 
village and gender 
   
-0.472* 
    
(0.285) 
Cut 1 -7.279 2.387 -7.530* 2.658 
 
(4.470) (2.299) (4.367) (2.273) 
Cut 2 -4.104 5.917** -4.378 6.170*** 
 
(4.473) (2.319) (4.370) (2.296) 
Observations 537 537 537 537 
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Pseudo R square 0.0674 0.138 0.0624 0.135 
Chi square 61.21 68.94 57.86 64.86 
Log-likelihood -467.7 -432.3 -470.2 -434.0 
Notes:  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
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Table 4A.5: Separate ordinal logit estimates of the relationship between per 
capita expenditure measures of relative deprivation and subjective welfare: social 
networks reference groups 
Models 3 4 5 6 
 
“Good 
friend” 
reference 
group 
“Trusted” 
reference 
group 
“Received a 
gift from” 
reference 
group 
“Given a gift 
to” reference 
group 
Demographic characteristics 
    Female = 1 0.237 0.299 0.416* 0.358 
 
(0.250) (0.238) (0.236) (0.240) 
Age -0.012 -0.015 0.011 -0.006 
 
(0.044) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Some primary school 0.269 0.134 0.307 0.280 
 
(0.375) (0.383) (0.360) (0.363) 
Some middle school 0.601 0.473 0.657* 0.632* 
 
(0.380) (0.376) (0.356) (0.360) 
Some secondary school 1.237*** 1.107*** 1.345*** 1.320*** 
 
(0.379) (0.379) (0.357) (0.361) 
Beyond secondary school 1.341*** 1.159** 1.319*** 1.293*** 
 
(0.465) (0.493) (0.441) (0.446) 
Household size 0.145** 0.125** 0.139** 0.132** 
 
(0.060) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Economic characteristics         
Log pc exp 0.625*** 0.517** 0.638*** 0.629*** 
 
(0.214) (0.212) (0.215) (0.214) 
Number of plots 0.062 0.103 0.166 0.148 
 
(0.111) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) 
Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“good friends” reference group -0.740* 
   
 
(0.425) 
   Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“trusted” reference group 
 
-0.661* 
  
  
(0.364) 
  Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“receiving a gift from” reference 
group 
  
-0.508 
 
   
(0.398) 
 Log leave-out mean of pc exp of 
“giving a gift to” social network 
   
-0.769** 
    
(0.385) 
Village-level effects         
Pokrom 0.258 0.357 0.350 0.414 
 
(0.303) (0.318) (0.284) (0.282) 
Oboadaka 0.579** 0.624** 0.682*** 0.654** 
 
(0.273) (0.274) (0.256) (0.258) 
Konkonuru -0.064 -0.022 0.033 0.066 
 
(0.274) (0.267) (0.267) (0.268) 
Cut 1 -0.428 -0.759 1.476 -0.365 
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(2.392) (2.355) (2.374) (2.246) 
Cut 2 2.927 2.392 4.661* 2.858 
  (2.406) (2.373) (2.398) (2.258) 
Observations 453 451 492 486 
Pseudo R square 0.0703 0.0611 0.0689 0.0653 
Chi square 57.05 50.10 59.71 55.76 
Log likelihood -381.7 -395.4 -428.1 -420.3 
Notes:  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
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Table 4A.6: Separate ordinal logit estimates of the relationship between 
household asset measures of relative deprivation and subjective welfare: social 
networks reference groups 
Models 3 4 5 6 
 
“Good 
friend” 
reference 
group 
“Trusted” 
reference 
group 
“Received a 
gift from” 
reference 
group 
“Given a gift 
to” reference 
group 
Demographic characteristics 
    Female = 1 0.063 0.159 0.194 0.141 
 
(0.255) (0.242) (0.237) (0.241) 
Age -0.016 -0.037 -0.016 -0.038 
 
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) 
Age squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Some primary school 0.270 0.154 0.276 0.270 
 
(0.370) (0.371) (0.352) (0.356) 
Some middle school 0.623* 0.570 0.632* 0.597* 
 
(0.375) (0.362) (0.347) (0.350) 
Some secondary school 0.945** 0.901** 1.070*** 1.015*** 
 
(0.373) (0.367) (0.347) (0.352) 
Beyond secondary school 0.820* 0.735 0.882** 0.803* 
 
(0.462) (0.469) (0.427) (0.432) 
Household size 0.003 -0.012 -0.017 -0.021 
 
(0.056) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) 
Economic characteristics         
Log hh assets 1.013*** 1.020*** 1.056*** 1.068*** 
 
(0.207) (0.207) (0.195) (0.197) 
Number of plots 0.073 0.109 0.154 0.140 
 
(0.110) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107) 
Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“good friends” reference group -0.102 
   
 
(0.151) 
   
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“trusted” reference group 
 
0.207 
  
  
(0.192) 
  Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“receiving a gift from” reference 
group 
  
0.283* 
 
   
(0.172) 
 
Log leave-out mean of hh assets of 
“giving a gift to” social network 
   
0.083 
    
(0.138) 
Village-level effects         
Pokrom 0.045 -0.090 -0.225 -0.018 
 
(0.304) (0.324) (0.292) (0.290) 
Oboadaka 0.659** 0.872*** 0.756*** 0.691** 
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(0.283) (0.279) (0.268) (0.268) 
Konkonuru 0.216 0.321 0.449* 0.371 
 
(0.279) (0.272) (0.265) (0.267) 
Cut 1 5.469*** 7.442*** 8.797*** 6.673*** 
 
(1.828) (2.168) (1.992) (1.760) 
Cut 2 9.163*** 10.940*** 12.351*** 10.253*** 
 
(1.902) (2.241) (2.074) (1.840) 
Observations 453 451 492 486 
Pseudo R square 0.136 0.130 0.142 0.136 
Chi square 53.16 52.05 65.74 60.11 
Log likelihood -354.8 -366.2 -394.6 -388.3 
Notes:  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; * at the 10% level 
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Imputation results 
 
A comparison of complete cases and imputed values reveals that the new averages 
including the means and standard deviations of the imputed data are consistent with 
complete cases. Most of the missing responses are due to respondents not having a 
sampled social network. The total number of complete cases is 413, although, as seen 
below, each individual model has a higher number of respondents. Overall, the mean 
economic characteristics tend to be lower for the imputed data. Using the imputations 
of per capita income and demographic characteristics, values for village and village-
gender leave out mean income and assets were computed and therefore are not 
presented here.  
 
Table 4A.7: Comparing means and standard deviations between complete cases 
and imputed data 
 
Complete cases Imputed data 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Demographic 
Characteristics 
      Perception of wellbeing 582      2.007             0.621 582     2.007           0.621 
Female = 1 602 0.488 0.500 608 0.489 0.500 
Age 583 43.139 13.711 608 43.250 13.552 
Household Size 576 5.080 2.199 608 5.057 2.189 
Education level 
      Some primary school 566 0.239 0.427 608 0.237 0.425
Some middle school 566 0.279 0.449 608 0.281 0.450 
Some secondary school 566 0.288 0.453 608 0.288 0.453 
Beyond secondary school 566 0.060 0.238 608 0.061 0.239 
Economic characteristics             
Pc expenditures 591 130.743 89.481 608 129.97 89.822 
Log leave-out means of           
 Pc exp of "good friends" 
reference group 506 4.877 0.375 608 4.872 0.382 
Pc exp of "trusted" 
reference group 504 4.914 0.305 608 4.910 0.321 
Pc exp of "receiving a gift 
from" reference group 543 4.902 0.326 608 4.903 0.329 
Pc exp of "giving a gift to" 
social network 538 4.905 0.317 608 4.898 0.330 
Hh assets of "good friends" 
reference group 506 7.760 0.748 608 7.747 0.780 
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Hh assets of "trusted" 
reference group 504 7.774 0.657 608 7.792 0.672 
Hh assets of "receiving a 
gift from" reference group 543 7.823 0.715 608 7.817 0.719 
Hh assets of "giving a gift 
to" social network 538 7.795 0.707 608 7.782 0.715 
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Table 4A.8: Ordered logit estimates of subjective economic welfare using data 
generated by chained multiple imputation 
Models 1 2 
 
Village 
reference 
groups 
Village and 
gender reference 
groups 
Demographic characteristics         
Female = 1 0.230 
 
0.241 
 
 
(0.215) 
 
(0.216) 
 Age -0.015 
 
-0.016 
 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.042) 
 Age squared 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Some primary school 0.401 
 
0.394 
 
 
(0.317) 
 
(0.319) 
 Some middle school 0.713 ** 0.680 ** 
 
(0.317) 
 
(0.321) 
 Some secondary school 1.185 *** 1.126 *** 
 
(0.330) 
 
(0.331) 
 Beyond secondary school 1.025 ** 1.023 ** 
 
(0.405) 
 
(0.417) 
 Household size 0.015 
 
0.016 
 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.057) 
 Economic characteristics         
Log pc exp 0.115 
 
0.107 
 
 
(0.196) 
 
(0.194) 
 Log hh assets 0.974 *** 0.972 *** 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.184) 
 Number of plots 0.152 
 
0.172 * 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.096) 
 Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village -4.391 ** 
  
 
(1.725) 
   Log leave-out mean of assets by village -1.614 *** 
  
 
(0.506) 
   Log leave-out mean of pc exp by village and gender
  
-2.501
 
   
(1.546) 
 Log leave-out mean of assets by village and gender
  
-1.050 ** 
   
(0.463) 
 Cut 1 -27.136 ** -13.663   
 
(11.977) 
 
(10.824) 
 Cut 2 -23.561 ** -10.115 
 
 
(11.961) 
 
(10.824) 
 Observations 582   582   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4A.8: Ordered logit estimates of subjective wellbeing using data generated 
by chained multiple imputation (continued) 
Models 3 4 
 
"Good friend" 
reference group 
"Trusted" reference 
group 
Demographic characteristics 
    Female = 1 0.232 
 
0.239  
 
 
(0.214) 
 
(0.214) 
 Age -0.014 
 
-0.013 
 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.041) 
 Age squared 0.000 
 
0.000  
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Some primary school 0.429 
 
0.361  
 
 
(0.319) 
 
(0.319) 
 Some middle school 0.754 ** 0.722  ** 
 
(0.321) 
 
(0.320) 
 Some secondary school 1.225 *** 1.182  *** 
 
(0.332) 
 
(0.331) 
 Beyond secondary school 1.069 *** 1.026  ** 
 
(0.275) 
 
(0.408) 
 Household size 0.017 
 
0.021  
 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.056) 
 Economic characteristics         
Log pc exp 0.172 
 
0.165  
 
 
(0.203) 
 
(0.197) 
 Log hh assets 0.203 *** 0.994  *** 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.184) 
 Number of plots 0.146 
 
0.141  
 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.096) 
 Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of "good friends" 
reference group -0.318 
   
 
(0.313) 
   Log leave-out mean of pc exp of "trusted" reference
group 
  
-0.775 ** 
   
(0.330) 
 Log leave-out mean of hh assets of "good friends"
reference group 0.031 
   
 
(0.161) 
   Log leave-out mean of hh assets of "trusted" reference
group 
  
0.351  * 
   
(0.186) 
 Village-level effects         
Pokrom -0.088 
 
-0.404 
 
 
(0.292) 
 
(0.305) 
 Oboadaka 0.690 *** 0.686  *** 
 
(0.252) 
 
(0.254) 
 Konkonuru 0.273 
 
0.503  * 
 
(0.258) 
 
(0.273) 
 Cut 1 5.906 *** 6.122  *** 
 
(1.991) 
 
(2.105) 
 Cut 2 9.495 *** 9.733  *** 
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(2.041) 
 
(2.152) 
 Observations 582   582   
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Table 4A.8: Ordered logit estimates of subjective wellbeing using data generated 
by chained multiple imputation (continued) 
 
Models 5 6 
 
"Received a gift from" 
reference group 
"Given a gift to" 
reference group 
Demographic characteristics 
    Female = 1 0.220  
 
0.228  
 
 
(0.216) 
 
(0.215) 
 Age -0.011 
 
-0.012 
 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.042) 
 Age squared 0.000  
 
0.000  
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Some primary school 0.348  
 
0.361  
 
 
(0.319) 
 
(0.320) 
 Some middle school 0.709  ** 0.705  ** 
 
(0.320) 
 
(0.321) 
 Some secondary school 1.165  *** 1.181  *** 
 
(0.333) 
 
(0.334) 
 Beyond secondary school 1.044  ** 1.048  ** 
 
(0.411) 
 
(0.408) 
 Household size 0.014  
 
0.014  
 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.057) 
 Economic characteristics         
Log pc exp 0.168  
 
0.174  
 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.201) 
 Log hh assets 0.986  *** 0.983  *** 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.184) 
 Number of plots 0.153  
 
0.153  
 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.095) 
 Relative deprivation measures         
Log leave-out mean of pc exp of "receiving a gift 
from" reference group -0.450 
   
 
(0.311) 
   Log leave-out mean of pc exp of "giving a gift to"
social network 
  
-0.510 
 
   
(0.313) 
 Log leave-out mean of hh assets of "receiving a gift
from" reference group 0.342  * 
  
 
(0.183) 
   Log leave-out mean of hh assets of "giving a gift to"
social network 
  
0.211  
 
   
(0.165) 
 Village-level effects         
Pokrom -0.323 
 
-0.230 
 
 
(0.294) 
 
(0.291) 
 Oboadaka 0.717  *** 0.713  *** 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.251) 
 Konkonuru 0.420  
 
0.378  
 
 
(0.272) 
 
(0.266) 
 Cut 1 7.673  *** 6.350  *** 
 
(2.164) 
 
(2.062) 
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Cut 2 11.272  *** 9.947  *** 
 
(2.222) 
 
(2.114) 
 Observations 582   582   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Conclusion 
My dissertation examines how social environments influence both decisions 
and subjective wellbeing. The dissertation has necessarily narrowly detailed which 
aspects of the social environment matter. However, without such details it is not 
possible to understand which – and by how much – the various factors of the social 
environment will matter for development policy, governance policy, programming, 
and interventions into the lives and livelihoods of residents of low-income countries. 
My findings indicate that it is not possible to separate an individual’s choices or 
perceptions from her social environment, and particularly not from the degree of 
inequality within her environment. Ignoring the effect of a social environment on 
individual behaviors results in only a partial understanding of what motivates 
individuals’ choices.  An omission of relevant aspects of the social environment is 
particularly consequential for studies of respondents in low-income countries, where 
social environments are highly variable both between and within countries. In this 
chapter, I discuss implications of findings from them for future research on the 
intersections of inequality, subjective wellbeing, community attributes and behaviors. 
In Chapter 2, using experimental evidence, we analyze how peer monitoring by 
community members shapes transfer choices in northern Kenya. Social norms of the 
sharing of food are more likely to be observed when peers monitor a respondent’s 
choice between cash and food. I find peer monitoring induces over 20 percent of 
respondents to choose the more socially optimal choice of food rather than cash. In 
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other words, when peers are observing choices, people are more likely to use the 
opportunity to build their reputations as norm-followers. Whether people choose food 
to “get credit” with their peers or to avoid social sanctioning later is an interesting 
avenue for future research. Thus, while the social norms of food sharing do not appear 
to be binding, the presence of peers does prime some people to choose the reputation-
enhancing transfer. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, my research aims to advance understanding of when and 
why Africans feel better or worse about their standard of living. There is an especially 
large void in understanding if and how individuals’ assessments of their own well-
being varies with others’ assessments and with policy-related variables such as school 
enrollment, health care, and physical security. In Chapter 3, examining subjective 
wellbeing for ten sub-Saharan countries, I find first that institutional attributes, such as 
the level of crime, affect the reported wellbeing of respondents. Second, inequality 
within spatially-defined reference groups matters for individuals’ perceptions of their 
lives. However, mean-measures for these same reference groups do not influence 
wellbeing, contrary to other studies. This may be because the spatially-defined 
reference groups are too large to be used as benchmarks for respondents. 
In Chapter 4, using micro-level data from Ghana, I turn to examining the 
sensitivity of subjective measures of economic welfare to reference group 
construction. Overall, I find that increases in mean per capita expenditures of 
respondent-identified social network reference groups are associated with 
improvements in individuals’ perceptions of economic wellbeing. However, the 
opposite occurs when we use economic characteristics spatially-measured reference 
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groups. In other words, when members of social networks comprised of trusted 
individuals or those have given the respondent a gift, the respondent feels better off as 
well. This indicates that individuals’ economic wellbeing is not only sensitive to 
reference group definition but also that reference groups likely play different roles for 
individuals. For example, those who are trusted or part of a reciprocity network may 
be more likely to assist the respondent. Thus, respondents may perceive these 
reference groups’ economic success as a greater source of support for the respondent 
in a time of need. 
Contribution 
By analyzing the ways that wellbeing and choices are related to understandings 
of social environments, including social norms, institutions, and reference groups, I 
show how the social environment shapes individuals’ lived experiences and their 
perceptions of their lives. Ultimately, failing to incorporate relevant attributes of a 
respondent’s social environment perpetuates a narrow, overly individualistic approach 
to understanding peoples’ motivations, choices, and lives.  
My first contribution is that in a social environment with strong social norms 
of sharing food transfers but not yet similarly developed norm for cash transfers, I find 
framing effects influence some respondents’ choices between cash and food. The very 
presence of community-members at a moment of decision-making is enough to change 
the relative worth of different transfers, one of which is indicates greater commitment 
to a community’s sharing norm than the other. Thus, the social environment acts as a 
direct influence on the likelihood of following established social norms of sharing.  
Second, my research using village-level data from Ghana shows that relative 
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deprivation is sensitive to its definition. My findings indicates that respondents do not 
treat all reference groups equally. Care should be taken when defining them. In 
particular, analyst-defined reference groups are more likely to result in feelings of 
relative deprivation compared to reference groups comprised of social network 
members. As a result, I move the relative deprivation debate away from whether 
relative deprivation is or is not universally experienced and refocus it toward 
identifying who should be included in reference groups.  
Third, and relatedly, I do not find consistent evidence of mean-based measures 
of relative deprivation. I do find some evidence of relative deprivation, particularly for 
analyst-defined reference groups. However, people tend to experience positive 
feelings of economic wellbeing when the financial situation of trusted members of 
their social networks or those who have given them gifts improves.  
Fourth, across several sub-Saharan African countries, I also find inequality 
statistically strongly adversely impacts wellbeing. Inequality-based relative 
deprivation may be a more universal phenomenon than previously recognized. One 
implication of my finding of inequality-based relative deprivation is that re-assessment 
of the broader question of inequality in development may be warranted. People not 
only do not assess their wellbeing in isolation from one another but also are adversely 
impacted by inequality. Chapters 3 and 4 lay the groundwork for understanding how 
reference groups and inequality shape key decision-making in politics, economics, and 
social life—questions I expect to address in future work.  
Future directions for research 
My contribution to the study of development in the coming years includes 
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articulating the relationship between subjective wellbeing and inequality, with an eye 
toward informing development assistance policy. Further, the relationship between the 
social environment and wellbeing is likely central to the ways that people make 
decisions about, adopt, and reject a range of livelihood choices. In future research I 
will seek to understand how decisions are influenced by wellbeing. 
First, I intend to examine the degree to which the ‘hedonic treadmill’ exists in 
low-income countries and what factors, if any, contribute to it, with a particular focus 
on attributes of the social environment. The hedonic treadmill has been used to 
describe the finding that people have a steady state of happiness, returning to the same 
or similar level of wellbeing over time, regardless of positive or negative life changes 
(Brickman and Campbell 1971, Helliwell and Putnam 2004).  Kahneman and Krueger 
(2006) argue that the hedonic treadmill may be better labeled the “aspiration 
treadmill” to reflect “if people gradually adjust their aspirations to the utility that they 
normally experience, an improvement of life circumstances would eventually lead 
them to report no higher life satisfaction than they did before, even if they were 
experiencing higher utility than previously” (p. 16). Nonetheless, much of the research 
on hedonic treadmills is from high-income countries. In rapidly changing low-income 
countries, do people become inured to improvements in their lives, or do they anchor 
their wellbeing to an earlier time, when life was substantially different? Findings of a 
hedonic treadmill would indicate that changes in policies to improve material 
wellbeing may have little impact on perceptions of wellbeing even as life has changed 
materially. Yet, my findings of the roles of inequality and the social environment on 
subjective wellbeing would seem to indicate that policy-related variables could very 
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much influence wellbeing. Thus, some work on whether the hedonic treadmill or 
relative deprivation dominates could be valuable.  
Second, and relatedly, in places where public services, public programs, or 
private insurance are becoming more commonplace, I would like to explore how 
decreasing uncertainty in individuals’ lives impacts their perceptions. My work has 
demonstrated that inequality within group outcomes matters for subjective wellbeing, 
but whether less dispersion over time in one’s own set of outcomes improves 
wellbeing is not yet known. A panel dataset that includes network information and 
(ideally changes in) resilience building / volatility smoothing institutions or activities 
could allow me to examine the effects of networks and alternative mechanisms of 
reducing uncertainty on subjective wellbeing while accounting for some of the 
heterogeneity across respondents. 
The existence of three waves of data for a subset of households in the Ghana 
data means that I may be able to undertake research on changes to income over time. I 
could compute the growth (or decline) in income, in assets, changes in family 
structure, etc. over the past decade for respondents who participated in multiple waves. 
By so doing, I could establish how the relative stability (or lack thereof) and/or growth 
of income, assets, etc. contribute to feelings of wellbeing. If own-economic stability is 
an important component in wellbeing, then I would expect to see people experiencing 
gyrations in assets (or income) over time report lower subjective wellbeing. By using 
panel data, I could include individual effects in order to address latent heterogeneity in 
wellbeing responses due to personality traits and/or genetic factors (Ravallion 2012). 
Using reference groups would allow me to compute the deviation in the respondents’ 
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own economic fortunes from the reference group average. This would allow me to 
estimate how a respondent’s wellbeing is shaped by whether her economic fortune is 
changing faster or slower then the assets of the reference-group. In villages with 
relatively little in or out-migration, this could provide insight into whether attributes 
from network-defined reference groups over time provide a recurring, updated 
benchmark or whether respondents limit their benchmarking against reference groups 
for a “snap-shot” of their current economic status.  
Third, identifying the roles that reference groups and institutional attributes 
and the amount of inequality within them has reinforced my interest in disentangling 
how differences in subjective economic wellbeing and observed economic condition 
may shape the decisions individuals make.  The gap between objective economic 
measures and subjective economic wellbeing is worth exploring because it can provide 
insights into what people feel and value, and therefore, ultimately, how people make 
decisions. While I’m not yet sure how to estimate this, one approach could be to 
estimate the difference between rescaled objective and subjective measures on an 
investment decision, for example, could allow for the examination of whether the 
degree of difference matters for how people make choices. If so, it could indicate the 
degree of cautiousness or confidence people feel about their objective economic status 
and would be a shift toward using wellbeing as an explanatory variable. 
Fourth, as people gain access to these services and institutions, social norms 
about what is appropriate to expect from one’s broader social environment and from 
one’s reference group change. Continuing to monitor the degree to which different 
social norms influence decisions in the face of rapidly changing social environments 
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can alert us to broader changes within a community.  
Fifth, Bookwalter and Dalenburg (2010) raise and discuss the possible 
problems that could result from individuals within a household reporting on a 
household-level measure of economic wellbeing. In the Ghana dataset, the subjective 
economic wellbeing questions ask both husbands and wives about the economic status 
of a household. In some households, husbands and wives report different levels of 
wellbeing, although there is no immediately discernable pattern as to whether men or 
women report higher or lower levels of economic wellbeing. The dataset includes a 
marital status module, which asks about trust, decision-making, etc. within a marriage. 
By creating a three category dummy: the same, men report higher than women, 
women report higher than men and including household fixed effects, I may be able to 
discern different intra-household level drivers of subjective economic wellbeing.  In 
this way, I may be able to unpack what the circumstances of the individual are within 
the household and how they influence his or her response. 
My research advances our understanding of when and why Africans feel better 
or worse about their standard of living and challenges some of the core assumptions 
on subjective wellbeing. I find evidence both that peers shape the choices people make 
and that social environment, including community attributes and (some) reference 
groups, influence life perception. In these studies, respondents do not experience 
positive externalities when comparing themselves to their reference groups. Rather, I 
find both social-network based relative deprivation and inequality-based relative 
deprivation. One important finding from my work on inequality is that examining 
inequality not just at the global level (e.g., across countries) but also at the micro-level 
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(e.g., within-reference groups) can enhance our understanding of the impact of 
inequality on peoples’ lives. My dissertation research thus lays the groundwork for 
future research developing more nuanced explanations of how perceptions of 
wellbeing influence the decisions people make, particularly related to participation in 
development, political action, and risk taking.  
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